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Abstract 
The argument of this thesis is that measures taken by international bodies to establish the rule of law in post-
conflict situations are undertaken in the mistaken belief that they will automatically enhance conditions for the rule 
of law to flourish. In fact, examination of the situation in Southern Sudan demonstrates that there is a wide 
disconnection between the measures pursued and the outcome of the process. This study will therefore inquire into 
the different meanings attributed to the concept of the rule of law in order to establish what the concept signifies in 
the context of statebuilding, with a focus on Southern Sudan. How does the theoretical understanding of the rule of 
law correlate with the legal and institutional measures taken by international organizations such as the United 
Nations and the African Union to build the effectiveness of the state in Southern Sudan? The study will further 
address issues such as what kind of state institutions are envisaged by rule of law reforms, together with the 
historical and theoretical imperatives which orient and drive the rule of law building process in post-conflict 
situations. The research is envisaged as a contribution to the debate on how to make ‘rule of law work on the 
ground’. It is hoped that if practitioners and policy makers take into account the findings of this study, their 
contribution to rule of law reforms in countries like Southern Sudan that have experienced protracted conflicts will 
not only achieve their objectives of reforms but also significantly improve the social and economic wellbeing and 
human rights protection of the people in whose name these reforms are pursued.    
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Introduction 
 
A. The statement of the problem 
Since the early 1990s, there has been a proliferation of legal and institutional measures 
undertaken by international organizations and other actors under the banner of promotion of the 
rule of law in countries emerging from armed conflicts. The main research of the thesis is to 
examine the conceptual understanding and application of the concept of the rule of law in the 
context of building a constitutional and institutional framework of democratic governance in 
South Sudan, a newly independent state that has emerged from armed conflict.  
 
The argument behind the thesis is that international measures taken to establish the rule of law in 
post-conflict situations are undertaken in the mistaken belief that they will enhance conditions 
necessary for the rule of law to flourish. However, closer examination reveals that there is a wide 
disconnection between the measures taken and the ensuing consequences. The disconnection 
stems from the fact that the concept is framed, understood, and applied in different contexts. 
For this reason, the thesis seeks to contribute to the conceptual understanding and application of 
the rule of law norms within the larger goal of statebuilding under a legal framework in which 
people have faith to guarantee their rights and advance their collective wellbeing as a society.  
 
The study will therefore inquire into the different meanings attributed to the concept of the rule 
of law, in order to establish what the concept signifies in the context of statebuilding, taking 
Southern Sudan (now the independent South Sudan) as a case in point. How does the theoretical 
underpinning of the concept of the rule of law correlate with the legal and institutional measures 
taken by international organizations, notably the United Nations and the African Union, to build 
the effectiveness of the state in South Sudan? 
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In considering this question, the study will address a wide range of issues such as what kind of 
state institutions are envisaged by rule of law reforms, together with the historical and theoretical 
imperatives which orient and drive the rule of law building process in post-conflict situations. 
Major problems or lacunae intended to be redressed by establishing the rule of law, and the 
reasons why this seems to be important, will be investigated and analyzed as well.  This will entail 
a consideration of the minimum attributes of the rule of law that are relevant to legal and 
institutional reforms pertaining to statebuilding. Which laws and institutions are targeted for 
reform, and on what basis? These questions are examined in detail in chapter six which examines 
institutions built to support the rule of law such as an independent judiciary and law and order 
institutions. When donors provide money to build the rule of law, what exactly are they 
promoting and for whose benefit? In other words, what kind of world do they want to see by 
investing a significant amount of their resources in the rule of law cause? All these issues inform 
the study in order to examine, for example, how rule of law reform can lead to building legal 
institutions such as an independent judiciary to underpin a state that is based on the rule of law. 
A question of fundamental importance is whether establishing the rule of law requires nothing 
less than the transformation of social norms regarding armed conflict and state power allocation, 
and whether international actors can succeed in ushering in a reconstructed, effective democratic 
state based on the rule of law?  
 
The setting in which this study is situated shows that there are international dimensions to the 
rule of law. It seems that the United Nations (UN) organization, inspired by its underlying 
principles and institutional architecture, is the largest and most influential international actor in 
the field of building the rule of law, with an unmatched capacity to disseminate the theme of the 
rule of law as an essential component of statebuilding. Alongside the UN, the African Union 
17 
 
(AU) is also considered as a regional organization that has a normative basis for promoting the 
rule of law and its application. In 2006 it adopted a post-conflict reconstruction policy with 
Southern Sudan as its major focus. Indeed the AU Constitutive Act of 2000, which establishes 
the AU, declares that the rule of law is one of its fundamental values among its principal 
objectives.  
 
For the sake of seeking clarity on the content of the rule of law, it is worth noting that the 
practice of the UN in promoting reforms based on the rule of law in post-conflict situations 
tends to equate human rights and the rule of law. In other words these two concepts are invoked 
synonymously, in the belief that they are two sides of the same coin. A critical examination of 
this claim is of some importance to this study, to establish how the rule of law is understood and 
applied in post-conflict contexts in which respect for human rights is a critical part of state 
building and reconstruction.  
 
An early writer such as Albert Dicey, to whom the origin of the concept is widely credited, while 
he wrote extensively on the rule of law was silent on the correlation between the rule of law and 
human rights. In fairness, the concept of human rights as it is known today did not exist during 
Dicey’s time; could it be that in coining the idea of the rule of law, Dicey had the same 
underlying concerns as those that are dealt with by human rights today? Clearly modern writers, 
jurists, and institutions with interests in the subject consider both the rule of law and human 
rights as essential to achieve collective human advancement.                      
 
But why should this study be concerned with the theme of the rule of law in the specific context 
of reconstruction of states emerging from conflict? The proposal to tackle the question of the 
rule of law in this regard arises because of the conceptual and theoretical belief of the 
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international community in the vital role of the rule of law in achieving effective institutional 
reforms to guarantee peace and stability in such states. Given these assumptions, this study will 
examine these claims in light of the international efforts undertaken to build the rule of law in 
Southern Sudan. The study will further address the legal dimension of the question of whether 
the rule of law as a juridical concept that historically developed, and is entrenched, in some 
Northern countries like Britain can successfully be replicated in other countries, especially those 
emerging from conflict,even though the latter countries have had little or no historical 
association with the concept as understood within the former’s context.   
 
The study aims to critically examine what constitutes a post-conflict situation and specific issues 
relating to the rule of law in this context. Under what circumstances or conditions can a given 
area be considered or identified as being in a post-conflict situation? For example, countries and 
regions with and without active armed conflict seem to be joined in international practice under 
the heading of a ‘post-conflict situation’. Yet there are significant differences between these two 
situations in terms of needs and challenges. In this regard, this study will attempt to critically 
examine the criteria or conditions that should be taken into account when considering a situation 
to fall within the ‘post-conflict’ category. This analysis is crucial because the way the term is used 
has practical implications for the kind of steps to be taken, and the context for doing so, in order 
to reconstruct states that are in a post-conflict situation. It is argued here that this clarification 
will contribute to deeper understanding of the rule of law in post-conflict context and how it can 
be translated from theory into practice.   
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While it can be argued that the conflict in Southern Sudan has ended, the implementation of the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) on which this peace and stability hinges is uncertain.1 
Some of its major components agreed upon by the parties have not been implemented, which to 
a great extent threatens the implementation of the whole Agreement. It is against this reality that 
this study will address the rule of law in Southern Sudan within a specific time frame after 
signing of the CPA, from 2005 to 2011. This timeframe was chosen because after this period 
Southern Sudan became an independent state separate from Sudan.           
 
B. Background of the study 
The idea to write this thesis was conceived while I worked at the Max Planck Institute for 
Comparative Public Law and International Law at Heidelberg in Germany as a Senior Fellow in 
the Africa Projects (Sudan and Somalia). During this period, I had extensive involvement with 
Sudan where I conducted training for judges and lawyers from different departments of the 
government.  
 
While in Southern Sudan, I was fascinated by a wide array of activities carried out by different 
international actors under the rubric of the rule of law. Different activities ranging from training 
of women for self-employment to training of local chiefs in dispute resolution in Rumbek, 
promoting health services for women in Yei, prison or classroom construction in Kapoeta, 
poverty alleviation programmes in West Nile, British Council-supported English language 
training in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, or legal training for lawyers and police in Juba, all these 
activities had something in common. They were being carried out as part of rule of law reforms. 
When I asked some local officials how these activities would contribute to their quest for a 
democratic society enshrined in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), few seemed to 
                                                 
1 For in-depth discussion of the CPA see chapter two.  
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understand the nature and objectives of these reforms. It was at this time that I made a decision 
to conduct an inquiry into the rule of law reform process.  
 
Perhaps it is important to explain why the research will focus on Southern Sudan. That country 
was an autonomous region within the sovereign State of Sudan until it voted for secession in 
January 2011. As will be shown in chapter two, the history of Southern Sudan is replete with 
examples of gross violations of human rights and total collapse of the rule of law. It is this state 
of affairs that compelled the UN and the AU as international actors to take measures to address 
these challenges. This research was therefore underpinned by the desire to examine the rule of 
law reform efforts undertaken by international actors to address these challenges within the 
context of Southern Sudan.  
 
The need to build and strengthen the rule of law has become arguably the primary focus of the 
international community’s engagement in Southern Sudan, given that it has emerged from 
protracted conflict and is still fragile. Nowhere is this challenge more critical than in post-conflict 
Africa where the majority of countries emerging from conflict have either very few rule of law 
institutions with their attendant norms and values or, in some cases, none at all. Consequently, 
the engagement of the United Nations and the African Union has become increasingly vital, and 
in some cases indispensable, to help address these challenges. For the African Union this role 
has become pressing owing to the protracted nature of conflicts in Africa and the ever expanding 
role of the organization which is being looked to by African countries to play a larger role in 
addressing continental problems in line with its newly adopted vision of ‘African solutions for 
the African problems’.2 
 
                                                 
2 John Akokpari et al. (eds), The African Union and Its Institutions, Johannesburg: Jacana Media, 2008. 
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This study does not intend to address the question of transitional justice in the context of 
Southern Sudan. The reason is that while gross violations of human rights and international 
humanitarian law were committed during the conflict, negotiators of the CPA did not include 
provisions for redress in the final peace agreement. While it is difficult to discern the reasons for 
their decision, it is evident that redress for past atrocity crimes would have not boded well for 
senior government officials both in the government and in the Sudan’s Peoples Liberation 
Movement (SPLM) under whose leadership these crimes may have been committed, and whose 
future role was key to successful implementation of the agreement. Because of this decision of 
negotiators to exclude transitional justice in the final peace agreement, this study will address the 
efforts to build the rule of law as envisaged in the CPA without specifically focusing on the 
question of transitional justice.   
 
C. Significance and contribution of the research 
The significance of this study lies in its potential to clarify the content and international 
application of the rule of law to statebuilding in the context of post-conflict situations. There has 
been a growing conceptual divergence in the theoretical conceptualization of the rule of law and 
its application in the context of statebuilding, and this appears to have had a negative impact on 
rule of law reforms. Different writers and institutions define the concept depending on how they 
want the definition to advance their claims. This study will demonstrate that different 
conceptions of the rule of law reflect several instantiations which would depict the ideal world of 
the rule of law in varying ways. The study questions the assumption that reforms instigated 
under the rule of law can automatically lead to stronger and effective legal institutions in post-
conflict contexts. The author sets out to demonstrate that the continued multiple usage of the 
concept of the rule of law has practical consequences on the lives of the beneficiaries. This is 
because some of the wide ranging actions under the banner of the rule of law not only cause 
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more harm to the people but also achieve goals that may have little correlation with the needs of 
those in whose name the actions are pursued.          
 
Crucially, the importance of this inquiry is its promise to critically unpack the normative content 
of the rule of law concept and examine mechanisms by which it can be translated from an ideal 
concept into a concrete value. This clarification is essential because any successful efforts to 
build the rule of law greatly depend on how the term is conceptualized and applied.  
 
In this regard, the study adds further significance by contextualizing the discussion in what the 
author characterizes as the two waves of rule of law transfer. The first wave in the 1960s and 
1970s is characterized by the ‘law and development movement’, which was an attempt by 
Western countries, especially the US, to build Western-type legal institutions in Africa to 
spearhead democracy and development. The second wave is a modern rule of law reform effort 
which is considered virtually to aim at all positive attributes of a Western liberal market state 
including democracy, corruption-free government, and commitment to human rights among 
others. Yet, both initiatives met a common fate. They both seem to have failed to attain their 
legal and economic objectives and both were originated internationally and undertaken by 
international actors with little or no consultation with local constituents. The contribution of this 
study is to examine what should be done differently, if the modern rule of law transfer is to be 
effective or different from the previous initiative under the law and development movement.  
 
D. Methodology of research 
Because of the nature of the study, its different components required a combination of different 
techniques. Primary data were obtained by way of field research and interviews in Southern 
Sudan. This was relevant to chapters two, five and six. The researcher visited Southern Sudan 
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several times in 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010. During this time he collected vital material relating 
to the functioning of major rule of law institutions in the country, including the Supreme Court, 
Court of Appeal and High Court. He also worked with judges of the High Court at the state 
level (in all ten states in Southern Sudan). This work provided him with access to material and 
firsthand experience of the rule of law challenges facing Southern Sudan. During the same 
period, the author had access to policies, material, and techniques developed by major national 
and international actors involved in promoting the rule of law reforms in Southern Sudan. These 
include the United Nations Development Programme, the United Nations Mission in South 
Sudan, the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and various 
national and international NGOs. The author’s engagement with these organizations significantly 
exposed him to their working approach and how they conceived and implemented rule of law 
oriented reforms.  
 
The author further conducted interviews with judges of the Supreme Court, the Registrar of the 
Supreme Court, and judges of the Court of Appeal and the High Court both at the central 
government level in Juba and at the state level. Interviews were also conducted with the chief 
advocate general of Southern Sudan, the head of the legal aid department, the head of the 
correctional services department, the office of the prosecutor general, the office of the Anti-
Corruption Commission, and the children’s department in the Ministry of Legal Affairs, among 
other high ranking officials and departments. The interviews were essentially conducted to find 
out how these officials and institutions approached rule of law reforms and addressed challenges 
that confronted them in the process. Interviews were conducted on a one to one basis. This 
approach was preferred because it gave an opportunity to the author to conduct interviews while 
witnessing the ‘reality on the ground’ at first hand. Further, the author avoided making use of 
questionnaires because of the risk that he would not obtain important information, given the 
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language barrier in the country where despite English being the official language, Arabic is still a 
language widely spoken and understood, and there are several African languages also. Face to 
face interviews were therefore preferred because they enabled the author to seek clarification or 
more information whenever it was warranted.   
 
E. Sources of research 
Four major sources were consulted in course of writing this work: 
(i) Major sources of international law were used in accordance with Article 38 of the 
Statute of the International Court of Justice: international conventions and treaties, 
international customs and general principles of international law. Further, the key to 
understanding the rule of law was Dicey`s original work on the rule of law as 
discussed in chapter one of this study, along with other theoretical studies.   
(ii) The study has made reference to the work of the United Nations organizations such 
as the UNDP and UNHCR in rule of law reform. It has also made reference to 
different reports of the Secretary General on rule of law reforms.3 Similarly, primary 
documents like the situational and analytical reports by the African Union Heads of 
State and AU Assembly Resolutions reports of the AU Peace and Security Council, 
decisions of the AU Post-conflict Reconstruction Committee, and various reports by 
the African Union Commission on the rule of law were analyzed. It has also made 
reference to sub regional instruments such as the SADC, ECOWAS and EAC 
Treaties and their subsequent protocols. 
                                                 
3 ‘Uniting our Strengths: Enhancing United Nations Support for the Rule of Law’: Report of the Secretary General, 
2006. For a comprehensive list of some treaties that have direct relevance to the rule of law see also, 
http://au.int/en/treaties. And www.unrol.org. Accessed March 2013. See also A/Res/60/180 & S/Res/1645 
(2005).  
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(iii) Lastly, this work drew upon significant experience of the researcher in the rule of law 
sector in Sudan, having worked in the region for some time. 
 
F. Structure of the thesis 
The thesis comprises seven chapters. Chapter one provides an in-depth discussion of the rule of 
law concept and how it is understood by different writers and institutions. It examines the 
content of this concept and how it is used by international actors to achieve their objectives in 
statebuilding. Since the concept has always been associated with different instantiations, the 
chapter identifies minimum attributes which it believes provide minimum benchmarks for the 
rule of law concept. The second chapter introduces Southern Sudan as the subject matter of the 
study and gives a historical account of the country and especially of how its constitutional history 
affected the development of the rule of law. The third chapter discusses the concept of self-
determination in international law in the context of Southern Sudan. This discussion is warranted 
by the fact that the historical struggle for self-determination in Southern Sudan was largely 
underpinned by the desire to build a society based on the rule of law and yet no sufficient 
attention was paid to discussing how such a society would be built once self determination was 
achieved. The key argument in this chapter concerns whether attaining self-determination 
automatically leads to a society that upholds the rule of law.       
 
Chapter four examines the law and development movement sponsored earlier by international 
actors, and its nexus to the modern rule of law reforms. Is there any correlation between the 
two? The chapter argues that for modern rule of law reform to succeed its promoters must learn 
from challenges encountered during the earlier initiative of the law and development movement. 
Since the study looks at the role of two major organizations, the UN and the AU, in building the 
rule of law, chapter five examines the legal basis for the involvement of these two institutions to 
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build the rule of law in a post-conflict context like that of Southern Sudan. The chapter looks 
not only at how these institutions conceive and implement rule of law reforms but also at the 
existing legal framework that guides their vision of the rule of law. Chapter six looks into how 
building an independent judiciary and law and order institutions can enhance the rule of law. The 
judiciary and law and order institutions were chosen because of the key role of an independent 
judiciary to guarantee fair hearing and protection of fundamental rights and freedoms through 
access to justice and equality before the law. The chapter also provides a detailed discussion of 
the role of the traditional justice system in enhancing the rule of law in Southern Sudan. The 
Thesis concludes with some recommendations and proposals for a way forward.  
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Chapter One  
 
I. The Rule of Law and Post-conflict Statebuilding 
 
A. Introduction 
This chapter introduces and analyzes the concept of the rule of law as a crucial component of 
statebuilding in countries emerging from conflict. The analysis of the concept of the rule of law 
will be situated in the context of Southern Sudan, a region which is just emerging from four 
decades of conflict and attempting to build its institutions of governance. By deciphering its 
potential use in statebuilding in Southern Sudan, this chapter examines whether the rule of law is 
a standalone juridical concept or part of an applicable framework of rules and practice. In other 
words, how and to what extent can the rule of law concept be useful in statebuilding where it 
underlines formal institutions with legal authority, such as an independent judiciary, a 
representative legislature and an accountable executive? 
 
This chapter first highlights the concepts of statebuilding and post-conflict situations in part one; 
part two examines the rule of law as a theoretical norm by analyzing various definitions advanced 
by scholars, judicial officers and public officials (bureaucrats) involved in the promotion of the 
rule of law. Part three discusses minimum attributes which manifest the rule of law in a given 
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society. Mindful of different descriptions of the rule of law concept advanced by different writers 
and institutions, in part four the chapter argues that the rule of law should be considered from 
the institutional as well as from a values approach, to ensure that a holistic understanding of the 
concept is achieved. Part five considers the rule of law as an export product by analyzing its 
nature and content as an exported product whose outcome is influenced by the law and 
development movement, which previously attempted to export the rule of law in terms of 
development. The last part provides a critical discussion on how minimum attributes can inform 
the rule of law as an export product. This part concludes by arguing that it is important to pursue 
and measure the impact of rule of law reforms on the basis of minimum attributes identified in 
part three of this chapter.  
 
Statebuilding has been defined by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) as purposeful actions to develop the capacity, institutions and legitimacy 
of the state in relation to an effective process for negotiating mutual demands between a state 
and its polity.1Statebuilding can therefore be considered as attempts to establish or re-establish 
and strengthen public structures in a given territory capable of fulfilling core functions associated 
with the state, such as guaranteeing peace and security to the citizens and providing essential 
services to them.2 The need for statebuilding emanates from state failure which can be 
considered as the failure of public institutions to deliver public services to the people, on a scale 
likely to undermine the legitimacy and existence of the state itself.3 
 
                                                 
1 Concepts and Dilemmas of State Building in Fragile Situations: From Fragility to Resilience, Paris: OECD, 2008, 
14.  
2 Armin Von Bogdandy et al., ‘Statebuilding, Nation-Building and Constitutional Politics in Post-conflict Situations: 
Conceptual Clarifications and an Appraisal of Different Approaches’, Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, vol. 
9, 2005, 580.  
3Ibid. 
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The key assumption behind statebuilding is that the task of transferring Western-type institutions 
and their attendant values to states that are perceived as failing is not a matter of whether but 
only of how.4 This narrative posits that statebuilding as a tool for society transformation can be 
attained as long as international actors improve coordination and cooperation, both underpinned 
by continued commitment of the international community to provide requisite resources to 
achieve these objectives.5 International actors assume that their role is to solve already identified 
local problems such as corruption, bad governance or disregard of human rights. Yet what is 
evident is that statebuilding as a tool of conflict transformation does not take place in a historical 
vacuum and does not involve consistent technical assistance beyond the duration determined by 
the funding imperatives of the donors.6 As argued by Chesterman, statebuilding is an attempt to 
mould non-Western states where these reforms are pursued into modern good societies 
compatible with governance, democracy and the rule of law.7 
 
Given that these reforms are pursued in the name of local people, it is important to question the 
role of local polities in the statebuilding process, to determine how their participation informs 
the process. It is argued that given the increasingly powerful role of international actors in 
determining what states complying with the rule of law, human rights or democracy look like, the 
reforms undertaken under the banner of statebuilding may not reflect needs and aspirations of a 
local polity, especially when its needs fail to align with the assumptions of international actors. 
Despite various assumptions underlying statebuilding, it is argued that when the concept is 
examined in the context of Southern Sudan it is evident that there has been a total collapse of 
                                                 
4Bliesemann Berit de Guevara, Statebuilding and State Formation: The Political Sociology of Intervention, Abingdon, Oxon.: 
Routledge, 2012, 1.  
5Ibid. 
6Ibid. 
7Simon Chesterman, You the People: The United Nations, Transition Administration and Statebuilding, Oxford; Oxford 
University Press, 2005.  
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public institutions which has greatly undermined the legitimacy of the state and hence justified 
the role of international actors to build these institutions. It is because of this reality that this 
research intends to explore these issues in light of efforts undertaken by international actors to 
build rule of law in Southern Sudan. 
 
The World Bank defines post-conflict reconstruction as support for transition from conflict to 
peace in a country emerging from armed conflict through rebuilding social economic framework 
of the society. Hence, for the Bank, post-conflict reconstruction has two objectives, to facilitate 
transition to peace and to support social economic development.8 In 1992, the UN Secretary 
General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in his Report Agenda for Peace conceived post-conflict 
reconstruction as efforts pursued to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into 
conflict, by rebuilding the institutions and infrastructures of states torn by civil war and strife and 
addressing causes of conflict such as economic despair, social injustices and political 
oppression.9His successor Kofi Annan in his report In Larger Freedom stressed an urgent need to 
build lasting peace in war-torn countries.10 In this Report Annan recommended the 
establishment of the UN Peace Building Commission whose mandate was inter alia ‘to marshal 
resources at the disposal of the international community to advise and propose integrated 
strategies for post-conflict recovery, focusing attention on reconstruction, institution building 
and sustainable development in countries emerging from conflict’.11 
 
It is not only institutions that have attempted to define post-conflict reconstruction; individual 
writers have also addressed the matter. For example, Jensen contends that post-conflict 
                                                 
8Steven Holtzman et al., Post-conflict Reconstruction and the Role of the World Bank, Washington, DC: The World Bank, 
2008, 13. 
9 Boutros Ghali, Agenda for Peace, United Nations: New York, 1992, para 21. 
10Kofi Annan, In Larger Freedom, United Nations: New York, 2005, para 15.  
11UNGA Res. 60/180/2005 and UNSC Res. 1645/2005. 
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reconstruction entails military and civilian activities conducted across the spectrum from conflict 
to peace to establish or maintain order in states or regions.12 Davis conceives post-conflict 
reconstruction as consisting of four clusters: guaranteeing physical security and a long-term 
process of reconciliation, rebuilding the country’s physical infrastructure, creation of sustainable 
self-government and social economic development.13 On his part Jeong posits that post-conflict 
reconstruction entails ‘a wide range of sequential activities, proceeding from ceasefire and 
refugee resettlement to the establishment of a new government and social economic 
reconstruction.14 However, there are some scholars who note that post-conflict reconstruction is 
not a straight forward process but should rather be patterned depending on the prevailing 
situation.15 
 
Examining these definitions advanced by scholars and institutions, it can be argued that the 
primary objective of post-conflict reconstruction is to build institutions of governance and an 
infrastructure for social economic development. And the aftermath of war provides an 
opportunity for international actors to implement these objectives of ‘moulding’ these societies 
into states compliant with human rights, democracy and the rule of law. However, as experience 
in Southern Sudan has shown, it is difficult to set a specific timeframe for post-conflict 
reconstruction, mainly because the length of the process depends on the availability of resources 
and commitment of international actors to continue their engagement. It is further argued that 
the timeframe depends on the prevailing conditions on the ground mainly because international 
actors cannot impose peace on people unless and until they are ready to peacefully coexist.  
                                                 
12Eric Talbot Jensen, ‘Post Conflict Reconstruction’, New England Journal of International and Comparative Law, vol. 14, 
2007, 35. 
13Peter Davis, Corporations, Global Governance and Post Conflict Reconstruction, Abingdon, Oxon.: Routledge, 2013, 25.  
14 Ho-Won Jeong, Peacebuilding in Post Conflict Societies: Strategy and Process, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2005, 1.  
15 Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations, Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006, 18.   
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A key question to pose, however, is when can it be determined with certainty that a particular 
conflict has ended? For example, parties to a conflict may have declared an end to a conflict and 
signed an agreement like the Sudanese Comprehensive Peace Agreement while small intensity 
hostility still continues within a country. For the sake of this research Southern Sudan is 
considered a post-conflict country mainly because the protracted conflict between the Sudanese 
government and the SPLM officially ended in 2005 with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement. While it is clear that Southern Sudan still faces complex security challenges, 
especially from within the country and from neighbouring Sudan, it is evident that the full-scale 
conflict witnessed prior to the signing of the CPA is not likely to erupt again. Indeed, 
international and regional efforts are underway to peacefully address these challenges.16Hence 
this research considers Southern Sudan as a post-conflict situation.  
 
B. Rule of law as a theoretical norm 
But why is it important for the purpose of this thesis to define the rule of law? Two reasons 
favour defining this concept: (i) the need to seek clarity on the concept itself and (ii) the necessity 
to spell out the ingredients of the rule of law to demonstrate that it is a viable juristic principle 
and not merely a vague political aspiration. The rule of law is both a legal and a constitutional 
concept, it carries the force of law, and it operates in diverse political and social contexts.17 
                                                 
16 The African Union Peace and Security Council continues to support the efforts of the AU High Level 
Implementation Panel on Sudan, chaired by Thabo Mbeki, former President of South Africa. The role of this Panel 
has been to facilitate negotiations relating to Southern Sudan`s independence from Sudan, including disputes over 
oil, security arrangement, citizenship, debt obligation and the common international boundary between the two 
countries. See the Panel`s Report December 2012 (PSC/PR/2 (CCCXLIX). 
17 Mortimer Sellers, ‘An Introduction to the Rule of Law in Comparative Perspective’ in Mortimer Sellers and 
Tadeusz Tomaszewski (eds), The Rule of Law in Comparative Perspective, Dordrecht, Springer Publishers, 2010, 4-9. See 
also Geoffrey Walker, The Rule of Law: Foundation of Constitutional Democracy, South Carlton, Victoria: Melbourne 
University Press, 1988, 2-12. 
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Further, the imperative of defining the rule of law is premised on the fact that its conception 
differs significantly from situation to situation. The question is, how different is it when applied 
in a post-conflict situation, or in developing or fragile states in general, in the context of 
statebuilding? For example, while international support for countries emerging from conflicts is 
characterized as ‘rule of law support’, similar support extended to developing and fragile states is 
characterized as support for ‘democratic governance or ‘deepening democracy’, the phrase 
commonly used by the United Nations Development Programme.18 
 
Despite the importance of defining the rule of law, there is no universal definition or agreement 
as to what the term ‘rule of law’ actually means, and there are indeed several different meanings 
attached to it.19 Albert Vienny Dicey, writing in 1885, advanced three features which collectively 
manifest as the rule of law. First, according to Dicey, there should be absolute supremacy of the 
law. This is opposed to the influence of arbitrary power and is demonstrated when a person is 
only punished for a breach of law in the ordinary legal manner before the ordinary courts of the 
land and nothing else. Second, there should be equality before the law of all persons and classes. 
This includes the government and government officials. Thus Dicey argues that every person, 
whatever his rank or condition, is subject to the ordinary law of the realm and amenable to the 
jurisdiction of tribunals. Third, and last, the rule of law requires full incorporation of 
constitutional law as part of the ordinary law of the land, not as a separate constitutional code 
which might be vulnerable to suspension in times of emergencies or at the whims of the rulers.20 
Reading these elements of the rule of law, it is clear that Dicey employed the concept as a 
                                                 
18Human Development Report 2002: Deepening Democracy in a Fragmented World, Oxford; Oxford University Press, 2002. 
19 For a conceptual analysis of the rule of law see Albert Vienny Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the law of the 
Constitution, 9th edn, London: Macmillan Publishers, 1945; John Rawls, Theory of Justice, Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press: Cambridge, 1971; Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1979, 210-229 and Lord Bingham, The Rule of Law, London: Penguin, 2010.  
20 Dicey, above note 19, 179-193. 
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description of the distinctive political culture in Victorian England, and did not speculate at 
much length on its normative implications.21  
 
For example, even if the rule of law were to be fully incorporated as in constitutional law as part 
of the law of a country, constitutions generally allow suspension of certain laws during 
emergencies, and it is in such periods that a government can appropriate to itself a wide range of 
powers to justify its actions even if such actions infringe or inhibit freedom and liberty of the 
people. What is crucial therefore is that before the suspension occurs there are strict institutional 
and legal procedures which are designed to minimize the possibility of abuse.  It can further be 
argued that, Dicey dislike of wide discretionary powers to public officials and institutions can be 
attributed to his fear that such powers might be abused by those entrusted with it hence his 
desire to see all English people protected by the rule of law. Indeed, his fear may have also 
emanated from the reality that in this period, officials and institutions in England had wide 
discretionary powers which could be abused at the detriment of the citizens.  
 
Decades later, to add to Dicey’s definition, the American political philosopher John Rawls sets 
out a general definition of the concept of the rule of law by giving three of his own precepts 
which, he believes, in their totality reflect the concept. First, Rawls argues that the actions which 
the rule of law requires or forbids must be of a kind which people can reasonably be expected to 
do or avoid. He further argues that the law must not impose impossible requirements and judges 
and legislators must act in good faith and belief that the laws can be obeyed and executed. 
Second, he argues that similar cases must be treated similarly, thereby limiting the discretion of 
judges and others in authority. It compels them to justify the distinctions they make between 
                                                 
21 Thom Ringer, ‘Development, Reform and the Rule of Law: Some Prescriptions for a Common Understanding of 
the Rule of Law and its Place in Development Theory and Practice’, Yale Human Rights Development Law Journal, vol. 
10, 2007, 190.  
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persons by reference to the relevant legal rules and principles. Third, every offence must be 
reflected in the law. This notion requires that laws must be known and expressly promulgated, 
that their meaning must be clearly defined, that statutes must be general in expression and intent 
and prospective rather than retroactive.22 
 
However, these elements stipulated by Rawls do not explain how the subjects of the law can 
limit the exercise of discretionary powers by those in authority. Rawls assumes that judges and 
legislators will always rely on their moral values to limit their discretionary powers, something 
which is unrealistic given the prevalence of dictatorship in different countries. In other words, 
this theory of Rawls can only be relevant in areas where the government acts in accordance with 
the will of the people. And it is only within the democratic context that the government can act 
in accordance with the will of the people.   
 
In his book The Morality of Law, the American Legal Scholar Lon Fuller identified so-called ‘vital 
elements’ or ‘canons’ which collectively constitute the rule of law. Fuller argues that in order for 
the rule of law to exist, laws must exist and be obeyed by all, be consistent, be written with 
reasonable clarity, published, prospective, general and avoid contradictions. He further argued 
that laws should not command the impossible and all official actions should be in conformity 
with law.23 Fuller labeled his canons the ‘inner morality of law’, suggesting that they are not 
simply conditions of efficacy of a legal system but moral requirements. He further argued that 
the practice of the rule of law limits the kind of injustice which governments can pursue. To him, 
law is the enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the governance of agreed rules between the 
citizens and the authorities. Examining features identified by Fuller, it can be contended that he 
conceived the rule of law as a critical component in advancing human dignity.  
                                                 
22 John Rawls, above note 19, 7-18. 
23 See generally Lon Fuller, The Morality of Law,New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969.   
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However, one can argue that Fuller confused a legal system with a good legal system, or 
minimum conditions of a legal system with the conditions of an effective legal system. 
Admittedly, these canons can make a legal system more efficient, but not necessarily morally 
good.24 For example, the fact that a law imposing tax is retrospective might infringe the rights of 
taxpayers, nevertheless it remains a law, and anyone not complying with it can be sanctioned for 
breaking the law. Similarly while a law sanctioning detention without trial may infringe on 
fundamental rights of citizens, it remains a valid law under which a person can be punished. 
These examples illustrate the reality that the law to be enforced need not necessarily be morally 
good as argued by Fuller. As argued by Raz (discussed below), rule of law may also enable the 
law to serve bad purpose contrary to Fuller’s assertion.   
 
Another influential scholar, Joseph Raz, in his seminal essays on law and morality argued that 
most of the content of the rule of law doctrine can be subsumed into two propositions, (i) that 
people should be ruled by the law and obey it and (ii) that the law should be such that people will 
be able to be guided by it. He argues that people can obey the law only if part of their reason for 
conforming is their knowledge of the law. The law must be such that people can find out what it 
is and act on it.25 Raz argues that the rule of law should not be confused with democracy, justice 
or equality or dignity of people, and considers these elements as the preserve of human rights 
which should be distinguished from the rule of law. Indeed, he argues that ‘the law may institute 
slavery without violating the rule of law’. As will be seen in this work, it is argued that 
compliance with the rule of law necessarily entails respect for the dignity of the person who is 
the beneficiary of the law in the first place. Consequently, if a state supports slavery, it breaches 
                                                 
24 David Luban, ‘The Rule of Law and Human Dignity, Re-examining Fuller’s Canons’, Hague Journal on the Rule of 
Law, vol. 2, 1, 2010, 32. 
25Joseph Raz, above note 19, 214. 
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its most basic obligation to ensure that each agent subject to its powers is equally regarded as a 
person capable of possessing legal rights.26 
 
Closely re-echoing the rule of law elements advanced by Dicey, Chesterman argues that the core 
definition of the rule of law consists of three elements. The first element is the supremacy of the 
law, which necessarily requires the state to refrain from the arbitrary exercise of power. The 
second attribute is that the law must apply to the sovereign and instruments of the state, with an 
independent institution such as a judiciary to apply the law in specific circumstances. The third 
and last element is equality before the law. He argues that law should offer equal protection 
without discrimination. For him, where these three elements – the supremacy of the law, equality 
before the law, and government bound by laws – are observed the rule of law is upheld.27 
 
Most recently in 2010, the British judge and jurist Lord Bingham suggested that the rule of law is 
a concept which requires that all persons and authorities within the state, whether public or 
private, should be bound by and entitled to the benefit of laws publicly made, taking effect in the 
future and publicly administered in the courts.28 Lord Bingham admits that his conception of the 
rule of law is not comprehensive, nor can it be universally applied without exception or 
qualification. Yet he argues that any departure from this conception of the rule of law calls for 
close consideration and clear justification by relevant bodies.29 
 
The question to pose here is, what has motivated the re-emergence of interest in the rule of law 
subject by jurists and scholars, as attested in the efforts of Lord Bingham? Is it because of fears 
                                                 
26 Evan Fox Decent, ‘Is the Rule of Law Really Indifferent to Human Rights?’ Law and Philosophy, vol. 27, 2008, 565. 
27 Simon Chesterman, ‘An International Rule of Law’? American Journal of Comparative Law, vol. 56, 2008, 15. 
28Lord Bingham, above note 19, 9. 
29David Luban, above note 24. 
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that it is being undermined by powerful states such as the UK or the US in their counter-
terrorism efforts? Or is it because of the perceived threat posed by fragile or rogue states? It can 
be argued that this interest is partly motivated by the desire and belief of jurists, judges and 
scholars who consider the rule of law essential for protecting human rights and general human 
advancement. Hence its advocacy not only within domestic legal systems but also at the 
international level.30Indeed it was on this basis that after the end of theCold War in the early 
1990s, international actors assumed the role of building the rule of law in the belief that such a 
process was key inpost-conflict state reconstruction.  
 
The Charter of the United Nations31in 1945 echoed the language of the rule of law in its 
preamble when it sought to ‘establish conditions under which justice and respect for the 
obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained’. 
Similarly, the preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 explicitly stipulated 
that ‘human rights should be protected by the rule of law’.32What is evident is that these 
international instruments have made a clear link between the presence of the rule of law and 
enjoyment of human rights.  
 
International human rights organisations have amplified this approach. In 1959 the International 
Commission of Jurists in its report made the connection between the rule of law and human 
rights by declaring the rule of law to constitute certain rights and freedoms, such as an 
independent judiciary and improved social, economic and cultural conditions conducive for 
human dignity. Similarly the International Bar Association, an institution extensively involved in 
the promotion of the rule of law worldwide, conceived the rule of law to consist an independent 
                                                 
30Andre Nollkaemper, ‘The Internationalized Rule of law’, Hague Journal on the Rule of Law, vol. 1, 1, 2009, 74-78. 
31 Charter of the United Nations, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. 993, entered into force 24 October 1945. 
32 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UNGA Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc A/810 (1948). 
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and impartial judiciary, due process of law, equality of all before the law and government bound 
by the law.  The views of such bodies matter because they have been at the fore in translating 
their vision of the concept into concrete results in different parts of the globe, thus combining 
rule of law activism with theory. Indeed, today many actors building rule of law institutions have 
sought to advance their activities on the basis of those institutions’ conception of the rule of law.   
 
Beyond scholarly writing we can also look towards legal precedent and practice as a way of 
understanding the concept of the rule of law. The Nuremberg Tribunal in 1946 identified 
important elements whose existence manifests the rule of law in criminal proceedings. The 
Tribunal asserted that the rule of law in the context of international criminal proceedings 
includes (i) the right of the accused to know the charge against him/her within a reasonable time 
before the trial, (ii) the right of the accused to the full aid of counsel and preferably counsel of 
their own choice, (iii) the right to be tried by an unprejudiced judge or impartial tribunal, (iv) the 
right of the accused to give or introduce evidence, (v) the right of the accused to know the 
prosecution evidence, and (vi) the general right to a hearing adequate for a full investigation of 
the case.33These manifestations of the rule of law in criminal proceedings are captured in 
international human rights law in which they extend to the requirement of a fair hearing by a 
competent, independent, and impartial tribunal.34 
 
However, as the debate on the precise meaning of the rule of law has progressed, the concept 
has attracted critics, especially academics who have argued that the term ‘rule of law’ has become 
so rhetorical that it is increasingly seen as no more than a shorthand description of the positive 
                                                 
33 ‘Principles of International Law recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of 
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aspects of any given political or legal system.35 Professor Judith Shklar argued that this 
expression may have become meaningless owing to ideological abuse and general over-use. She 
contends that the concept may have become just another one of those self-congratulatory 
rhetorical devices that grace the public utterances of Anglo-American politicians. She suggests 
that no intellectual effort needs to be wasted on this bit of ruling class chatter.36 
 
Echoing Shklar’s criticism, Tamanaha describes the rule of law as an exceedingly elusive notion 
giving rise to a rampant divergence of understanding and analogous to the notion of ‘the good’ 
in the sense that everyone is for it, but all have contrasting convictions about what it is.37 
Tamanaha further contends that some practitioners believe that the rule of law includes 
protection of individual rights, some believe that democracy is part of the rule of law,  while 
others believe that the rule of law is purely formal in nature requiring only that laws should be set 
out in advance in general, clear terms and be applied to all. He concludes by arguing that ‘there 
are almost as many conceptions of the rule of law as there are people defending it’.38 
 
Part of this criticism emanates from the belief that the concept is being invoked by different 
actors simply to justify certain actions in a given context. It is the way in which the concept is 
invoked that raises many questions as to whether the concept is a viable juridical concept worth 
pursuing. Nevertheless, despite this criticism by some scholars and practitioners, the 
international community has progressively attempted to find a ‘common language’ to serve as an 
all-encompassing tent for the rule of law activities.  
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In 2004, the then UN Secretary General Kofi Annan advanced a widely acclaimed definition 
which has been heralded by both academicians and practitioners as a new beginning for the rule 
of law.39 The Secretary General conceived the rule of law to be a ‘Principle of governance in 
which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the state itself, are 
accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently 
adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights norms and standards. It 
requires, as well, measures to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, equality 
before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in the application of the law, separation of 
powers, participation in decision making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and 
procedural and legal transparency’.40 This definition has been hailed because it is seen to include 
all positive attributes of a state that upholds the rule of law. 
 
In his definition the Secretary General transcends the fact that the rule of law is not so much a 
norm or a certain way of organizing a justice system, but a multifaceted cultural achievement that 
also includes certain values and practices in everyday social life as a part of governance.41 This 
definition has sparked a lively discussion within and outside the United Nations and in the 
process has accorded the concept a higher profile within the international community.42 
However, as this work will show, this conception of the rule of law by the Secretary General, 
despite its wide acceptance, is almost entirely aspirational because it lists items which would be 
                                                 
39 Stefan Bariga and Alejandro Alday, ‘The General Assembly and the Rule of Law: Daring to Succeed’? Max Planck 
Year Book of the United Nations Law, vol. 12, 2008, 382-387.  
40 See generally United Nations, ‘The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post Conflict Societies’, 
The Report of the Secretary General, S/2004/616, August 2004. 
41 Thomas Fitschen, ‘Inventing the Rule of Law for the United Nations’, Max Planck Yearbook of International Law, 
vol. 12, 2008, 347-380. 
42Ibid. 
42 
difficult to attain not only in a post-conflict context but even in countries enjoying political and 
economic stability such as Western developed countries. It is these difficulties that raise some 
questions on the practical application of this definition.43 
 
From the various analyses enumerated in this section we can identify three approaches to the 
concept of the rule of law. The first approach is that of various scholars and academics such as 
Dicey, Rawls and Raz who are largely interested in exploring the theoretical concept and general 
understanding of the concept. However, it should be emphasized that because of the nature of 
the theoretical context of these definitions, they may have little appeal to the practitioners 
involved in building institutional conditions that support the rule of law. The second approach 
entails the rule of law definition advanced by national and international judicial institutions or 
officials(such as the Nuremberg Tribunal orLord Bingham) who envision the rule of law concept 
as a legal norm which should be observed by all branches of government such as the executive, 
judiciary and legislature. The definition bythese institutions and officials is mainly shaped by the 
day to day experience of interpreting the law and maintaining international and constitutional 
order where the law is supreme and obeyed by all.  
 
The third approach entails what one may term as a functional or bureaucratic definition which 
has been advanced mainly by international practitioners (such as the UN, IBA and ICJ) seeking 
to make the rule of law a reality. This approach is essentially guided by the prevailing 
assumptions of what a society upholding rule of law looks like. It derives from the daily 
experience of institutions like the United Nations in building the rule of law and also the 
experience of the rule of law practitioners on what they imagine a society with the rule of law to 
be like. Among these three approaches, it is argued that the challenges lay with the last approach 
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advanced by practitioners. This approach tends to associate the rule of law with ‘all positive 
attributes’ of a liberal state, which essentially, one would contend,exist in some developed 
countries. The danger of this approach is that it is highly idealistic and ignores that localpolitical 
conditions in any context dictate how things work in practice.    
 
The debate above on various definitions of the rule of law raises an important question as to 
whether there is a direct link between the rule of law and the protection of human rights. Does 
efficient human rights protection depend on the rule of law? Critical analysis of the arguments of 
various scholars like Dicey or Raz would show that the rule of law is all about certainty of the 
law and government acting in accordance with the law of the land irrespective of the ideals 
advanced by that law. But this conception of the rule of law clearly fails to appreciate that laws 
exist to serve the interests and wellbeing of the subjects of a state. Indeed, as stated already, the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights clearly states that the rule of law is essential in advancing 
and protecting human rights.44Hence these two concepts (human rights and the rule of law) are 
intertwined, in the sense that enjoyment and advancement of human rights greatly depend on the 
extent to which the rule of law is upheld in a given society.  
 
For example, freedom of speech or movement will be meaningless unless there are institutional 
mechanisms created to secure them when infringed or violated. It is in recognition of this reality 
that the rule of law has become an essential condition through which to realize human rights, 
whether civil or social-economic rights.45 The absence of institutional conditions to advance the 
rule of law as understood in a democratic society46 allows human rights abuses to occur, because 
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there are inadequate legal restrictions on violent conflict or state abuse, or because the pre-
existing legal order condones such abuse. Thus one may argue that while human rights comprise 
the corpus of substantive rights accorded to each individual, it is only through strong and 
accessible rule of law institutions that these ideals of human rights can be secured.47Nowthis 
Chapter examines what may be considered minimum attributes of the rule of law.  
 
C. Minimum attributes of the rule of law concept 
From the different attributes and standards of the rule of law propounded by the previous 
scholars and institutions, to establish a general understanding of the concept and the ideals it 
embodies, these standards can be categorized as the institutions and values of the rule of law – 
that is, the qualities that inhere in the concept of positive law such as generality, certainty and 
stability of law on one hand, and institutional conditions for an effective legal order necessary for 
the protection and advancement of the rule of law on the other, such as an accessible and 
independent judiciary and judges or an accountable government. These standards are elaborated 
below:   
 
a. The rule of law requires that laws be relatively certain, clearly expressed, open, 
and adequately publicized.48 Distinction should be made between the publicity 
and availability of laws. In any given jurisdiction there are countless statutes 
which are enacted to regulate a wide range of activities, and so the authorities are 
required to ensure that these laws are widely available whenever anyone wants to 
make use of them or seek recourse to justice through them. The value of 
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promulgation renders the law transparent and open for public deliberation and 
criticism regardless of its functional aspects.49Further, a legal system should be 
internally consistent and coherent, so that laws do not conflict with each other. 
In addition laws should be prospective, sanctioning only behaviour which takes 
place after their enactment.50 
b. The rule of law further requires that substantive law be guided by the principle of 
‘normativism’, i.e. substantive law should possess characteristics of certainty, 
generality and stability.51 The law’s failure to create a predictable legal 
environment would amount to a double predicament: functional and moral. 
From a functional perspective, the law would fail to guide people’s conduct since 
it would undermine their ability to plan their activities in advance. And from a 
moral perspective, such a legal regime would manifest a profound disrespect for 
people’s freedom and autonomy because it might interfere with people’s 
legitimate expectations of the legal system.52Further, enactment of vague laws 
that may directly or indirectly infringe rights of the people should be avoided. 
This was acknowledged by Lord Diplock, a former member of the UK House of 
Lords, who in 1975 opined that ‘the acceptance of the rule of law as a 
constitutional principle requires that a citizen, before committing himself to any 
course of action, should be able to know in advance what are the legal principles 
which flow from it’.53 Under the rule of law the state commits itself to guarantee 
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all people under its sovereignty the possibility to foresee the legal consequences 
of both their own behaviour and that of the other social subjects they necessarily 
interact with. The specific contribution of the certainty of law is the possibility 
for all citizens to confidently take care of their own business and to claim their 
rights, with a good chance of success with respect to both their socialpeers and 
political authorities.54 
c. Closely related to legal certainty is that the rule of law presumes that a law is in 
place and manifests its content, particularly its consistency with international 
human rights standards, its supremacy in the hierarchy of power structure, the 
institutions and procedures for its implementation and enforcement, and the 
fairness with which it is applied in any given case. A system of government 
established under the rule of law connotes transparency of institutions, policies, 
practices and programmes that affect all aspects of life which are essential for any 
functioning society. Under the transparency principle, society at large is able to 
monitor a state’s compliance with its obligations.55This observation contrasts 
with the arguments of scholars like Joseph Raz who argue that rule of law should 
be distinct from human rights.  
d. The rule of law also must mean freedom from public lawlessness and anarchy. It 
calls upon the government to be bound by substantive law not only by the 
constitution but also, as far as possible, by the same laws as those that bind its 
individual citizens.56Admittedly, the government can allocate itself power to 
impose arbitrary laws such as discriminatory taxation or declare a state of 
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emergency, the arbitrary conduct by the government against an individual is an 
exception to the rule of law.57The government cannot claim that it is advancing 
the rule of law if it is breaking the very tenets of the rule of law it claims to 
uphold.  
e. The rule of law further presupposes that all individual subjects should be equal 
before the law. Subjective situations falling within a given legal framework are 
treated alike, namely in the light of the same normative principles and in 
accordance with the same rules.58 This observation is well captured by the 
International Commission of Jurists which contends that ‘the essential value, 
however of insisting on equality before the law lies in the necessity that it places 
on the legislature to justify its discriminatory measures by reference to a general 
scale of moral values’.59 Equality before the law and non discrimination-are thus 
the opposite of arbitrariness, and in spite of the difficulty of their interpretation, 
lie at the root of the rule of law. 
f. An independent judiciary is another vital feature of the rule of law. But what is an 
independent judiciary and why does it matter? An independent judiciary means 
the existence and operation of a judicial system capable of dispensing justice 
without fear or favour and free from influence whether political or otherwise.60 It 
matters because an independent, effective, and least corrupt judiciary plays an 
important role in promoting the rule of law in any given society, by restoring 
faith of the public in institutions exercising public authority. It also reflects the 
judiciary’s role in ensuring the lawful exercise of public powers by members of 
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the legislative or executive branches of the government.61 Impairing judicial 
independence undermines confidence in the courts as a dispute settlement 
mechanism because it can threaten the stability, and eventually the existence of 
the social order. Judicial independence is also ensured by the inherent jurisdiction 
of the court to punish contempt of court and to make any orders necessary for 
the preservation of the subject matter of the suit or otherwise enabling the court 
to perform its function. While the rule of law requires that judges must be 
independent, they must also be bound by law. Their function is to interpret the 
law and the fundamental principles and assumptions that underlie it.62 
 
Closely related to the independent judiciary is the presence of an independent 
and responsive legal bar association which can play a crucial role in producing 
access to justice, especially for the poor. The role of an independent bar in 
enhancing the rule of law is well captured by Justice Khanna of the Supreme 
Court of India, who observed that ‘there can indeed, be no greater indication of 
decay in the rule of law than a docile bar, a subservient judiciary and a society 
with a choked or coarsened conscious’.63 
g. To establish a state that abides by the rule of law, the standards for individual 
protection must not only exist but also include reliable, accessible and timely 
enforcement of rights.64The rule of law requires that there must be an existing 
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constitutional commitment or international obligation to guarantee individual 
rights, granting their holders the power to claim them on a judicial level whether 
against their fellow citizens or the state and its organs.65 To support the rule of 
law means advocating the protection of individual rights as the primary aim of 
both legal and political institutions.66 The true source of the values of the rule of 
law, even in countries with written constitutions and stable democracy, is 
reflected in the patterns of behaviour and belief of the people and their 
representation by the institutions of the legal system.67 
h. The rule of law requires a general congruence of law with social values. Where 
the law consists solely of recognized customs, all that is needed is a willingness 
on the part of the courts to give due recognition to new customs as they become 
established and displace the old ones.68Yet, it should be acknowledged that it is 
not the laws on the book which measure the law’s success in guiding human 
conduct, but its application in practice. The application mechanisms of the law 
are therefore crucially important in determining law’s success or failure in 
fulfilling its putative functions.69However, it is essential that the social values in 
question should be consistent with human rights standards.For example, while  
the African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights was keen to reflect African 
values such as an individual obligation to one`s family and community, it 
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nevertheless ensured consistency with universal human rights which recognize 
individual rights and freedoms.  
i. The rule of law depends on the existence of a government capable of enforcing 
law and order. This aspect is crucial precisely because law and order are central to 
the popular understanding of the rule of law.  It is essential in protecting the lives 
and property of citizens, and is a prime way of protecting the human rights of the 
poor and other marginalized populations who often face the greatest threat from 
a lack of security.70 Without this enforceable reciprocity law cannot operate as a 
restraint on power. Law enforcement traditionally has been confined within the 
purview of the executive but the executive also has to be subject to the law. 
Government officials must be amenable to criminal prosecution and effective 
civil remedies must be available for persons adversely affected by unlawful 
government acts.   
 
It is argued that these minimum attributes represent qualities inherent in the rule of law and the 
institutional conditions which augment the rule of law. Consequently, where they are observed 
and advanced, they connote the minimum standards for the rule of law. It should be noted that 
the quest to craft minimum standards emanates from the need not necessarily to come up with 
the definition of the rule of law concept, but rather to build clear benchmarks or standards 
which should serve as a mark of applicability to those with an interest in the advancement of the 
concept both from theoretical and practical perspectives. In the following section, the chapter 
provides an analysis of both the institutional conditions necessary to advance the rule of law and 
the values or qualities which inhere in the rule of law.  
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D. Towards a common understanding of the rule of law 
An approach to the rule of law informed by an understanding of, or at least sensitivity to, the 
dynamic nature of institutional interactions needs to be at the centre of any such efforts to better 
understand the concept.71 The rule of law may not be a single concept at all:rather, itcan be 
considered a system of principles that relate to the legal governance of society, but not itself 
primarily a legal system. The rule of law anchors and stabilizes legality without freezing the 
conception of any given state. It allows change and adaptation of the law with changes in legal 
practices.72 Indeed this assertion was well articulated by the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) when it stated that ‘the rule of law does not mean merely a 
formal legality which assures regularity and consistency in the achievement and enforcement of 
democratic order, but justice based on the recognition and full acceptance of supreme value of 
the human personality and guaranteed by institutions providing a framework for their full 
expression.’73 
 
Consequently, if the concept entails institutional safeguards on one hand and values or qualities 
which are augmented by these institutions on the other, then it is desirable that conditions which 
dictate success or failure in the application of these norms should be examined in depth. 
Admittedly, this categorization does not answer the fundamental question as to why rule of law 
reform succeeds in some countries and fails in others, but it can shed light on what conditions 
reflect and sustain the rule of law. The desirability of relating the rule of law institutions and 
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values is reinforced by the reality that ends and means to secure the rule of law are closely 
interlinked. For example, successful access to justice will greatly depend on the institutional 
strength of the judiciary and its judges, while proper guarantee of the right to fair trial will not 
only depend on the stability and generality of statutory laws but also on the effectiveness of the 
prosecution, correctional services and police departments. Similarly enjoyment of fundamental 
rights and freedoms do not depend only on their entrenchment in the constitution but also on 
the kind of institutions created to secure them.  
 
i. Constitutional and institutional approach 
This approach is more concerned with building or creating a constitutional order under which 
independent and effective institutions can be established, an order capable of not only 
commanding the faith of the people but of guaranteeing and acting in their interests as well. For 
example, it requires the building of an independent and accessible judiciary which can impartially 
adjudicate disputes among people, and also an effective government to maintain law and order to 
guarantee security for the citizens and their property as discussed in chapter six. It is worth 
noting that although most scholars define the rule of law by its ends, most ‘rule of law 
promotion’ programmes implicitly define the rule of law by its institutional attributes.74 This is 
because, unless there is a mechanism in place to implement the requirements of the law to serve 
the interests of those it was created to regulate, it will be meaningless. However, it should be 
carefully noted that while all these institutions exist in most countries, albeit in different forms, 
how they facilitate and respond to the needs of citizens greatly differs. The mere presence of a 
police service or a judiciary is not enough to determine that a particular society upholds the rule 
of law; it clearly depends rather on how those institutions respect and promote individual rights. 
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Creating the rule of law requires, in addition to strong institutions, credible commitments that 
protect those institutions and ensure their sustainability. Institutions should be impersonal, in the 
sense that their functioning does not depend on the idiosyncrasy of individuals and is not 
affected by replacement of the individuals who have to act in accordance with its rules.75 The 
element of sustainability is reinforced by the fact that the rule of law concerns not only what the 
law is today, but also what it will be in the future. In particular, it is concerned with its continued 
ability to guide with certainty the day to day actions of those subject to the law. Creating a state 
that honours the rule of law today as well as tomorrow requires institutions with two 
characteristics. First, they must commit the state (both politicians and bureaucrats) to honouring 
of agreed rules and rights. Second, they must commit all major players in society to respect the 
constitutional rules. But how can politicians and those in authority commit to respect for the 
law? It comes down to the power of the law to regulate and restrain activities of all citizens, and 
also the ability of institutions like the judiciary to carry out their functions without interference.76 
 
Despite the importance ofinstitutional conditions in safeguarding the rule of law, it is 
nevertheless argued that, if the rule of law is considered from the institutional perspective alone, 
it could survive even under a military dictatorship or in non-democratic countries. The existence 
of institutional conditions that manifest the rule of law in any given society cannot be measured 
by the presence of rule of law institutions alone in isolation from the values that underpin them. 
A holistic approach that incorporates values or qualities should be adopted when analyzing 
general conditions which manifest the rule of law in any given context.   
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ii. Values approach 
Values or qualities inherent in the law such as stability, generality and certainty are relevant in so 
far as they are inherent in the institutions that support the rule of law. Yet, unless the dominance 
of these values within a given legal system is clearly established and vindicated through law 
administered by independent institutions, the rule of law cannot be considered to exist. For 
example, even an impartial and efficient judiciary cannot be of value in and of itself if a society 
never had a dispute to resolve.77 Rather it is of value because it is believed that such a judiciary 
will enable disputes to be resolved efficiently and without recourse to violence. This will create 
predictability and will provide a source of case law for similar cases. It is these ends, among 
others, that compose the intrinsic goods that the rule of law brings.78 However, it is critical that 
social values conform to international human rights standards. For example, while constitutions 
in Islamic contexts tend to reflect the social values of these societies, it is evident that some of 
these values are inconsistent with universal human rights norms. An independent judiciary must 
therefore guarantee equality of all citizens, especially marginalized groups such as women, 
children and persons with disabilities,before the law, and equal access for all.  
 
Whether the rule of law can be said to exist or not in a given society is largely reflected in the 
commitment displayed by the society concerned, not only in the creation of institutional 
conditions such as an independent judiciary to support the rule of law but also in defending the 
values for which these institutions stand. For example, to ensure the independence of the 
judiciary it is necessary to examine how the requirements for an independent judiciary are met, to 
what extent judicial decisions are given without external or internal influence, the extent of 
executive involvement in the work of the judiciary, access to courts by the downtrodden in the 
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society, and the way judges decide their cases. What is crucial is that the judiciary should be 
independent and able to effectively guarantee enjoyment of fundamental rights of all citizens.  
 
In the introductory chapter one of the questions raised was, how can values which augment the 
rule of law be translated into concrete results? This question is relevant considering that the 
absence or presence of the rule of law has a direct implication in the lives of the people. It was 
further questioned whether international actors such as the donor countries or organizations 
involved in building the rule of law can successfully compel local authorities to comply with or 
nurture rule of law values as espoused by the former.It is argued that this task requires both 
international actors and domestic beneficiaries to articulate the same language as to what should 
constitute the rule of law. There must be an acknowledgement that the only means of 
establishing the rule of law is through state based enforcement structures, and that upholding the 
rule of law is a core state function that can only be delivered by a functioning state.    
 
Having an excellent constitution reciting all international human rights instruments within itself 
cannot guaranteea state compliant with the rule of law. Rather, how these ideals are respected 
and enforced in the day to day lives of the people will reflect commitment to the rule of law and 
human rights. The definitional confusion, or lack of a definition consensus, stems from the 
attempt to treat the rule of law as a single discrete concept, rather than as a label which could be 
applied to a number of models lying at various points on the power-law spectrum.79 
Approaching the rule of law on the basis of both the institutional conditions and the values or 
qualities they are intended to achieve within a society provides more clarity and will help focus 
practice on the means and end goals of the rule of law. In other words, the rule of law concept 
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cannot be considered strictly as a legal concept without taking into account the qualities that 
inhere in the concept itself.80 
 
Can institutional conditions of the rule of law can exist or survive in an autocratic or 
authoritarian state? For example, countries such as Myanmar,81 North Korea,82 
Afghanistan83andSudan84 have been condemned by both international organizations (the UN 
General Assembly ortheUN Human Rights Council) and individual countries (US and Britain) 
for not respecting the rule of law. Yet some of these countries have institutions which 
collectively develop the rule of law, similar to those existing in countries that are making the 
condemnation and consider themselvescompliant with the rule of law.  
 
Most of the elements that presuppose commitment to the rule of law, such as constitutions 
setting out rights and duties of citizens, or a judiciary to determine disputes among the people, 
do exist in these countries just as in countries that claim to uphold the rule of law. Admittedly 
these institutions are different in terms of their effectiveness and ability to protect individual 
rights, but these differences exist globally even among and within countries considered to uphold 
the rule of law. For example, in Apartheid South Africa in 1986 the judiciary struck down 
government emergency legislation which the court argued was inconsistent with the rule of law.85 
Yet it was clear that South Africa was a country whose legal system was premised on 
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discrimination among its citizens. It is therefore not enough for laws to exhibit stability, 
generality and certainty, in addition these laws must comply and protect fundamental rights and 
freedoms so that those supposed to abide by them can rely on them with expectations that they 
will be capable to address their grievances and protect them. 
 
E. The rule of law as an export product 
Having examined the minimum attributes which can collectively be considered as augmenting 
the rule of law generally, one may wonder whether the norms that augment the rule of law can 
be successfully exported from one country or society to another. This question is posed in light 
of the ongoing attempts by international actors to build the rule of law in post-conflict countries. 
These actors are guided by the assumption that countries emerging from conflict lack adequate 
institutional conditions to promote the rule of law, and that it is through international support 
that they can create the necessary environment to promote the rule of law. In other words, can a 
society considered to uphold values of the rule of law successfully transfer its rules and values 
which have served it well to another society? This question is pertinent especially when 
considered in light of the prevailing belief of rule of law reformers who view post-conflict 
society and developing countries in general as incomplete versions of developed states, that is, as 
lacking essential ingredients of developed society in the Western world.86 
 
The argument of those champions of the rule of law has been that if, in particular, developing 
countries and post-conflict societieswant genuine economic and social progress, they must 
commit to the rule of law as understood and previously experienced by the Western developed 
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world.87 However, the reformers neither define the ‘developed society’ nor articulate how the 
rule of law can lead to a ‘developed society’; rather it is taken as self-evident. It is partly on the 
basis of this belief that the rule of law has witnessed a resurgence of international and 
supranational organizations as actors in their own right, together with a countless number of 
NGOs advancing their own causes by pushing, challenging and monitoring states to comply with 
the values and the institutional legal order which collectively manifests the rule of law as 
understood in the Western context.88 
 
If the concept of the rule of law can be exported from one society to another, then it is worth 
asking, what kind of the world is imagined by the exporters? And what are the theoretical and 
historical imperatives that drive the process? It is argued that international actors have different 
assumptions which underpin their involvement in building the rule of law. For example, the UN 
presupposes that any society emerging from conflict, in order to achieve peace and stability and 
enjoy human rights, can only do so with firm commitment to the rule of law.89 So the UN`s 
involvement in building the rule of law is partly motivated by the need to promote human rights 
and access to justice, peace and stability which are considered vital for human progress. Similarly, 
the efforts of international financial institutions such as the World Bank, while they argue that 
their primary interest in promoting the rule of law is to address corruption and venal governance, 
both considered detrimental for achieving sustainable development, are evidently geared towards 
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advancing their core interests in promoting free market economies and investment 
opportunities.90 
 
Collectively, institutions involved in building the rule of law assume that societies committed to 
the rule of law enjoy peace and stability, economic development, and accountable government 
which upholds human rights and democratic ideals, that they have an independent and impartial 
judiciary and, in general, a society premised on justice and equality and a favourable investment 
climate. Even then, there is little evidence to back up the assumption that establishment of the 
formal dimension of the rule of law will lead reliably and predictably to the emergence of a 
robust societal commitment to the more substantive aspects of the rule of law necessary to 
realize these assumptions as imagined by these international actors.91 
 
Furthermore, it is pertinent to inquire into the motive of those involved in building the rule of 
law institutions in other countries. Rule of law promotion is an activity undertaken by agents in 
one set of countries but conducted in another set of countries, such that it is neither mandatory 
nor aninteraction of the equals. So why do countries not affected by strife decide to promote the 
rule of law in those that are affected by strife or have emerged from it? It is argued that there are 
multiple considerations involved in export of the rule of law from one country to another by 
different actors. For example,since the breakdown of the institutions of governance in any given 
society may lead to transboundary insecurity, flow of refugees to neighbouring countries, and 
safe havens for terrorists or a sanctuary for rebel movements destabilizing other countries, 
assisting countries to overcome these challenges within their own borders may work in the 
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broader interests of the neighbouring countries and international community at large. It is on this 
basis that prevention forms an integral part of the concept of responsibility to protect 
populations from mass crimes. As acknowledged by the United Nations, the failure of state 
institutions anywhere in the world weakens the protection of every state against transnational 
threats such as terrorism and organized crimes. Hence addressing these challenges is presented 
by international actors as a matter of necessity rather than choice.92 
 
Increasingly, the global war on terror and security continues to define and underpin global 
perspectives on building the rule of law in post-conflict contexts. This raises the question of 
whether the rule of law is a ‘neutral term’. From Somalia to Afghanistan both the European 
Union and the United States, arguably the largest donors to the rule of law promotion cause, 
consistently justify their involvement in these countries by the need to build rule of law 
institutions to address insecurity challenges emanating from terrorist groups based in these 
countries.93However, despite these pronouncements the plight of ordinary Afghans or Somalis 
rarely features in their considerations. From this it can be argued that the export of the rule of 
law is not something done primarily to help common people in these countries, but is commonly 
conceived and undertaken to advance and protect interests of donor countries.94 Admittedly, 
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local populations may benefit from these activities because of improved security and rule of law 
institutions built in the process. Yet, there is a danger that this ‘spillover effect’,if it comes from 
activities undertaken by external actors without engaging the locals, may not reflect the needs 
and aspirations of the people in these countries, rather may end up causing more instability than 
the stability it seeks to bring.  
 
The export of the rule of law has not been limited to export by the developed Western countries 
to Africa; similar examples may be found elsewhere,indeed Kosovo is a case in point.95 The 
European Union has invested heavily, both financially and technically, in supporting the rule of 
law reform programmes in the area, yet rule of law challenges such as corruption and insecurity 
persist.96 An example of how international actors become preoccupied with the desire to 
‘remake’legal structures in post-conflict societies akin to those in their own countries is 
exemplified by the remarks of the former UN Special Representative to Kosovo, General 
Steiner, who stated that ‘We want the rule of law instead of the rule of the jungle. We want to build 
here a civil society  after the model we see everywhere in the rest of Europe……. if one wants to join the club 
of European democracies one has to accept the fundamental rules……and part of the 
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fundamental rules is the rule of law’.97 It is this kind of vision that raises a question as to whether 
the legal system of a particular country can be transformed from outside by international actors 
to reflect the rule of law as understood by other countries without taking into account their 
practical and peculiar challenges.  
 
But the major questions on rule of law export are: can it, and should it be done? Before 
answering these questions, it is useful to examine who should be the exporter and importer of 
the rule of law. Normally in post-conflict society the rule of law importer is the society 
concerned, emerging from conflict, while the exporter tends to be the international community 
through multilateral organizations like the United Nations, the World Bank, donor organizations, 
regional organizations, non-governmental organizations or individual countries through bilateral 
assistance and cooperation. However, the perennial governance challenges facing post-
conflictsocieties in their quest to build the rule of lawcast a shadow of doubt, despite substantial 
resources devoted by donors to the cause, on the effectiveness and sometimes on the relevance 
of the exercise itself. This is true especially when societies emerging from conflict slide into 
violence againafter a short spell of time, despite substantial help to build rule of law institutions 
provided by donors.98 
 
Underlying rule of law export is a fairly completebut undefined vision of what society is and how 
it should look in the eyes of the exporters. The goal is not simply to construct or reform 
institutions, it is to actively reform the way people in these societies behave and inculcate ideals 
about how the state should be sustained. Several assumptions are made, such as corruption being 
detrimental to good governance and the private sector being good for free market advancement, 
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in the cause of enabling the poor to fully engage in economic activities. Yet, these actors hardly 
articulate a mechanism for creating the right environment to enable the poor to participate in the 
realization of these positive values and desires associated with the rule of law. The idea that if the 
poor participate in the free market economy it will improve their wellbeing is treated as self-
evident, without examination of how this participation will be achieved, or admission of 
empirical evidence of its failure in many cases.    
 
The rule of law as an export product faces a myriad challenges because the ‘goals’ of the rule of 
law keep on expanding, depending on the actors involved in the export process. For example, 
while the rule of law was originally associated with an independent judiciary or a certain and 
predictable legal system, increasingly it is considered vital for encouraging investment, achieving 
good governance, strengthening civil society, promoting human rights, fighting impunity, 
combating corruption, and justifying action against terrorism, among many elements. From this 
narrative, the rule of law has come to be interpreted differently, to achieve a wide range of 
objectives. Increasingly, in some Western countries, war is considered as an opportunity to 
‘remake’ states in the image of rule of law compliant states. Civil societies in these Western 
countries are confronting expanded powers of governments to limit civil liberties in the name of 
preserving the rule of law.99 Yet, in post-conflict countries and other developing countries, 
similar legislation which limits the enjoyment of civil liberties is justified in the name of 
                                                 
99 For example, when President George H.W. Bush announced the start of the Gulf War in 1991 he stated that ‘we 
have before us the opportunity to forge for ourselves and for future generations a new world order – a world where 
the rule of law, not the law of the jungle, governs the conduct of nations’. See speech to Congress 6th March 1991. 
The Japanese Minister of Justice claimed that capital punishment is vital to preserve the rule of law in Japan 
Available: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/feb/21/japan-executions-resume-three-hangings. And Louise 
Arbour, regarding the rule of law, has noted that ‘do gooders and democrats try to convince dictators to improve 
rule of law while repressive regimes refer to the rule of law as they crackdown on dissent in their countries’. See: 
‘The Rule of Law’ available: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/27/opinion/UN-general-assembly-on-the-rule-of-
law.html?_r=0. Accessed March 2013.  
64 
advancing the rule of law. The concept of the rule of law is assumed to cover a wide range of 
elements that are increasingly becoming difficult to analyzeso as to determine whether it can be 
achieved within the prescribed context by international actors.   
 
Despite the ongoing activities by international institutions and donor countries to build the rule 
of law in post-conflict contexts, these actors have dismally failed to actively engage and integrate 
the needs and aspirations of the presumptive beneficiaries in what they conceive and understand 
to constitute the rule of law. For example, despite rule of law actors being against centralization 
in any context, the programmes undertaken by these institutions to achieve the rule of law are 
themselves centrally planned by a small group of powerful institutions in Western capitals 
without any likelihood of accountability for their actions to those in whose name these activities 
are carried out.  Similarly, these institutions have done little to reconcile and inter-relate different 
assumptions which to them manifest the rule of law into a coherent goal worth a common 
pursuit. It is dangerous to treat rule of law programmes as if they were being imposed on a host 
country in ways that ignore the legal history of such countries and as if such countries had no 
legal history at all.100 In addition, new institutions created to build the rule of law must reflect the 
present and future needs of a given country. Further, it is critical for these institutions to analyze 
whether existing laws require amendment, modification or modernization, or should be 
abolished or replaced with different laws.  
 
The nature and methodology of export will determine whether the rule of law can successfully be 
exported to other countries, especially those in transition or emerging from conflicts. Normally 
the methodology of export of the rule of law varies depending on the society concerned. For 
example, in Southern Sudan or Somalia the export has ranged from conducting training for 
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judicial officials and writing constitutions and other legislation to supporting the new 
government in its role of maintaining law and order, or helping it create a conducive 
environment for business and investments – all elements that are considered to be crucial for 
peace consolidation. In fragile states or developing countries the methodology has ranged from 
restructuring the available laws to complying with the international norms and standards while 
also supporting those countries in efforts to ‘deepen’ democracy.101In the next section below, the 
chapter will examine what has been the content of rule of law export especially in post-conflict 
contexts in Africa. This part of the chapter will also lay out what would be considered as 
increasing the effective export of the rule of law.   
 
i. The content of the export 
If the rule of law can be considered as an export product, what kind of product is it that is 
exported or imported? The argument here is that before attempts to export the rule of law are 
made, exporters must know the needs of their ‘clients’ or importers and what kind of product 
will suit their needs. Further, they should be mindful of what they are exporting – not simply 
anything they consider to be‘best practice’ or ‘international standards’ as applied in their home 
countries or other countries facing similar challenges. In the same way importers must be 
informed and certain of what they are importing and whether the product itself conforms to 
their peculiar needs and environment. Arguably the bargaining power between the exporter and 
importer is clearly tilted in favour of the former, because the latter is either too weak or too poor 
to mount an effective negotiating strategy to ask for better terms on what it considers to be 
suitable for its needs. Thus the success or effectiveness of this process will greatly depend on 
how the exporter exercises its dominant position to ensure that the unique needs and prevailing 
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conditions of the beneficiary are taken into account before the final export package is 
determined.  
 
The primary value of the rule of law is derived from the understanding that institutionalized legal 
rules and structures constrain and regulate both the state apparatus and the broader society, 
establishing and maintaining social order.  Hence the primary goal of exporting the rule of law 
should be to reform or build institutions of the state as the primary means by which important 
functions such as security, protection and advancement of human rights could be guaranteed to 
the wide population. It is possible to export technical assistance such as resources to build rule of 
law institutions but it is not so easy to export the culture where these institutions are respected. 
Indeed in most post-conflict societies what is missing is not only the rule of law institutions but 
also the political will among society’s top leaders to make these institutions work effectively. 
Institutional reforms like strengthening judicial independence, establishing appropriate court 
jurisdiction over executive and administrative actions, or reforming the countries` statutes and 
regulations generally require political leadership, especially the willingness to be restrained by the 
law. This is something that cannot be exported but must come from within the society itself.   
 
The rule of law reform or export should take into account historical factors or cultural 
components when arguing for reforms in a post-conflict context. This argument stems from the 
reality that the rule of law reforms do not take place in a vacuum. Every African society has 
indigenous legal traditions in addition to the laws received from their former colonial masters 
and their customs and traditions. Similarly, in these societies there are often quasi-institutional 
means for resolving disputes among members as well as established traditions for arbitrating 
legal rights and entitlements. Hence reforms which do not take into account these traditional 
institutions and customs that have existed for many years will very likely fail.    
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It is contended that building the rule of law cannot be undertaken as a self-evident enterprise.  In 
other words, international institutions, donors and civil society cannot assume that all it takes to 
build the rule of law is to create institutions resembling those that already exist in other countries 
which they consider to uphold the rule of law. These institutions must advance strategies for 
making these reforms work and fit in the lives of the people in that particular context. The 
danger of attempting to export the rule of law to countries uninterested in the whole package of 
the concept, or unaware of what they are importing, is that export efforts may be wasted and 
misused. Instead of strengthening the rule of law, reform efforts aimed at improving the 
efficiency of courts or police or prosecutors may end up strengthening rule by law- a repressive 
use of law by authoritarian leaders to control the population.102 
 
The question of ‘best practices’ has been controversial in developing countries and post-conflict 
societies, in particular where the assumption has been that if these countries adopt laws which 
have served well other countries in similar situations then there is a higher chance for them to 
successfully replicate themselves in other society. The argument has always been that Africa is 
not special, rather it is part of the international community with shared values, so that what 
successfully worked in other countries can also work in the continent.103But these arguments, 
however meritorious they might be, conveniently ignore the reality that, by its very nature Africa 
is unique because of its chequered past and continuous challenges which continue to adversely 
afflict the continent. And in any case not all African countries are the same, because of their 
different historical and current levels of development.  
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For example, it would be unrealistic to ask a local chief in Malakal in South Sudan who never 
went to school and who does not speak English to discard informal justice mechanisms which 
have shaped his entire life of dispute resolutions solely on the ground that such systems 
contravene ‘international standards and values’, without giving him an alternative system which 
he could easily understand, identify with and use in managing conflict in ‘his’ society. Certainly, a 
local system may be repugnant to known norms of international legal system which countries like 
Sudan have accepted to be bound by, but it is equally true that change cannot come overnight. A 
system which has existed for hundred years cannot be successfully replaced by a donor-funded 
rule of law project of two to three years. Rather, a genuine rule of law reformer should commit 
to working with such a chief and collectively discuss how such an informal system would be 
enriched by a synergy of international norms, without necessarily replacing the entire system.   
 
To understand the enforcement of the rule of law we must consider the differences between the 
universalists’ and the relativists’ positions as to the way rule of law norms should be 
interpreted.104 While universalists argue that the idea of law is universal and must be evenly 
applied, with no exceptions or excuses, relativists insist that laws are culturally contingent and 
must be applied only according to prevailing local circumstances. The arguments of both 
universalists and relativists, with regard to building the rule of law in post-conflict society, hold 
merit. In the international context, rules need to be both universal in their reach and relative in 
their interpretation and application. This is because the world is an intricate and heterogeneous 
place and comprises of many societies and as many forms of cultural expression, all of which 
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have powerful, dominant actors and vulnerable, subordinated ones.105 An Naim notes that the 
credibility of international human rights standards will be enhanced if they are perceived to be 
legitimate within the various cultural traditions of the world.106 Much as rule of law reformers 
should insist on international standards, these standards should be informed by local knowledge 
and a wide comprehension of prevailing circumstances for people to appreciate them.  
 
F. What would constitute effective rule of law export? 
After activities of building the rule of law institutions are undertaken, how is the success, 
progress or failure established? Rule of law reform initiatives, if they are to be effective, must be 
patterned on the minimum attributes of the rule of law identified above, such as an independent 
judiciary and a predictable legal framework consistent with international human rights 
standards.107 It is through these benchmarks that success, failure or progress is to be measured 
and through which accountability can be exercised.108 Yet, the conceptual divergence among 
development theorists, experts and donor agencies noted earlier has meant that parties assessing 
them may have something quite different in mind to those implementing them.109 Similarly, this 
varied understanding of the rule of law among different constituents may likely produce 
competing and conflicting standards in different states and systems.110The importance of this 
approach is that minimum attributes provide a clear framework of objectives which reflect the 
needs of local polity in the reform process. Aligning rule of law reforms with these attributes will 
ultimately enable the reformers to pattern their reforms against established objectives instead of 
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pursuing reforms that may have little or nothing to do with beneficiaries in societies where these 
reforms are undertaken.  
 
One of the institutions that has fallen victim to this conceptual anarchy of the rule of law has 
been the United Nations itself. Examining the UN definition of the rule of law identified above, 
it is evident that the organization has developed such a broad conception of the rule of law that 
it is simply difficult to measure whether these attributes can be achieved.111This highly 
aspirational approach to defining the rule of law by identifying it with a flourishing welfare state 
such as we would recognize in a very few developed states is highly controversial when measured 
across countries facing different economic and political challenges.  
 
This definition assumes moral and political commitments to multiculturalism, formal gender 
equality and democracy.112 Clearly, this approach to understanding the rule of law would obviate 
any meaningful distinction between the rule of law and the just society; as Shklar observes,if the 
rule of law means everything, does it still mean anything?113 Any attempt to measure success or 
failure in building the rule of law by both international organizations and donor countries should 
clearly try to separate the idea of the rule of law from its several instantiations, if only to see if 
there is anything at all in the idea itself that is coherent and capable of being analyzed without a 
‘wish list’ of preconceived assumptions.114 
 
It is highly unrealistic for the rule of law reformers to conceive their own assumptions, which to 
them constitute an ideal world, without articulating a plan for how these claims, such as the free 
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market or respect for human rights, would be achieved. If training of law enforcement officials, 
strengthening the criminal justice system, development of a market economy, an independent 
judiciary, a constitution with a strong human rights protection regime or accountable 
government are all considered to fall under the rubric of the rule of law, it will clearly be difficult 
to measure success or failure of the rule of law. For example, in a country like Somalia which has 
been embroiled in civil war for the past two decades, in the process of building the rule of law a 
constitution which enshrines human rights or commitment to independent judiciary may be 
achieved, yet such a constitution may not command legitimacy beyond the enclave of 
Mogadishu. In such instances it is highly unrealistic to measure the rule of law on the basis of 
such lofty goals and assumptions; rather progress and failure should be measured against 
minimum standards identified in this chapter and not vague assumptions imagined by the 
reformers.  
 
Despite this divergent conception of the rule of law, and the failure to articulate a clear plan 
forways to achieve the ever expanding list of instantiations associated with the rule of law, the 
concept should be reclaimed especially by those involved in building the rule of law, to ensure 
that the applicability of the concept is limited to building institutions and nurturing values vital to 
support the rule of law. It can be reclaimed by ensuring that efforts to build the rule of law are 
underpinned by the ultimate objective of achieving minimum attributes of the concept identified 
above. This is to be recommended in light of the tendency of international institutions and 
donor countries to invoke the rule of law to achieve a wide range of goals which unfortunately 
may not be in congruence with the rule of law needs of the local people. For, example when an 
operation focused on getting rid of Al Qaida in Afghanistan or Mali or Al Shaabab in Somalia 
invokes the rule of law to justify its activities, it greatly compromises not only the legitimacy of 
the concept but also people who become hostile to the whole exercise of building the rule of law 
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– because of a belief that such claims advance the interests of international actors rather than 
helping to address the plight of the people. 
 
The advantage of reclaiming the rule of law concept is that it will enable international actors 
involved in the reform process to measure the impact or success of their efforts through well 
established objectives reflected in these attributes. It will further address the challenge of 
‘conceptual anarchy’ where the rule of law is conceived and justified to achieve awide range of 
goals and objectives of different actors which may have nothing to do with the interests of local 
beneficiaries. It is counterproductive to invoke the rule of law to justify a wide range of activities 
which as a matter of fact may have nothing or little to do with those in whose name these 
activities are undertaken. The biggest challenge facing the current rule of law reform initiatives is 
very much related to the constant invocation of the concept to justify activities which to local 
people may be considered detrimental to their progress and wellbeing. Thus, reclaiming the 
concept begins with acknowledging and embracing minimum attributes as key benchmarks upon 
which all reforms should be patterned.  
 
The danger of viewing the rule of law as a combination of all positive attributes which a state 
should reflect has meant that even genuine efforts to build rule of law have been resisted by 
some quarters who view the whole enterprise as imperialistic. Arguably, institutional conditions 
such as an independent and accessible judiciary and the ability of the legal system to be 
predictable and provide protection and order for those under its jurisdiction can contribute to 
the general development of the rule of law. But before development of these institutions, actors 
need to regain legitimacy and credibility among the people who continuously consider the rule of 
law as synonymous with the advancement of Western interests and values.  
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G. Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated that the continued conceptual anarchy regarding the rule of law 
has meant that the term is understood to mean different thing to different people. Because of 
this fact the chapter has identified minimum attributes of the rule of law which provide clear 
benchmarks for those interested in rule of law reforms. The chapter has argued that there is a 
great need for coherence between those implementing the rule of law reforms and those 
supposed to benefit from these activities. This coherence can be achieved when reforms are 
based on minimum attributes which take into account aspirations and needs of the local polity. It 
has also been emphasized that constant invocation of the rule of law concept to justify activities 
which in some cases have no correlation with the actual needs of the people has been 
detrimental to the overall efforts of building the rule of law. 
 
It has therefore been suggested that the term ‘rule of law’ needs to be reclaimed by international 
actors involved in rule of law reform from the ‘conceptual anarchy’, to ensure that their efforts 
reflect actual needs of those in whom reforms are pursued. Reclaiming the rule of law will entail 
a need to ensure that the applicability of the rule of law concept is limited to building strong 
institutions and nurturing values that underpin these institutions. Reclaiming the rule of law 
concept will help international actors regain credibility and legitimacy from their beneficiaries 
who increasingly consider rule of law reforms as a means to advance Western interests and 
values on the pretext of helping other countries to address various social, economic and political 
challenges they face. As argued in the introduction to this chapter, ultimately, if rule of law 
reforms are to be effective, post-conflict society will require strong institutions such as an 
independent judiciary and law and order institutions such as police, correctional services and 
effective prosecution services, underpinned by a constitutional legal order which represents 
aspirations of the concerned polity. Because of their key role in the realization of the rule of law, 
these issues are examined in detail in chapter six of this study. In the following discussion, the 
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next chapter will examine the impact of constitutional development on the rule of law in 
Southern Sudan, to introduce Southern Sudan as the focus of the study and explain why it merits 
this inquiry.  
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Chapter Two 
II. The Impact of the Constitutional Development on the 
Rule of Law in Southern Sudan. 
 
A. Background 
This chapter introduces Southern Sudan as the focus area of this study. It examines the 
constitutional development in Southern Sudan and connects this development to the overall 
quest of building the rule of law in the country. It addresses the constitutional issues within the 
wider Sudanese context. This aspect is underpinned by the fact that although Southern Sudan 
voted for independence in January 2011, it has been part of Sudan and as such its constitutional 
development cannot be examined without being linked to Sudanese constitutional history and 
how it affected the development of the rule of law in Southern Sudan. 
 
The relevance of this chapter is to demonstrate that while the constitution is vital to guarantee 
fundamental rights and freedoms of the citizens in a given polity, it must be anchored in a legal 
and political framework capable of advancing the ideals reflected in the constitution. For 
example, such a framework must reflect separation of powers or checks and balances among the 
key organs of government such as the legislature, judiciary and the executive. The framework  
should also reflect fundamental rights and freedoms of the citizens such as equality before the 
law and access to justice. This aspect is significant because, among the key attributes discussed in 
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the introductory chapter, the rule of law depends on the existence of a government capable of 
enforcing law and order to guarantee security for citizens and their properties, an independent 
judiciary, respect for human rights, equality of citizenship and non-discrimination. Examining 
different examples, this chapter will demonstrate how disregard and absence of these attributes 
not only led to the erosion of the rule of law but also lay behind a protracted conflict between 
the SPLM and successive governments in Khartoum until 2005 when the CPA was signed. The 
chapter proceeds as follows: the first part will examine a brief history of Sudan, part two will 
provide an examination of the constitutional history of Sudan and the way constitutional 
evolution affected the development of the rule of law. The events leading to the negotiation and 
signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005 will be examined as well and its impact 
on the rule of law analyzed.   
 
It is imperative to discuss the constitutional history of Sudan to clearly articulate the relevance of 
this history to the development of the rule of law in Southern Sudan. Although the negotiations 
and eventual adoption of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005 ushered in a new 
constitutional framework in Sudan, the way this framework was designed to ensure that it attains 
its objectives is a subject that warrants further enquiry. For example, the Interim Constitution of 
Southern Sudan reaffirms that the rule of law and constitutional democracy are the core ideals of 
Southern Sudan’s constitutional order. Yet the question must be asked, what are the mechanisms 
within which this constitutional order can be achieved? What will be done differently to ensure 
that the rule of law and democratic governance which underpin this constitution are realized? It 
may further be of interest to investigate why the previous constitutional legal orders failed to 
support the rule of law: can it be contended that this new order adopted after the signing of the 
CPA will be any different from previous ones? It is in the hope of understanding these 
complexities that this chapter will discuss the constitutional history of Sudan and how the 
evolution of this history impacted the general development of the rule of law.The constitutional 
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history of Sudan will further help us understand the challenge of building the rule of law in the 
current statebuilding efforts in post-conflict Southern Sudan. 
 
B. Brief history of Sudan 
Before discussing the nexus between the constitutional development and how it impacted the 
rule of law in Southern Sudan, it is worth examining the history of Sudan to understand what 
makes Sudan warrant this inquiry and how it contributes to the broader question of rule of law 
reform in Southern Sudan. The history of the modern Sudan traces its origin to the first quarter 
of the 19thcentury when it was conquered by the Viceroy of Egypt Mohamed Ali in 1821.1 Before 
that period there did not exist a single political entity known as Sudan. The Sudanic kingdoms of 
Sennar and Darfur controlled much of what is today Northern Sudan while the largest tribes in 
the South, Dinka, Shilluk, Anuak and Nuer, controlled the South. In the period preceding the 
Turco-Egyptian conquest of the Northern Sudan, the Southerners maintained their own 
independence by resisting raids and invasions from the Northern kingdoms.2 
 
It was when Mohamed Ali sought gold and slaves in the Sudan to establish his financial and 
political autonomy from the Ottoman Sultan that the Viceroy decided to establish contact with 
the South. He felt that Northern Sudan’s gold was too little to meet his needs and its population 
too small to provide the slaves he needed for his army, and so he decided to conquer the 
Southern kingdoms which were previously beyond the reach of the Northern kingdoms.3 In his 
efforts he was supported by Northern Sudanese many of whom not only wanted to be relieved 
from the harsh demands now placed on them but also saw a possibility to seek opportunities in 
                                                 
1 Deng Akol Ruay, The Politics of Two Sudans: The South and the North 1821-1969, Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of 
African Studies, 1994, 11-29.  
2 See generally, R.L. Hill, Bibliography of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, London, 1939 and Richard Gray, A History of 
Southern Sudan, 1839-1889, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961.  
3 Abel Alier, Southern Sudan: Too Many Agreements Dishonoured, London: Ithaca Press 1990, 11. 
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the land which was previously beyond their reach. By 1860s the slave trade was so profitable that 
the military and commercial networks were expanded throughout the South by both Northern 
Sudanese and Turco-Egyptian officials, sometimes working in competition but often working in 
conjunction with each other.4Thus it can be argued that the first interaction between the North 
and the South happened purely on account of the financial motives of foreigners working 
together with Northerners who wanted to exploit resources for their own benefit.  
 
In 1881-96 there was internal revolution popularly known as the Mahdist revolution,whose goal 
was to free the North from Egyptian control. But this revolution was defeated in 1898 by the 
Anglo-Egyptian forces who wanted to control the whole of Sudan to extend their sphere of 
influence to acquire vital resources for trade.5 With the victorious establishment of Anglo-
Egyptian rule in Sudan after the defeat of the Mahdists, the British decided to administer 
Southern Sudan as an integral part of Sudan. The decision was strategic and dictated more by the 
exigencies of the European scramble for Africa than by local consideration for improvement of 
the plight of Southerners who were considered extremely poor and backward by the invading 
British forces.6 
 
Strategically, Britain wanted to occupy the South to maintain its control of the Nile basin which 
was crucial to secure the whole of Nile valley to safeguard its colonial interests in Sudan and 
Egypt.7 Effective control of Sudan by the British meant that Southern Sudan became part of the 
British colonial empire primarily because of its strategic location and the British fear that other 
                                                 
4Ibid., 12. 
5 Mohamed Omer Beshir, The Southern Sudan: The Background to Conflict, London: C. Hurst and Co., 1968, 2-5; M.W. 
Daly, ‘Broken Bridge and Empty Basket: The Political and Economic Background of the Sudanese Civil War’ in 
M.W. Daly and Ahmad Alawad Sikainga (eds), Civil War in the Sudan, London: British Academic Press, 1993, 3-5.  
6 Lam Akol, Southern Sudan: Colonialism, Resistance and Autonomy, Ewing Township, NJ: Red Sea Press, 2007, 5. 
7Ibid., 5. 
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colonial powers like France and Germany might extend in the North and conquer the area,which 
would jeopardize its economic interests. Southern Sudan became an integral part of Sudan 
largely as a strategy to satisfy the economic interests of the British and Egyptians.  
 
With this brief introduction explaining how Southern Sudan became an integral part of Sudan, it 
is pertinent to examine the historical development of Sudan and what influenced the political 
developments that led the South to fight for autonomous status within the country and 
subsequently to seek total independence through self-determination.8 What gives Southern 
Sudan a significant and distinguished identity is the minimal degree of coexistence it maintained 
with other areas in Sudan, in comparison with other parts of Sudan and even with other African 
countries. This occurred partly because of the imposition of the segregatory British colonial 
policy, which from its inception in 1922 introduced the Closed District Ordinance and Passports 
and Permits Ordinance that were meant to control movement between Northern and Southern 
Sudan.9Although the British justified this policy on the basis of a need to protect the Southerners 
from pressures from the North, its enforcement separated them and exacerbated their 
differences.10 
 
The official British policy towards Southern Sudan became clearer soon after the Second World 
War. But even before the end of the war, in 1944 the British Civil Secretary, Sir Douglas 
Newbold, issued a new policy on the South stating that ‘the approved policy of the government 
is to act upon the fact that the people of the Southern Sudan are distinctly African and Negroid’. He 
went on to emphasize that ‘our obvious duty to them therefore is to push ahead as far as we can 
with economic and educational development so that these people can be equipped to stand up 
                                                 
8 For extensive discussion on the right to self-determination, see chapter three of this work.  
9 Sudan Government, Laws of the Sudan, 1941, 137-143. 
10 Edgar O`Ballance, Sudan, Civil War and Terrorism, 1956-1999, London: Macmillan Press, 2000, 1.  
80 
for themselves in the future whether their lot be eventually cast with the Northern Sudan or with 
East Africa’.11 An examination of this policy demonstrates two competing and contradictory 
visions of the British for Southern Sudan. On the one hand the British had recognized that the 
people of that region had much more in common with their fellow East Africans than with 
Northern Sudan,but on the other hand, because of its strategic economic position and 
specifically because of the Nile river, the colonial government was keen for this region to be part 
of Sudan, so as to effectively control the Nile for its economic benefit. The unintended 
consequence of this policy is that it furthered the marginalization of Southerners. 
 
When British colonial government convened the Juba Conference in 1947 to allow Southerners 
to participate in decisions concerning them, the major question as to whether Southern Sudan 
would continue to be part of the united Sudan or would be independent on its own with its own 
constitutional structure had already been settled;12 Southern Sudan would continue to be an 
integral part of the united Sudan. Instead the Juba Conference was meant to solicit views on how 
bestcould Southerners be included in political arrangement between the North and the South 
after the departure of the colonial government.13During the Conference, the main argument of 
Southern Sudanese was that the South should first be afforded an opportunity to prepare itself 
before joining hands with the North which was more advanced, before it could determine its 
future. Southern representatives recalled the past experience of slavery and oppression and 
argued that it would take time to develop mutual respect and promote a genuine sense of 
equality of citizenship before genuine unity was forged.14 These demands were rejected by 
                                                 
11 Abel Alier, above note 3, 18. See also M. Abdel Rahim, ‘The Development of British Policy in the Southern Sudan 
1899-1947’, Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 2, 3, 1966, 227-245.  
12 James W. Robertson, Transition in Africa, London: Hurst, 1974, 107. 
13 Elias Nyamlell Wakoson, ‘The Politics of Southern Self-Government 1972-83’ in M.W. Daly and Ahmad Alawad 
Sikainga (eds), note 5, 35.   
14 M. Abdel Rahim, above note 11, 227-245.  
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Northerners supported by the British. However, it should be noted that Britain’s support was 
premised on its desire to win Northerners’ backing against the influence of the Egyptians.15 
 
When Sudanese independence, to take effect on 1 January 1956, was imminent, Southerners 
insisted that without being given complete autonomy they would not agree to full Sudanese 
independence from the departing Anglo-Egyptian colonial masters. It was in response to this 
hardline position of Southerners that the Northern members eventually agreed reluctantly to the 
insertion of a provision into the independence resolution which stipulated that the Southern 
demand for a federal system of government with expanded autonomy would be considered after 
independence.16 In response, Southern politicians deferred the question until after independence 
in exchange for posts in the government to be formed.17 Yet in December 1957, Prime Minister 
Khalil announced that ‘the Constitutional Committee had given the Southern claim for federal 
status very serious consideration, but had found that it would not work in Sudan and hence the 
issue would be dropped’.18 This was a severe setback to Southerners and it galvanized their belief 
that Sudanese leaders were not willing to honour their commitments to their compatriots in the 
South by affording them full rights as citizens in the country. To Southerners, their full 
participation in the affairs of the country would have paved the way for a unified country based 
on justice, equality and coexistence with the North.   
 
The subsequent governments which assumed power after independence, whether elected 
democratically or installed by military takeover, emphasized the Muslim and Arab identity of the 
Sudan, disregarding the stark reality of the varied composition of the populace in the country. 
                                                 
15 Paul Nantulya, ‘Preventive Diplomacy in Sudan’ in Hussein Solomon (ed.) Towards Sustainable Peace: Reflections on 
Sustainable Peace in Africa, Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa, 2003, 125-127.  
16 Bona Malwal, People and Power in Sudan: The Struggle for National Stability, London: Ithaca Press, 1981, 47. 
17 Dunstan M. Wai, The African-Arab Conflict in the Sudan, London: Africana Publishing Company, 1981, 35. 
18 Bona Malwal, above note 16, 48. 
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This assertion was famously echoed by one senior government minister who stated that ‘Sudan is 
an Arab country and whoever doesn’t feel Arab should quit’.19 Indeed Sadiq Al Mahdi, one of 
the influential politicians in the modern Sudan and once a Prime Minister, stated that ‘…the 
dominant feature of our nation is an Islamic one and its overpowering expression is Arab, and 
this nation will not have its entity identified and its prestige and pride preserved except under an 
Islamic revival’.20 It was this failure of successive Sudanese governments to address demands of 
Southerners that led to the outbreak of the conflict which, save for a brief period in 1972-1983, 
continued until the signing of the CPA in 2005.  
 
C. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement 2005 
Two decades of civil war21 between the North and South formally ended on 9 January 2005, 
when the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army 
(SPLM/A) signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in Nairobi in Kenya. The CPA is 
comprehensive in the sense that it addresses the core dispute between Sudanese government and 
the SPLM/A.22The origin of the peace process between the Sudanese government under 
President Bashir and the SPLM/A can be traced in efforts launched by the Inter-Governmental 
Authority on Development and Desertification (IGADD) in the early 1990s.23In 1994, IGADD 
initiated formal negotiations between the SPLM/A and the Sudanese Government. The interest 
of IGADD in these negotiations was essentially premised on its role as a regional organization 
                                                 
19 Lam Akol, ‘The Present War and its Solution’ in F.M. Deng and P. Gifford (eds), The Search for Peace and Unity in 
Sudan, Washington, DC: Wilson Center Press:, 1987, 16. 
20 Dunstan M. Wai, above note 17, 117. 
21 Sudan experienced continuous armed conflict since its independence, apart from an eleven-year period of peace, 
until 2005. The conflict which ended in 2005 is considered to have lasted for two decades because it was 
uninterrupted conflict since 1983. 
22 See generally C. Murray and C. Maywald, ‘Sub national Constitution-Making in Southern Sudan’. Rutgers Law 
Journal, vol. 37, 4, 2006, 1203-1234. 
23Ibid.,1203-1234. It is worth noting that IGADD was initially formed in 1986 as an organization with focus on 
drought and desertification. However, its name was changed to IGAD in 1996 to focus on development only.  
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keen to promote peace and security within its member states. After an initial unsuccessful round 
of talks, it presented the parties with a Declaration of Principles (DoP) intended to provide the 
basis for the agreement.24 
 
The DoP required from the parties a commitment to five principles fundamental to the struggle 
of the South: a right to self-determination; separation of state and religion; equitable sharing of 
resources; security arrangements; and a referendum in the South with independence as an 
option.25It should be noted from the outset that IGADD assumed the mediation role in Sudan 
mainly because other institutions such as the UN and the OAU before were not involved in 
resolving this conflict; this can be attributed to the geopolitical configuration of the Cold War,in 
the case of the UN, and the doctrine of non-intervention in internal affairs which characterized 
most of the OAU’s history.26It should also be emphasized that the fact that Sudan was a member 
of IGADD and most of the countries in this regional grouping were experiencing civil conflicts 
provided a compelling need for the Organization to get involved in resolving these conflicts 
which were afflicting its member states.27 
 
Below we examine the constitutional development in Southern Sudan and how it affected 
development of the rule of law. This discussion is critical to understand the differing 
perspectives and approaches between the Southerners and their counterparts in the North in 
addressing the root causes of the conflict. Further, the imperative of this discussion is premised 
                                                 
24Ibid.  See also Korwa G. Adar, John Nyuot and Eddy Maloka, Sudan Peace Process: Challenges and Future Prospects, 
Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa, 2005, 15. 
25 Francis Deng and Mohamed I. Khalil, Sudan Civil War: The Peace Process before and Since Machakos, Pretoria: Africa 
Institute of South Africa, 2004, 6-13.   
26 Art. III of the OAU Charter. 25th May 1963. In fact the UN and the OAU joined much later in support of the 
efforts of IGADD in the early 2000s. 
27 See generally, Waithaka Waihenya, The Mediator: Gen. Lazaro Sumbeiywo and Southern Sudan Peace Process, Nairobi: 
East African Educational Publishers Ltd, 2006. 
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on the fact that building the rule of law requires a constitutional framework spelling out rights 
and duties of citizens and their leaders, to guarantee responsibility and accountability in nation 
building. Only through critical examination of the constitutional development of this region is it 
possible to understand factors inhibiting or advancing the rule of law and how they shaped the 
subsequent Southern Sudanese constitutional discourse.    
 
D. Constitutional development in Southern Sudan 
Arguably the constitution making process is one of the most important components to guarantee 
the rule of law, whether in a conflict or a non-conflict context. Thus how a constitution is made 
and what it says matter. A constitution’s legitimacy does not merely rest on its substantive 
content but equally on the process surrounding its making, and the degree to which it is rooted 
in the society concerned or imposed from above ultimately determines the long-term endurance 
of the constitution itself.28A constitution must also include and guarantee fundamental rights and 
freedoms of citizens. In Southern Sudan this was achieved because negotiation of the CPA 
involved international actors such as the UN, the AU, IGAD, the US, the UK, Norway and the 
Netherlands who impressed upon parties a duty to commit to international human rights 
standards. However, having a constitution and respecting what is written in it are two different 
things and in most cases conflicts have tended to centre on the latter aspect.  
 
When a country is plunged into a conflict because of the failure of the existing constitutional 
framework, the challenge is how to amend or make and adopt another constitution recognizing 
the interests of distinct groups without giving such groups special privileges at the expense of 
others. And precisely how the people in whose name the constitution is made participate in the 
process and the role of international actors will either legitimize or compromise the process and 
                                                 
28 Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na`im, ‘Constitutional Discourse and the Civil War in Sudan’ in M.W. Daly and Ahmed 
Alawad Sikainga (eds), above note 5, 97.   
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the actual outcome. Hence one of the major challenges of thepost-conflict context in 
constitution making processes is how to ensure that the process reflects not only the interests 
and aspirations of the people but also how people actively and effectively participate in the 
process.    
 
From the outset it is important to clarify the nexus between a constitution making process and 
the rule of law. The constitution underpins the system within which the governors and the 
governed interact in a given polity. It articulates the rights and obligations of both the citizens 
and their leaders. To successfully regulate this relationship the constitution must enshrine and 
guarantee the enjoyment of the basic rights of the people, provide the mechanisms for their 
enjoyment and protection, and articulate the institutional framework through which the society 
can seek redress for violation of their rights. Thus it may be argued that having a constitution 
articulating fundamental rights and freedoms does not automatically translate into a society 
respecting the rule of law; rather the respect and advancement of the rule of law in any given 
context will depend on respecting and enforcing what is provided for in the constitution.29 
 
Whether it is written or unwritten, flexible or rigid, the existence of a constitution is inevitable. It 
creates the various organs of government, determines their relationship to each other and the 
relationship between these organs and the people who are its main subjects, whether in their 
individual or collective capacities.30 In apost-conflict context especially, the constitution provides 
a framework for power and resource allocation. This is crucial because conflicts in most 
countries emanate from failure to equitably allocate resources and power withinthe polity. 
Successful constitutions may be negotiated by political leaders and drafted by lawyers, but they 
                                                 
29 See James Gathii, ‘Popular Authorship and Constitution Making: Comparing and Contrasting the DRC and 
Kenya’, William and Mary Law Review, vol. 49, 2007-2008, 1109-1138.   
30 Benjamin Obi Nwabueze, Constitutionalism in the Emergent States, Hurst: London, 1973, 2-3. 
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are made by the realities on the ground.31Ultimately a constitution must achieve a good balance 
between individual needs for personal freedom and social justice and organization of institutions 
of government.  
 
When searching for a new constitutional order in a war-torn country like Sudan it is imperative 
that the interests of different and at times unrelated groups should be accommodated without 
jeopardizing the interests of others.32 Indeed this has been the major challenge facing Sudan 
since its independence in 1956: to devise a workable constitutional structure which 
accommodates varied groups and their interests while maintaining the unity of the country. 
Below we examine different constitution making process in the history of Sudan and how each 
process advanced or inhibited the quest for the rule of law in the country.  
 
i. The Independence Constitution 
The history of the constitutional development of post-independence Sudan dates back to the 
pre-independence period. Soon after the conclusion of the Juba Conference in 1947, the British 
colonial powers through the Legislative Assembly Ordinance of 1948 set up the Legislative 
Assembly consisting of 93 members of whom 65 were elected, 10 were nominated by the 
Governor General and 18 others were ex officio members by virtue of their ministerial positions 
in the Executive Council. Thirteen of the 93 represented Southern Sudan.33 The Constitution 
Amendment Commission, operating under the auspices of the Legislative Assembly, was 
appointed by the Governor in 1951 to spearhead efforts of constitution making.34 The 
                                                 
31 Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na`im, above note 28, 97. 
32 Muna Ndulo, ‘Constitution Making in Africa: Assessing both the Process and the Content’, Public Administration 
and Development, vol. 21, 2001, 101-108. 
33 Abel Alier, above note 3, 22. 
34 Abel Alier, ‘The Southern Question’ in Dunstan Wai (ed.), The Southern Sudan: The Problem of National Integration, 
London: Routledge, 1972.  
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Commission had only 13 members; Judge Stanley Baker from England was appointed as its 
Chairman. One person represented the South in this new Commission.35Although this 
Commission was later disbanded by the Governor, its deliberations were the basis on which 
Judge Baker drafted the Self Rule Statute that ushered the country to independence in 1956.36 
 
Sudan achieved its independence without the rival political groups having agreed on the form 
and content of a permanent constitution. The Constituent Assembly adopted a document known 
as the ‘Self Rule Statute’ of 1953 as the country’s first Transitional Constitution in December 
1955. The Transitional Constitution replaced the Governor General as the head of State with a 
five-member Supreme Commission37 elected by a parliament composed of an indirectly elected 
Senate and a popularly elected House of Representatives-essentially a Westminster model.38 In 
addition to defining the constitutional structures and powers of the self-rule institutions, the 
proposed draft constitution called for solid guarantees for the South,a proposal which was 
however rejected by the Northerners. By January 1956, Sudan became an independent unitary 
state with the Self Rule Statute as amended on the eve of independence as the Transitional 
Constitution for the Republic of Sudan.39 
 
The adoption of the Self Rule Statute as the independence constitution raises some profound 
questions relevant to the rule of law. Its adoption was not made through a participatory and 
democratic process. Rather it was drafted under the auspices of the British colonial power and a 
few Northern elites without the full involvement of Southerners. As such, this Statute lacked 
                                                 
35 Abel Alier, above note 3, 22. 
36 Ibid. 
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38Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na`im, above note 28, 100. 
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legitimacy and credibility because it did not reflect hopes and aspirations of those it was made to 
govern. Admittedly, citizens’ participation does not within itself augment respect for the rule of 
law, but it can be argued that the people’s involvement in constitution making is critical for the 
process and outcome which take into account people’s concerns on different issues as discussed 
in the minimum attributes of the rule of law.  
 
In chapter one we have seen that one of the major attributes of the rule of law is equality before 
the law and avoidance ofdiscrimination between citizens on any basis. However, the period 
following independence had negative consequences on the rule of law because it sowed and 
confirmed the mistrust and discrimination long feared by the Southerners. This period saw the 
entrenchment of the Northern Arab Islamic identity over the South, and the institutional 
framework formulated after independence did not create or encourage the basis of equality and 
coexistence among the people. Thus it set a stage for some sections in the society being treated 
with discrimination and oppression while others were accorded privileges of citizenship. The 
decision of the regime to consider Sudan as an Islamic state, disregarding the rights of non-
Muslims, further complicated the quest for a new inclusive constitutional order. Indeed it was 
under President Abboud`s regime that policies of Islamization and Arabization were intensified. 
The regime imposed restrictions on the activities of missionaries in the South which it viewed as 
a threat to national unity, and imposed Arabic and Islam on the South contrary to the 
constitution.40The actions of the government were discriminatory and detrimental to Southerners 
because they disregarded their citizenship rights as non-Muslims. In 1964, the government of 
General Abboud was toppled and another attempt to draft a new constitution was embarked on. 
Below we examine this process and its outcome.     
 
                                                 
40 O`Ballance, Sudan, note 10, 22. 
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ii. The 1965 Conference 
Before discussing the process and outcome of this Conference it is pertinent to clarify some 
aspects of the North-South conflict during this period. This conflict started soon after 
independence in 1956. When Southerners realized that the independence government was not 
willing to honour their demands they decided to rebel against the government, establishing a 
movement called Anya nya in 1958.41 The main reason given by Southerners for starting the 
conflict was the refusal of the central government to accord them regional autonomy in the 
South within which they could make decisions on vital issues that affected them without 
interference of the government.42Hence, when preliminary negotiations to seek peaceful 
resolution of the conflict were being carried out, already an armed conflict was actively going on.  
 
It can further be argued that the Northern rejection of Southerners’ claim for regional 
government with autonomy to make decisions affecting them without interference greatly 
contributed to the start and continuation of the conflict. This conflict had consequences for the 
institutions supporting the rule of law because critical institutions of governance such as the 
judiciary, police and correctional services were destroyed during the conflict. This destruction 
was not limited to institutions only; manypeople in the South became refugees in neighbouring 
countries while those who remained behind were unable to engage in any economic activities 
because of insecurity. Similarly, because of the conflict the government was unable to undertake 
reconstruction measures in the South, which reinforced the marginalization of Southerners.  
 
                                                 
41 The Anya nya movement was the rebel group which advanced the cause of Southerners. It is Dinka word which 
literally means ‘poisonous snake’. See for example Alexis Heraclides, ‘Janus of Sisyphus? The Southern Problem of 
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After the transitional government replaced the military rule of General Ibrahim Abboud through 
a popular uprising in 1964, it soon arranged what later came to be known as the Round Table 
Conference of March 1965. The main goal of this Conference was to discuss the ‘Southern 
question’ and address Southerners’ grievances through a new constitutional arrangement, in 
order to satisfy both the regional interests of the South and the national interests of Sudan as a 
whole.43 All political parties in the country were represented in the Committee appointed on a 
North-South basis, with six representatives from the North and six representatives from the 
South.44 However, neither women nor young peopleparticipated, the composition was all men. 
The impact of this exclusion was significant because it meant that concerns or suggestions of 
these groups were not included in the constitutional making process. Despite this non-inclusion 
of other groups, it may be argued that this Conference was crucial in the sense that it 
demonstrated the willingness of the Transitional Authority to address governance challenges 
within the country.   
 
The Committee agreed on a number of things, including the need to transfer some powers 
hitherto exercised by the central government to each of the regions in Sudan.45 Further, there 
was an agreement among the members on a right for the South to preserve and develop its own 
languages and culture. Similarly there was unanimity on the need to establish regional legislatures 
which would among other things enact regional laws, elect members of the government and 
supervise the executive machinery. Finally, the Committee agreed to recommend the 
parliamentary system of government in preference to a presidential system which was viewed as 
giving too much power to the executive. However, the right to secede for the South was 
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unanimously rejected by the Committee. The implication of this rejection was obvious; 
Southerners were compelled to demand and address their grievances within the united Sudan, a 
difficult task given their previous experience and the unwillingness of the previous regime to 
treat them as citizens with equal rights and obligations. 
 
Areas of agreement were overshadowed by several areas of disagreement. The Committee failed 
to address some critical issues whose solution would have given impetus to the accelerated 
process of constitution making. The Commissioners could not agree on the manner of selection 
of the head of the executive of the proposed region. The Southern representatives preferred that 
the head of the executive in the region be elected either directly or indirectly by the people of the 
region, because of their concern at the possibility that an appointed person would be indifferent 
to the plight of Southerners or would be imposed from Khartoum. The Northern 
representatives suggested that the head of state would select three persons from the region as 
candidates and the people of the region would be entitled to choose one of them through an 
electoral college.46 To Southerners this proposal represented another danger to their quest for 
autonomy because it would have been easy for the President to nominate three people of his 
choice and let the Southerners choose one person. This would have ensured that in whatever the 
outcome the President’s choice would be guaranteed to assume the office. Therefore this 
proposal was rejected by Southerners.  
 
There was further disagreement on whether the South should be one region as Southerners 
wanted or three regions as Northerners wanted. Chiefly, Southerners wanted one region whose 
size and population would be part of its strength, while the Northern representatives argued that 
the South was too big to be administered as one region, and moreover, the creation of one 
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region would perpetuate a confrontational posture between the Southern region and the central 
government.47 
 
The failure of the constitution making process in this period had implications for the 
development of and respect for the rule of law in Sudan. Notably, the Committee failed to agree 
on the broader issues of constitutionalism and governance which were critical to the successful 
resolution of the conflict. The decision of the regime to disregard the views and aspirations of 
Southerners eroded any confidence Southerners had in the regime’s ability to address their cause. 
Also, the fact that the regime attempted to treat the conflict in the South as a regional problem 
rather than a national problem which required a national solution meant that people in the South 
were compelled to resort to violence as the only way to advance their cause.  
 
In May 1969, General Nimeiry toppled the transitional government and outlined the reasons that 
led him and other members of the Revolutionary Council to take over power. Two reasons stand 
out as relevant to the advancement of rule of law and resolution of the Southern question. 
Firstly, the new government claimed it would work for the social justice and self sufficiency for 
the people, especially the underprivileged living in rural areas, of whom Southerners constituted 
a majority. Secondly, there was the failure of previous governments to solve the Southern 
problem(s) through an inclusive constitution. Subsequently the government issued a statement 
recognizing (i) the existence of the Southern problem, (ii) the cultural and historical differences 
between North and South, (iii) the right of Southerners to develop their separate cultures and 
traditions, and (iv) the right of Southerners to have their regional self government.48 
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Soon after assuming power, the government launched peace talks which culminated in what was 
to be known as the Addis Ababa Agreement, on the basis of which the government adopted the 
1973 Constitution. These two landmark events had a profound impact on the advancement of 
the rule of law and it is worth examining them and their implication to the ensuing Sudanese 
constitutional legal order in this period.  
 
iii. The 1972 Addis Ababa Peace Agreement 
When Nimeiry came to power in 1969, the conflict was escalating. His government decided to 
take initiatives to resolve this conflict by recognizing the national dimension of the ‘Southern 
question’. It was following this initiative that the Addis Ababa Agreement and subsequent 1973 
Constitution were adopted. The Addis Ababa accord which granted the South self rule and gave 
recognition to the country’s multifaceted diversity was concluded in March 1972 after intensive 
negotiations between the government and the South. The agreement, known in legal terms as 
Southern Provinces Self Government Act, was later incorporated into the 1973 Constitution.49 
The importance of the Addis Ababa Agreement is that it was an accord which effectively ended 
the first phase of the civil war and set the stage for the only period of peace which Sudan 
enjoyed, from 1972 to 1983. It should also be noted that this was the accord that granted 
considerable autonomy to Southern Sudan, something which had never happened before.50 
 
The Addis Ababa Agreement was in essence a series of settlements on specific matters, 
contained in three main parts. The first part comprised a draft organic law which defined powers 
of self rule for the Southern Provinces of the Sudan and regulated their relationship with the 
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central government.51 It also provided for separate items of revenue and grants from the central 
government to the Southern Region. Perhaps crucially, it also had provisions guaranteeing 
fundamental rights and freedoms.52 The second part addressed ceasefire arrangements while the 
third was the protocol on interim arrangements, comprising four subjects:interim administrative 
arrangements; temporary arrangements for the inclusion of the units of the People’s Armed 
Forces in the Southern Regional forces;53 Amnesty, and Judicial Arrangements; and the 
Repatriation, Relief and Rehabilitation and Resettlement Commission.54 
 
As a result of the Addis Ababa Agreement, Southern Sudan was granted its own Regional 
Assembly, a High Executive Council (HEC) acting on behalf of the national President, regional 
civil service departments and regional development institutions. The South gained authority over 
education, police and cultural development in the South. Arabic remained the official language of 
Sudan, but English was designated the principle language for the Southern Region without 
prejudice to the use of any other languages which might serve a practical necessity for the 
efficient and expeditious discharge of the executive and administrative functions of the Region.55 
In addition, the regional government had an independent budget, whose revenue was to come 
from local taxes, fees, natural resources and special allocations and grants-in-aid from the central 
government. The Southern Region was to be represented in the National Assembly in 
proportion to its population. The Agreement further provided for the equality of all citizens 
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before the law and guaranteed equality of opportunity without discrimination on the basis of 
race, national heritage, birth, language, sex, or economic status.56 
 
Under the arrangement, the South was granted both executive and legislative powers. It is critical 
to evaluate the powers granted to the regional government and whether the core demands of 
Southerners were fulfilled under this Agreement, and to what extent this Agreement advanced 
the rule of law in the country. It is argued that the impact of this Agreement on the rule of law 
should not be examined for its allocation of powers among different organs of the state, but 
rather for the way it contributed to the creation of stable institutions critical to the advancement 
of the rule of law.   
 
a) Legislative powers under the Addis Ababa Agreement 
Chapter V of the Addis Ababa Agreement vested regional legislative authority in a People’s 
Regional Assembly elected by Sudanese citizens resident in the South. The Regional Assembly 
had the power to legislate for the preservation of public order, internal security, efficient 
administration, and the development of the Southern Region in cultural, economic, and social 
fields.57 Nevertheless, the central government had exclusive powers on certain issues which the 
Regional Assembly had no competence to legislate upon, including among others 
communication and telecommunication, customs and foreign trade, external affairs, currency and 
coinage, inter regional river transportation, national defence, nationality and immigration, 
planning and public audit.58 The Regional Assembly could by a two-third majority request that a 
national law it deemed detrimental to Southern interests be suspended from entering into force, 
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though the President had a right to accept or reject such a request.59 While the President could 
veto any Bill deemed contrary to the national constitution, the Regional Assembly could 
reintroduce such a Bill, and according to article 107 of the 1973 Constitution, a two-thirds 
majority of the National Assembly could override a presidential veto.  
 
Examining these powers under the Addis Ababa Agreement, it can be argued that although the 
Assembly had considerable powers in matters affecting the South, the President of the Republic 
had overriding powers precisely because he could veto any decision made by the members of the 
Assembly. In fact this was one of the major weaknesses of the Agreement because the Assembly 
could not compel the President to approve a Bill it wanted to be passed. Furthermore, the fact 
that some members of the Assembly were appointed by the President allowed the government to 
influence decisions made by the Assembly. Despite these weaknesses in the Agreement, it is 
worth acknowledging that the recognition of the right of Southerners to take part in making 
decisions which directly affected them was a major achievement of the Agreement, given the 
previous unsuccessful attempts by Southerners to participate in the decision making process.  
 
b) Executive powers under the Addis Ababa Agreement 
Under Chapter VI of the Agreement the regional executive authority was vested in the High 
Executive Council (HEC) which acted on behalf of the President of the Republic. According to 
article 18 of the Agreement, the HEC was charged with specifying the duties of the various 
government departments in the Southern Region. The National President appointed the 
President of the HEC on the recommendation of the People’sRegional Assembly.60The HEC 
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President in turn proposed its members to the National President for appointment, the process 
being the same for removing appointees from office. 
 
As the overall accounting officer for Southern affairs, the President of the High Executive 
Council had the mandate to promulgate administrative regulations and efficient administration of 
the region. The Agreement was unclear on the exact relationship between the High Executive 
Council and various central government ministries,except for providing that the national 
President should from time to time regulate the relationship between the two. Provisions dealing 
with the relationship between the HEC President and the National President were unclear. 
Article 17 stipulated that the Council acted on behalf of the national administration, but Article 
21 made the Council responsible to the People’s Regional Assembly and the President. It can 
also be argued that this Agreement contradicted the requirement of accountability and effective 
exercise of state power by the Regional President. For example, the power to veto bills 
emanating from the Regional Assembly was vested in the President of the Republic rather than 
in the Head of HEC. Similarly, the Agreement vested in the President rather than the judiciary 
the power to determine the constitutionality of any bill to be tabled before the Assembly. These 
aspects clearly violated the cardinal principle of the separation of powers already discussed in 
chapter one.  
 
The allocation of power under the Agreement failed to guarantee independent functioning of the 
HEC President because the incumbent of that office was appointed by the President of the 
Republic on the recommendation of the People’s Regional Assembly, and the President was not 
compelled to appoint the candidate proposed by the Assembly. This arrangement ensured 
unfettered influence of the President in the affairs of Southern Sudan. Indeed, as later remarked 
by Clement Mboro, a Southern politician, ‘…the mere fact that the North was to elect a leader 
for us was to give the South a government without powers and void of the basic principle of 
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democracy which advocates that the governed should elect their own representatives….’61 It is 
partly the combination of these weak and intrusive provisions within the Agreement that Addis 
Ababa Agreement did not survive for long. Below we examine the factors which led to the fall of 
the Addis Ababa Agreement and ensuing consequences for the general constitutional 
development of Sudan. But before this examination, it is crucial to consider the significance of 
this Agreement, especially the way it affected the rule of law and the Sudanese constitutional 
discourse.  
 
iv. The significance of the Addis Ababa Agreement 
This Agreement had a significant impact on the constitutional development and the rule of law 
in Sudan. It was on the basis of this Agreement that the Sudanese government for the first time 
made serious attempts to create a constitutional legal order to accommodate and address the 
Southern question within a framework of justice and equality, which had been the core demand 
of Southerners since independence. Some notable achievements of this Agreement include the 
peace and stability ushered in immediately after the signing of the Agreement in 1972, and the 
promulgation of the Permanent Constitution of 1973. Furthermore, Southern Sudan had its own 
autonomy exercised through the Regional Legislative Assembly and Higher Executive Council. 
Notably, the Agreement provided constitutional protection for cultural diversity and 
decentralized economic development. In general, it can be contended that this Agreement paved 
way for economic opportunities by ushering in a period of relative peace and stability crucial for 
economic development.  
 
The Addis Ababa Agreement was significant in the sense that it reaffirmed and granted the long 
denied rights and claims of Southerners. For example, the regime recognized that an Islamic 
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state as favoured by the Northern elites would be detrimental to national unity and that there 
were historical and cultural differences between the South and the North which required fresh 
thinking from Northerners. This recognition boosted the trust of Southerners in the government 
and their willingness to abandon armed resistance to build a unified country where they could 
co-exist with their Northern compatriots.62 
 
However, it is worth asking,why should the government decision to accord one section of a 
society rights and entitlements more than others be considered positive for rule of law 
development? It is contended that this aspect should be considered in the historical context of 
the Sudanese polity. Since independence it had been Southerners who demanded equal treatment 
with the rest of the country from the central government. Indeed, a closer examination of the 
political development in Sudan would show that a large part of Sudanese society was united 
against the Southerners, a fact which may be attributed to the Islamic identity as a unifying factor 
among the Northern societies. Further, it was the Southerners who were marginalized by 
successive governments denying them equal economic, social and political opportunities with 
their Northern counterparts. It can therefore be argued that under the Addis Ababa Agreement, 
there was positive discrimination focused to redress injustices suffered by Southerners at the 
hand of Northern governments in Khartoum. This aspect should also be considered in the 
context of the minimum attributes identified in chapter one, where it was argued that equality 
and non-discriminationare essential for the rule of law. Below we examine the major reasons that 
led to the fall of the Addis Ababa Agreement.   
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v. The fall of the Addis Ababa Agreement 
Although the Addis Ababa Agreement had settled most important issues imperative to the 
South, the question of how the provisions would best be observed and maintained in the future 
remained unresolved.63 Practical implementation of the Agreement largely hinged on the 
willingness and ability of the President to uphold and implement the content of the Agreement. 
Various reasons can be attributed to the failure of the Addis Ababa Agreement.  
 
Firstly, it should be noted that Southerners agitated for self-rule, among other reasons, because 
they wanted equal opportunities in development programmes with their Northern counterparts. 
Unfortunately these were never realized. Southern Sudan continued to lag behind economically 
and most of its inhabitants were marginalized from most of the economic opportunities, 
contrary to what had been promised to them in the Agreement. It can therefore be argued that 
addressing economic issues was critical to the overall success of the implementation of the Addis 
Ababa Agreement, which was a political issue. The Regional Authority could not adequately 
finance its budget and hence was unable to launch critically needed development projects. For 
example, when oil was discovered in the South in the mid-1970s, the central government decided 
that oil income should accrue to the central government rather than to the South. In fact, as a 
result of the oil discovery, the central government decided to redraw the borders to ensure that 
oil producing regions were transferred from the South to the North. This decision restricted 
economic benefits which the South could benefit from oil exploitation.64 
 
The Republican Order of June 1983 by President Nimeiry ended recognition of regional 
languages and English as the principal languages of the South. Instead, it provided that the use of 
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non-Arabic languages was conditional on obtaining permission from authoritative decision 
makers within government circles.65 The Order effectively left Arabic as the only language in the 
South for official work and as the medium of instruction in formal education. The same Order 
dissolved the institutions of self-rule as had been agreed upon in Addis Ababa, namely the 
Regional Assembly and High Executive Council. Three regions were created and a Governor for 
each region (Bahr El Ghazal, Equatorial and Upper Nile) was appointed. All these decisions 
were made contrary to the provisions of the Agreement which mandated a two thirds majority 
and a referendum for such changes.  
 
The introduction of Islamic laws of Sharia to cover the whole of Sudan, including Southern 
Sudan, in 1983 was another factor contributing to the failure of the Agreement. It should be 
noted however that the promulgation of Islamic laws of Sharia did not explicitly subvert the 
Constitution of 1973, since Sharia was already included in the Constitution as one of the main 
sources of legislation. Rather, it was the decision to promulgate the laws across the entire country 
that went contrary to the spirit of the Addis Ababa Agreement. Just like any other agreement, the 
Addis Ababa Agreement required political will by the government and concrete commitment for 
implementation of what had been agreed upon by the parties. It was through the neglect and 
ultimate indifference by the central government under the same President Nimeiry who had 
negotiated the Agreement that the whole arrangement collapsed ten years after its conclusion.  
 
Despite all these shortcomings and the ultimate abrogation of the Agreement by President 
Nimeiry, 1972 remains a significant year in the political and constitutional development of Sudan 
for having brought about and maintained peace for a decade thereafter. In the following part this 
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Constitution will be critically examined in detail to analyze how it affected both the rule of law 
and constitutional development in Sudan during its existence.  
 
vi. The 1973 Constitution 
Soon after the signing of the Addis Ababa Agreement in 1972 the government decided to 
embark on a constitution making process. In the same year Sudan’s People’s Assembly was 
elected with the sole purpose of preparing a Permanent Constitution for Sudan. The government 
decided to prepare a new constitution in the spirit of the Addis Ababa Agreement to incorporate 
the Agreement in the constitution, so as to allay any fear among Southerners of any attempt to 
dishonour the Agreement.66 The new Permanent Constitution was approved and promulgated in 
May 1973. This process and its outcome were significant because it was for the first time that a 
Constitution recognizing rights of non Muslims in the country was adopted.  
 
The new Constitution established a presidential secular and a unitary republic in Sudan. Article 1 
of the Constitution stated that Sudan was a democratic, unitary, socialist and sovereign republic 
and part of both Arab and African entities. Not only did the Constitution attempt to incorporate 
the provisions contained in the Addis Ababa Agreement, it also tried to satisfy the demands of 
two competing groups which claimed recognition of their identities. It incorporated the desire of 
Southerners to acquire their autonomy within Sudan and specifically stated that within the 
country there should be self-government for the South in accordance with the Southern 
Provinces Regional Self Government Act of 1972.67So it can be contended that the 1973 
Permanent Constitution concretized the Addis Ababa Agreement by ensuring that the 
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Agreement would have constitutional force and would not be abrogated without following 
procedures laid down in the Constitution. Below we examine some of the salient features of this 
Constitution and their impact on the development of the rule of law.   
 
a) Salient features of the 1973 Constitution: 
Despite the fact that the 1973 Constitution was the outcome of a compromise meant to resolve 
conflict and differences between warring parties, it had all hallmarks of dictatorship where 
powers were concentrated in the hands of the executive. The President could appoint and 
remove the Prime Minister, as well as officers of the armed forces, heads of diplomatic missions 
and senior public servants without consultation.68He could declare a state of emergency for a 
maximum of thirty days and suspend any of the freedoms and rights guaranteed in the 
Constitution. In the event that the President decided to dissolve the National Assembly, the 
matter was to be presented to the newly elected assembly at its first sitting. 
 
When this Constitution is examined from the rule of law perspective, it is clear that it contained 
some provisions which undermined the spirit of the Addis Ababa Agreement. For example, the 
Constitution legitimized a single party state system and vested enormous powers in the hands of 
the President. It designated the President as ‘the symbol of sovereignty and national unity and 
the representative of the people’s will’.69 Further, the President was elected for a term of six 
years, but with no limitations as to the number of times he could present himself for re-election. 
This aspect had adverse effects on the political system; not only did it breed cynicism, it also 
encouraged ambitious elements to resort to unconstitutional means to oust the President.70 The 
Constitution empowered the President, when the People’s Assembly was not sitting or in cases 
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of ‘importance and urgency’, to make provisional orders which had the force of law immediately 
when made, subject to their future endorsement by the Assembly. The determination of what 
was urgent or important was the prerogative of the President. Clearly this was the antithesis of 
the rule of law because the Executive could manipulate the legislative process to its advantage.  
 
The implication of this constitutional arrangement was to effectively disenfranchise the majority 
of people, especially Southerners, denying them opportunity to fully participate in decision 
making at the national level. Admittedly the Constitution had provided for decentralization of 
power to the regions, but in reality most of these provisions had clauses which subjected them to 
the whims of the President. Similarly, the Permanent Constitution underwent several 
amendments which later proved to undermine it. For example, one amendment granted powers 
to security forces to make preventive arrest and detention without recourse to the judiciary.71 
This not only undermined the rule of law, it raised a possibility and an opportunity for the 
central government and its security officials to arrest people it deemed a threat to national 
security. Even if allegations were unfounded, there was no court of law to determine the 
lawfulness of such arrests or detentions.     
 
The Permanent Constitution promulgated in 1973 by President Nimeiry did not outlive him. 
When he unconstitutionally abrogatedthrough the Republican Order of June 1983 the Addis 
Ababa Agreement which could be considered as a foundation upon which the Permanent 
Constitution had been built, it spelt the end for the Constitution and his administration.72 The 
failure to create an inclusive constitutional legal order for Sudan not only had a negative impact 
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on the development and consolidation of the rule of law, it also meant that Sudan was once 
again going to require a new constitutional order to reflect the realities of the Sudanese polity. 
 
b) The constitutional order in Sudan after the military coup, 
1985-1997. 
Before discussing constitutional development after the fall of the Nimeiry regime in 1985 it is 
important to examine factors which led to the resumption of the conflict between the North and 
South in this period. It was the interplay of many factors that led to the resumption of the 
conflict in 1983 after a decade of calm. The decision of President Nimeiry to declare Sudan an 
Islamic State through the introduction of ‘September laws’ greatly contributed to the demise of 
the Addis Ababa Agreement. The implication of this decision was evident: it plunged the country 
into conflict again because it prompted Southerners to form their resistance movement in 1983 
under the umbrella of the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A).73 The 
establishment of the SPLM was directly linked to the decision of the government to annul the 
Addis Ababa Agreement and the subsequent 1973 Constitution which had been promulgated to 
underpin implementation of that Agreement.  
 
After the overthrow of Nimeiry in 1985 by a military coup, the Permanent Constitution of 1973 
was terminated. The coup led to the formation of the Transitional Military Council (TMC) and 
an Interim Council of Ministers, which ruled for one year before handing over to an elected 
Parliament and Council of Ministers. The Transitional Military Council (TMC) and the 
Transitional Council of Ministers restored the Regional Self Government Act of 1972.74 But its 
provisions were highly diluted from its original wording in Addis Ababa in 1972, so that it was 
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rejected by Southern political forces. For example, the TMC gave itself the power to amend the 
Addis Ababa Agreement wherever it believed it was necessary to do so, contrary to the previous 
guarantees which required a two thirds majority and a referendum for amendment.  
 
Notable efforts to prepare a new constitution for Sudan during this period were reaffirmed in 
the Koka Dam Declaration comprising the SPLM and other opposition groups in Sudan. This 
Declaration among other things called for the creation of a new Sudan free from racism, 
tribalism, and sectarianism.75 Importantly, the Declaration committed the parties to establish a 
constitutional conference to define the ‘new Sudan’, which would address the problems of Sudan 
collectively instead of focusing on Southern Sudan alone. However, these efforts also had no 
success because the Transitional Military Council which was supposed to convene the proposed 
constitutional conference handed over power to the new government, which as it turned out 
later was not committed to this Declaration.  
 
In June 1989 the civilian government of Sadiq Al Mahdi, which had come to power in 1986, was 
overthrown by the military under the leadership of Brigadier General Omar Al Bashir. The 
government of Bashir suspended the 1985 Constitution, dissolved the Constituent Assembly and 
banned all political parties and trade unions.76 Indeed almost ten years passed under the 
government of General Bashir before a new Constitution was promulgated in 1998. This 
Constitution had a far reaching impact given that it was promulgated amidst the intensifying 
conflict in the South between the government forces and the SPLM/A.  
 
Before examining the implication of the 1998 Constitution for the general development of the 
rule of law in Sudan, it is useful to highlight some issues. It is striking that Sudan was unlike the 
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majority of countries in Africa, whose political and economic development was largely 
characterized by foreign intervention. Despite its vast natural resources like oil, most of the 
political instability in Sudan was internally instigated with little outside interference, especially 
after independence in 1956. This was the period of the Cold War between East and West where 
countries got involved in the affairs of other countries for purely strategic reasons, but despite 
this Sudan saw little meddling by Western countries or the Soviet Union in its internal political 
affairs, by comparison with other African countries.  
 
The Organization of African Unity, adhering to its long established tradition of non-interference 
in internal matters, considered the Sudanese political instability as essentially a domestic affair, 
and so it barely discussed Sudanese political problems. A few countries like Uganda and Ethiopia 
broke ranks with the OAU to support the SPLM/A, to the chagrin of the Organization. It is also 
worth noting that while the great famine in Ethiopia in 1984-85 attracted the attention of 
millions of people from all over the world to the suffering of Ethiopians, in Sudan it was 
different. Despite the long running civil war which had claimed thousands of lives while forcing 
thousands of others to flee as refugees, serious attempts to help by the international community 
were only registered in the late 1980s when the UN launched Operation Lifeline Sudan.77 This 
Operation was made possible by unwritten agreement between the United Nations, the Sudanese 
government and the SPLM to allow humanitarian access to civilians affected by the ongoing 
conflict. It involved different UN organizations like UNICEF, WFP and UNHCR and other 
international non-governmental organizations providing relief in war zones, especially in the 
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South.78Although the Sudanese government agreed to this arrangement, the Operation was 
short-lived because of the intransigence of Khartoum regarding its continuation.  
 
It can therefore be argued that political events in Sudan were largely dictated by internal factors 
rather than outside influence. Unlike other African countries, Sudanese had relatively better 
opportunities to rebuild their country based on an inclusive constitution and in the process 
strengthen the rule of law and institutions of governance.  This argument is made precisely 
because, the various peace negotiations especially the Addis Ababa Agreement between the 
government and the rebels in Southern Sudan, had provided an excellent opportunity for the 
country to address wide range of issues which had been a key obstacle to social, economic and 
political progress in the country.  
 
vii. The 1998 Constitution 
An examination of the 1998 Sudanese Constitution shows that it had a major impact on 
development of the rule of law and general constitutional discourse in the entire Sudan. It was 
under this Constitution that for the first time Sudan acknowledged and accepted the diversity of 
nationalities and equal treatment of religions. Unlike other constitutions which had been adopted 
in the past, the 1998 Constitution was from its inception negotiated during the civil war between 
the government and the rebels in the South. It was because of inadequate consultation among 
Sudanese, and especially non-participation of Southerners in the process, that its credibility and 
legitimacy were highly compromised. Nevertheless it was embraced by some Northern 
opposition groups who felt that the document offered a new beginning amidst the escalating 
challenges, of both an economic and a security nature, within the country.79 
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79 However, despite the impact of this constitution on the development of the rule of law, one can argue that it 
incorporated some provisions that were contradictory to its stated goal of protection of fundamental rights, 
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A question to pose is, why did the Sudanese government decide to adopt a new constitution 
almost ten years after coming into power? There are varied reasons for this decision. For 
example, the end of the Cold War and the shift in the world order compelled most countries to 
embrace constitutional reforms to guarantee the rule of law and a market economy. Further, the 
government had come to power through a military coup in 1989, and as a way of seeking 
legitimacy before its own people and cementing its democratic credentials it had to adopt a new 
constitution to guarantee fundamental rights of its citizens. But this decision ought also to be 
examined in light of the prevailing political development in Africa during this period. Leaders 
who had come to power through military coups were adopting new constitutions by which they 
sought legitimacy through the electoral process. The major reason for this development was the 
end of the Cold War, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the changing nature of alliances 
between Western countries and developing countries, which were now dependent on respect for 
human rights, democracy and the rule of law. Admittedly, this electoral process was not 
democratic as it should have been because in most cases it was conducted under a single party 
rule or a legal framework that favoured the incumbents, but the fact that leaders could subject 
themselves to the popular will of their people enabled them to claim democratic credibility to 
their Western critics from whom they needed economic support. 
 
Perhaps more compelling was the fact that the Sudanese government was coming to terms with 
the reality that it could not win the war in the South through military means, and adopting a new 
constitution recognizing some of the grievances of Southerners was considered one of the best 
                                                                                                                                                        
especially for the non-Muslims. See generally John Luk Jok, ‘The Basis of Human Rights in the Present Sudan 
Constitution’ in Ed Brady and Cirino Hiteng (eds), Building a Multi religious Society in the Context of Islamic 
Fundamentalism: Challenges and Appropriate Christian Responses, Nairobi: AMECEA, 2001, 51-58. See also M. Hoebink 
(ed.), ‘Constitutional perspectives on Sudan: proceedings of the IDF seminar’, Working Paper Series, Centre for 
Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, University of Durham, 1999. 
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ways to resolve the conflict. The challenge posed by this new constitution was that it lacked 
legitimacy for Southerners because of their non-participation and non-inclusion of their key 
demands such as the right to self-determination. It also maintained Islam as the guiding source 
of law in the country, which alienated Southerners. Below we examine some of the features of 
the 1998 Constitution and their impact on development of the rule of law.  
 
a) Executive powers under the 1998 Constitution 
Executive power under the 1998 Constitution was vested in the hands of the President of the 
Republic.80 The Constitution designated the President as the ruler and highest sovereign 
authority of the country, responsible for the command of the armed forces and other organized 
forces. Other functions of the President included supervising justice and public morals, 
representation of the government and public opinion at public occasions, and initiation of 
constitutional amendment.81 The President was also to appoint two Vice Presidents to assist him 
in his work. He could also appoint advisers and assistants and define their seniority and 
duties.82While making these appointments the President was under no obligation to ensure fair 
reflection of the diverse Sudanese nationalities, which partly explains the grievances of other 
Sudanese groups who felt marginalized by the new Constitution.  
 
At the state level, the Constitution provided for a governor for each state, to take office in 
accordance with the Constitution and law that could be enacted for that purpose. Specifically, 
the Constitution compelled each state to present six names to the President of the Republic who 
in turn was to select three names.83 Then, in governorship elections people chose among the 
                                                 
80Article 42, 1998 Constitution. 
81 Ibid. 
82Ibid., Article 44. 
83Ibid., Article 56. 
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three approved candidates and the candidate getting more than fifty percent of the votes would 
be declared Governor-elect.84Clearly, these provisions for governorship elections were the 
antithesis of the rule of law, because the election method ensured that all those candidates who 
were on the ‘wrong side of the system’ or against the President’s agenda were disqualified; only 
those candidates whom the President favoured were eventually nominated. With this 
arrangement, it can be persuasively argued that this Constitution did little to advance 
constitutional democracy and the rule of law in Sudan.   
b) Legislative powers under the 1998 Constitution. 
The Constitution allocated legislative powers between a federal legislature85 and state 
legislatures.86 Among the functions and powers of the federal assembly were to endorse plans, 
programmes and policies of the state and society, approve constitutional amendments, laws and 
temporary decrees, supervise executive performance and issue resolutions concerning public 
affairs.87The Constitution granted powers to the federal legislature, in course of supervising the 
work of the executive, to issue recommendations to the President for the removal of any 
minister who lost the confidence of the National Assembly, as long as that decision was taken 
after a general debate and the resolution received the approval of fifty percent of members 
present and voting. Article 97 established state assemblies with legislative authority in each state 
and any other powers as might be determined by the Federal Constitution. Each state assembly 
was granted powers similar to those wielded by the National Assembly taking into account the 
character of state assembly as an organ of a state, with the State Governor replacing the 
President, and state ministers replacing federal ministers.88The Constitution reaffirmed 
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federalism as the governing system in Sudan and divided the country into twenty-six states. The 
aspect of federalism was significant because it came closer to responding to the Southern 
grievances on their claim to the right to self-determination. But despite this rather positive step 
Southerners rejected this Constitution for failing to reflect their views and aspirations.89 Indeed 
their rejection was demonstrated by the decision of the SPLM to continue the war against the 
government.   
 
The next part will analyze the process which preceded the adoption of the Interim National 
Constitution and the Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan 2005 which replaced the 1998 
Constitution. This unprecedented constitutional development in the history of Sudan since 
independence not only changed the constitutional structure for the country but also heralded a 
new era where governance and the rule of law were fully integrated in both constitutions for the 
first time. Further, these changes were profound in the sense that for the first time after almost 
fifty years of conflict between the South and successive regimes in Khartoum, the claim to the 
right to self-determination for the Southerners was recognized and affirmed, allowing 
Southerners to vote for the independence of their new state. Whether these events which were 
marked by intense and protracted peace negotiations between the rebels and the government 
resulted in the advancement of the rule of law in Southern Sudan is a subject of the following 
analysis.     
 
E. The CPA and constitutional development in Southern Sudan 
The continuation of the conflict in the South even after the adoption of the 1998 Constitution 
between the SPLM and the government greatly influenced the decision of the government to 
change its approach towards the resolution of the conflict in the South. The government 
                                                 
89 Ahmed T. el-Gail, ‘Federalism and the Tyranny of Religious Majorities: Challenges to Islamic Federalism in 
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adopted a softer line by going back to the negotiating table in efforts to come up with a further 
new constitution which would fundamentally take into account the key demands of Southern 
Sudanese, namely, their claim to the right to self-determination. Contentious issues like equitable 
distribution of natural resources (especially oil), separation of religion and the state and Southern 
representation in decision making were all considered crucial to the eventual resolution of the 
conflict.  
 
While introducing this chapter I discussed how the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was one of 
the defining features of post-conflict Southern Sudan. Earlier, in the introductory chapter I also 
discussed the reasons why Southern Sudan (now independent South Sudan) is considered to be 
in a post-conflict situation, by showing that the CPA signed between SPLM and the Sudanese 
government ended the protracted conflict between the parties. While the CPA was instrumental 
in ending the war, it is important that peace agreements of this nature should also be considered 
in the context of their role in addressing gender inequality and discrimination by reaffirming 
respect for the fundamental rights of all citizens.90 The CPA created a framework which 
recognized equality of citizenship as the pillar of the new constitutional legal order. This was 
therefore a significant achievement for Southern Sudanese who had waged an armed struggle 
against the government because of the entrenched discrimination against them.   
 
The negotiations under the auspices of IGAD between the parties marked the beginning of the 
serious dialogue that eventually led to the signing of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
in Nairobi.91 The Protocol recorded the agreement of the parties on a number of key issues and 
                                                 
90 Christine Chinkin, ‘Gender, Human Rights and Peace Agreements’, Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution, vol. 18, 
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provided a framework for future talks. It reaffirmed national unity as the guiding principle for 
both parties and the right of the Southern Sudanese to self-determination through an 
internationally supervised referendum after an interim period of six and a half years.92 This was a 
key demand which had greatly defined the Southern struggle against successive governments in 
Khartoum. The Machakos Protocol is regarded as a breakthrough in the pursuit of constitutional 
order in Sudan because it was in this Protocol that major disputed questions which had haunted 
Sudan for much of its history were addressed. 
 
Despite these concessions, one can ask, why was the North willing to make concessions it had 
previously rejected, such as self-determination? Many factors influenced the government’s 
decision but chiefly, the military cost of fighting the war which was approaching its twentieth 
year and the toll on civilians in both North and South provided a compelling reason for the 
parties to reconsider their approach to resolve the conflict. Further, the economic costs of the 
conflict were becoming prohibitive because the SPLM had designated all oil installations in the 
South as a legitimate military target. The implication of this was clear – the Sudanese government 
could neither invite foreign investors in the lucrative oil sector nor enjoy the economic benefits 
of the newly found oil wealth. But in addition, outside intervention by regional organizations 
such as the OAU and IGAD and Western countries like the US and its allies compelled Sudan to 
accept negotiations and dialogue as the only mechanism to resolve the conflict.93 
 
It can further be argued that for international actors, the assumption was that once Sudan signed 
a peace agreement with SPLM, it would automatically enhance respect for human rights and help 
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improve the rule of law. Indeed, the Sudanese situation is not unique, rather it was part of the 
broader attempt by the international community in 1990s and 2000s to support peace 
agreements believing they would lead to the respect for human rights and the rule of law. 
However, as Sudanese example has demonstrated, peace agreements do not automatically lead to 
the realization of these objectives without strong commitment from the parties to carry out the 
terms of such agreements. Below we examine the constitutional arrangement under the CPA and 
how this arrangement impacted rule of law development.’94 
 
i. Constitutional arrangements under the CPA 
Taking into account the historical development of the constitutional legal order in Sudan, one 
may ask whether the new order was different from the previous arrangements such as the Addis 
Ababa Agreement in 1972. What distinguished the 2005 constitutional arrangement was that it 
was more attuned to the concerns of Southerners. Under the constitutional framework put in 
place by the CPA, the source of law for legislation with legal force in the North alone would be 
Sharia and the consensus of the people.95 This provision not only allowed those who are not 
Muslims (especially in the South) to opt out of Islamic laws, but also conceded the long held 
demand by Southerners for the separation of state and religion. However, this provision was 
based on a wrong premise, assuming that Sudan was equally divided into Northern and Southern 
blocs where people were Muslims and Christians living without interaction. In reality, even in the 
North there are people of different beliefs who would be excluded by this arrangement.  
 
Administratively the CPA divided the country into 26 states, sixteen in the North and ten in the 
South. Although the CPA granted powers to each level of government, states in Southern Sudan 
were subject to the control of the Government of Southern Sudan. A key provision of the CPA 
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in this regard required all linkages between the national government and the governments of 
Southern states to be through the Government of Southern Sudan – no Southern state was to 
engage with the national government independently.96 As to why the requirement existed only 
for states in Southern Sudan and not those in the North, this may be attributed to the desire of 
the Government of Southern Sudan to limit interaction between the central government and the 
states within the South. It also reaffirmed the supremacy of the SPLM in determining affairs of 
the South without central government intervention. As to why the CPA made provisions for the 
adoption of a federal system, this can be attributed to the desire of negotiators to address the 
question of marginalization which had been a core claim of various Sudanese both from the 
North and the South.  
 
The CPA was different from the previous arrangements such as the Addis Ababa Agreement 
because the former, unlike the latter, established a mechanism to guarantee its implementation. 
The guarantors, in the form of the Commission on Assessment and Implementation, drew its 
members from select countries and institutions that had supported the negotiations and eventual 
adoption of the CPA.97 Further, the CPA put in place a defined time limit within which 
Southerners were to exercise their right to self-determination through an internationally observed 
referendum, whereas the Addis Ababa Agreement did not even consider the question of self-
determination. In fact the parties were required to make unity attractive as a condition for unified 
Sudan to be preserved. Ultimately, in July 2011, Southerners voted for secession, a fact which 
can be attributed to the failure of both parties to honour their obligation under the CPA.98 This 
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failure was due to the fact that the Sudanese government failed to undertake necessary social, 
economic and political reforms to adequately address marginalization and injustices which had 
been the basis of the Southern struggle.  
 
Although the CPA was credited with ending the North-South conflict, there is an issue regarding 
the legitimacy of this Agreement. This stems from the discussion in chapter one which saw 
public participation in decision making as a key attribute of the rule of law. The CPA was an 
agreement between the two dominant political forces in the country, the ruling National 
Congress Party (NCP) and the Southern Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) 
with no prior consultation with Sudanese people. It was approved by a popular referendum 
neither in the North nor in the South. This raises some concerns as to the legitimacy of this 
Agreement which fundamentally changed the Sudanese constitutional legal order through the 
writing of the new constitutions both for the South and the North. Given the importance of 
these Constitutions in the management of national affairs, it is argued that it was crucial that they 
are approved by the people through a popular referendum even if the CPA, as a peace document 
resulting from negotiation and compromise between the warring factions to end the war, was not 
subject to referendum. It may further be challenged as to who appointed the SPLM as the sole 
representative of Southerners in dealing with the North? This question cannot be answered 
without examining the origin of the SPLM/A itself and the process leading to the signing of the 
Addis Ababa Peace Agreement in 1972. It was in this period that different Southern political 
forces organized themselves under the Anya-nya rebel force and its political wing, the Southern 
Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM), to negotiate with the government. It is this same group 
that later transformed itself into the SPLM/A to wage war against the government in 1983. So it 
can be argued that SPLM/A was a product of the Anya-nya movement and the SSLM, founded 
in 1983 to advance the cause of Southerners. Admittedly, later in 1991 there was a split in the 
SPLM/A ranks when one of the most influential leaders of the movement broke away to form a 
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different rebel movement, SPLM/A-Nasri.99But these differences were resolved and in 1997 the 
movements reunited again under the original SPLM/A. It was this movement which eventually 
negotiated and signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005. 
 
F. The rule of law in the Southern Sudan constitutional legal order 
Examination of the constitutional development in Sudan since independence until the signing of 
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005 shows that the period is marked by failure to 
adopt an all embracing constitution which could guarantee fundamental rights and freedoms for 
diverse Sudanese polity. As already discussed in chapter one, the rule of law connotes meaningful 
and enforceable laws where decisions are transparent, fair and predictable, basic security with 
personal safety, protection of individuals and property rights, and an independent judiciary that 
safeguards both.100 Different constitutions did not embody or promote these attributes essential 
to guarantee the rule of law.  
 
The decision of successive Sudanese governments to embrace Islamic Sharia at the expense of 
other faiths ensured constant violent struggle by the minorities against the government. The 
failure to build an independent judiciary to guarantee individual and collective rights negatively 
impacted the development of the rule of law. For example, while the 1972 Addis Ababa 
Agreement had granted significant autonomy to the South, this autonomy was violated and 
ultimately abrogated by the same government without due regard to the implications for or 
reaction from the other signatory to the agreement. Similarly, the government decision to impose 
Arabic as the national language and restrict the use of other languages in the South greatly 
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deprived Southerners of their right to political participation, cultural rights and freedom of 
worship. As already discussed, during and after independence Southerners had wanted limited 
autonomy rather than full-fledged separation. But this decision to demand limited autonomy in 
lieu of a separate state was conditioned on the willingness of the government to improve 
necessary social and economic conditions which would have paved the way for consolidation of 
the rule of law and social justice based on equality of citizenship.  
 
It was only after the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement that we sawa real 
commitment of the Sudanese government to the rule of law and its attendant features such as 
the Bill of Rights which was incorporated in the Constitution. It was in this period we sawboth 
the ICSS and the ICS recognizing that all international human rights instruments to which Sudan 
is a party would automatically become part of the new constitutional legal order.101The 
commitment to human rights in the CPA can be attributed to the fact that its negotiation 
involved different parties and in particular Western countries such as the US, Germany, Britain 
and Norway and international institutions such as the UN, the AU and IGAD. It is clear that 
these international actors could not have agreed to support a peace agreement which was not 
based on international human rights standards and commitment to the rule of law.   
 
G. Conclusion 
The chapter has discussed constitutional development in Sudan and how this development 
affected the rule of law in the country. It has been shown that it was the lack of the rule of law as 
reflected in the minimum attributes identified in the introductory chapter, and complete 
disregard of human rights by successive governments in Khartoum and the general absence of 
an acceptable constitutional legal framework able to accommodate needs and aspirations of 
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various Sudanese nationalities, that underlay the protracted conflict between the SPLM and the 
Sudanese government. It has also been shown that the general absence of legal institutions such 
as an independent judiciary to guarantee equality before the law for all citizens, law and order 
institutions to protect all Sudanese without discrimination, guarantees of fundamental rights such 
as freedom of worship, freedom of expression and the right to cultural heritage exacerbated the 
marginalization of Southerners in the Sudanese polity.  
 
It was in the quest to address these challenges and end the conflict between the parties that the 
SPLM and the government negotiated and eventually signed the CPA. On examining the CPA it 
is evident that the rule of law is envisioned and associated with respect for human rights, an 
independent judiciary, strong law and order institutions, an accountable executive, and improved 
social and economic conditions among many other objectives. It is these that will be the subject 
of the next discussion in the context of self-determination as enshrined in the CPA. The chapter 
will examine the correlation between the demand for self-determination on the one hand and the 
advancement of the rule of law and protection of fundamental rights within Southern Sudan`s 
context on the other.  
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Chapter Three 
III. Southern Sudan and the Right to Self-determination in 
International Law. 
 
A. Introduction 
This Chapter introduces the right to self-determination as recognized and applied in international 
law. The right is examined in the context of the CPA which led to the formation of a new state 
of South Sudan.1It is this formation of a new state that raises some questions pertinent to the 
protection of human rights and advancement of rule of law in Southern/South Sudan. The core 
question in this chapter is, how does self-determination square with the secession and the 
protection and advancement of human rights and the rule of law in Southern Sudan?  
 
Can we contend that by exercising the right to self-determination Southern Sudan is likely to 
create an environment more amenable to promotion of the rule of law and enjoyment of human 
rights? Or, more fundamentally, is the claim of self-determination inherently antithetical to the 
rule of law? The discussion in this chapter will trace the development of self-determination in 
international law by specifically examining various international and regional instruments such as 
the UN Charter, the International Bill of Human Rights, and the African Charter on Human and 
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Peoples Rights on how they address the right to self-determination. The chapter will further 
examine how the concept has been understood and framed not only as a mechanism to resist 
injustice and oppression but also as a justification for advancing human rights and the rule of law 
in post-independence Africa. 
 
B. The concept of self-determination in international law 
The concept of self-determination is one of the most contentious and contested in the realm of 
international law and also an important aspect of the international law of statehood.2 It is a most 
commonly and passionately expressed concept in international relations, invoked by peoples who 
find themselves struggling against a variety of actual or perceived oppressive situations.3 It can 
mean the right of a political unit within a federal system, such as Southern Sudan or Kosovo, to 
secede from a federation or a unified state and become an independent sovereign state. Self-
determination not need necessarily lead to an independent state, it may simply mean the right of 
an ethnic, linguistic or religious group within an existing sovereign polity to a greater degree of 
autonomy and linguistic or religious identity without forming an independent state.4 
 
It has both internal and external dimensions providing a gloss on the notions of state 
sovereignty, the equality of states and non-intervention.5Contestation over self-determination 
arises from its definition and its basis and meaning.6 Despite this contestation the concept has 
been widely accepted as a legal right of peoples to determine their political, economic, social and 
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cultural destiny.7 The right also embraces disposition and control over natural resources and the 
right not to be deprived of the means of sustenance.8 
 
Despite the recognition of the right to self-determination in international law, the concept 
continues to be contentious because it challenges some of the fundamental principles of 
international law. It challenges the sovereignty of states and their territorial integrity, it interferes 
with matters within domestic spheres of states such as the protection of human rights of 
minorities, and it makes international relations, based on equality of states, uncertain.9 It is 
against this claim that self-determination in post-colonial Africa was either viewed with limited 
enthusiasm or exercised with extreme caution, especially when the claim to self-determination 
contained an aspiration for secession or independence. Since the striving for external self-
determination which was characterized by a bitter struggle between the colonizers and the 
colonized came to an end, African countries were less interested in supporting the internal 
dimension of self-determination, in the belief that such support would challenge territorial 
integrity of states and encourage secessionist claims.  
 
The tendency of post-independence African leaders to accumulate state resources for their own 
good and grant money and influence disproportionately to the members of their ethnic groups at 
the expense of other ethnic groups meant that resentment and rivalry against various ethnic 
groups complicated the entire quest for statebuilding in post-colonial Africa. Similarly, general 
poor governance led some of their own citizens to demand greater involvement in the 
management of both political and economic affairs in their countries, if necessary by force. It 
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was partly because of this failure to involve other ethnic groups in benefiting from economic and 
political opportunities available that most of the struggles for the right to self-determination 
occurred in post-independence Africa.  
 
The key question to pose is, who are the beneficiaries of the right to self-determination? 
International law contends that the beneficiaries of this right are the ‘peoples’, but hardly it 
explains who the peoples are and how we identify them. The use of variants such as ‘national 
self-determination’ or ‘self-determination of peoples’ may seem to indicate that groups which 
may invoke the principle include ‘nations’ and ‘peoples’. But how do we identify the ‘self’? This 
question is relevant when considered in the context of Southern Sudan. While in his report for 
the United Nations the UN Special Rapporteur on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection 
of Minorities, Aureliu Cristescu, argued that ‘people’ denotes a social entity possessing a clear 
identity and its own characteristics, it implies a relationship with a territory, even if the people in 
question have been wrongfully expelled from it and artificially replaced by another population. In 
the same report he cautions that people should not be confused with ethnic groups whose status 
is recognized in different international legal instruments.10 
 
Examining this description by Cristescu, it is clear that ‘peoples’ share common attributes such 
as commonality of interests, group identity, distinctiveness and a territorial link.11However, 
understanding ‘people’ in this context raises some complex questions such as ‘who is the people’ 
and ‘who belongs to the people’. In addition to the discussion on Southern Sudan in this chapter, 
it can be noted that the same challenge has been witnessed in Western Sahara over the past four 
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decades.12Despite these complexities, it is worth noting that the term ‘peoples’ has increasingly 
been clarified to include a community of individuals bound together by mutual loyalties, an 
identifiable tradition, and common cultural awareness, with historic ties to a given territory.13 
 
The Committee of experts that drafted the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights never 
defined the concept of ‘peoples’. Rather, the Chairman of the drafting Committee, Judge Keba 
Mbaye, in his report to the OAU Council of Ministers concluded that ‘the Committee refused to 
indulge in the definitions of such notions as ‘peoples’ so as not to end up in difficult 
discussion’.14 The International Commission of Jurist made an attempt to define what constitutes 
‘peoples’ in the context of self-determination. It suggested that communities recognized as 
people have certain common attributes which can be historical, ethnic, racial, cultural, linguistic, 
religious, geographical, economic or territorial. Yet it emphasized that none of the attributes are 
in themselves sufficient to prove that a community constitutes a people.15 
 
Self-determination is increasingly becoming both a uniting and a divisive factor. Parts wanting to 
break away from unified states have justified their position by invoking the right to self-
determination. Equally, some societies and countries have argued their case for reunification 
based on self-determination. Classic examples of the latter are the reunification of Yemen and of 
the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) after the fall of 
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the Berlin Wall.16 The treaty on the final settlement for the formation of a unified Germany 
formally acknowledged that German unity was brought about as the result of the exercise by the 
German people of its right to self-determination.17 Yet, it can be argued that these examples are 
unique in the sense that they have not been replicated elsewhere. Rather, most peoples have 
invoked self-determination as a basis for separation rather than unification.18 From the colonial 
territories demanding their independence to the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia,19 the 
break-up of the Soviet Union, the secession of Eritrea and now South Sudan, self-determination 
to form independent countries has been central to their claims.  
 
C. The development of the concept of self-determination 
Self-determination gained prominence in the early 20th century during the First World War when 
the United States under President Wilson became its foremost proponent. President Wilson’s 
support was motivated by the belief that ‘people had the right to choose their own sovereignty 
and be free from external coercion or alien domination’.20 He supported upholding ‘the liberty, 
the self government and undictated development of all peoples’. To him it was clear that no 
‘people should be forced under sovereignty under which it does not wish to live and no territory 
should change hands except for the purpose of securing those who inhibit it a fair chance of life 
                                                 
16 Michael Meyer, The Year that Changed the World: The Untold Story Behind the fall of the Berlin Wall, New York: Simon & 
Schuster, 2009. See also Peter Schweizer (ed.), The Fall of the Berlin Wall: Reassessing the Causes and Consequences of the 
End of the Cold War, Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2000.  
17Christian Tomuschat, ‘Self Determination in a Post Colonial World’ in C. Tomuschat (ed.) Modern Law of Self 
Determination, Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1993, 3.  
18 C. Tomuschat, ibid., 4.  
19 See Richard Iglar, ‘The Constitutional Crisis in Yugoslavia and the International Law of Self Determination: 
Slovenia`s and Croatia`s Right to Secede’, Boston College International and Comparative Law Review, vol. 15, 1, 1992, 213-
240. See also Garry Wilson, ‘Self Determination, Recognition and the Problem of Kosovo’, Netherlands International 
Law Review, vol. 56, 3, 2009, 455-481, and Steve Terret, the Dissolution of Yugoslavia and the Badinter Arbitration 
Commission: A Contextual Study of Peacemaking Efforts in the Post-Cold War Period, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000.  
20Message from President Wilson to Russia, June 9, 1917, Washington. 
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and liberty’.21 What this statement of Wilson demonstrates is the belief that people should be 
free to determine their own destiny without being coerced to accept any form of sovereignty 
which may be imposed on them against their wishes’.22 
 
However, President Wilson’s support for self-determination should not obscure the larger goal 
of this commitment. The idea of self-determination was combined with that of the liberal state 
which President Wilson was committed to advance. In the liberal context, political authority 
derives from individuals. It assumes that individuals are free and equal and the purpose of 
political institutions is to protect that freedom. A liberal state is characterized by 
constitutionalism and the rule of law as the best means of guaranteeing individual freedoms, as 
well as its representative and democratic character. The authority of government is seen to derive 
from the people in a generic rather than a national sense, as the group of individuals composing 
the population of a state.23 Yet, it is clear that not everybody, not even all Wilson’s colleagues in 
the government, shared his views on the liberty of all ‘mankind’ and their right to choose their 
own destiny. 
 
For example, Robert Lansing, the Secretary of State, raised a legal critique and was categorical 
that this declaration by President Wilson was ‘unfit’ for some races. He asked, ‘when the 
President talks of ‘self-determination’, what unit had he in mind? Did he mean a race, a territorial 
area or a community? Without a definite unit which is practicable, Lansing thought, application 
of this principle is dangerous to peace and stability; the more he thought about the President’s 
declaration on the right of self-determination, the more convinced he was of the danger of 
                                                 
21Ibid. 
22 W. Wilson, ‘An Address to a Joint Session of Congress’ in A.S. Link (ed.) The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984, vol. 46, 318-24.   
23J. Rawls, the Law of the Peoples, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999, 14.  
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putting such ideas into the minds of certain races.24 It was bound to be the basis of impossible 
demands on the post-war Peace Congress and create trouble in many lands, Lansing considered; 
the phrase was simply loaded with dynamite, it would raise hopes which could never be 
realized.25 
 
Reading the views of Secretary Lansing, one can point out that he was afraid of the fact that 
black people in the US who had been subjected to injustice and oppression, might have relied on 
the declaration to demand more rights from the US government. It can further be argued that 
Secretary Lansing was being sympathetic to European colonial powers which controlled vast 
territories across the world. Reaffirming the right to self-determination of peoples in colonial 
territories would mean repudiating colonial powers’ interests in these territories. Indeed, when he 
stated that ‘I am of the danger of putting such ideas into the minds of certain races’ he was 
saying categorically that self-determination would be relied upon by the people in these colonial 
territories and the US itself to claim their freedoms as such it was seen as a dynamite. It is not 
surprising therefore that within the US and colonial metropolis they did not interpret this 
concept as granting an avenue for freedom or independence for those they oppressed or 
colonised.  
 
In the 1941 Declaration of Principles the President of the United States and the Prime Minister 
of the United Kingdom reaffirmed that ‘the signatories desire to see no territorial changes that 
do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the people concerned and that the signatories 
respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live, and 
they wish to see sovereign rights and self government restored to those who have been forcefully 
                                                 
24 Robert Lansing, The Peace Negotiations: A Personal Narrative, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1921, 97-98. 
25 Ibid. 
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deprived of them’.26 Similarly the Yalta Declaration of 1945 reaffirmed and pledged signatories to 
the ‘earliest possible reestablishment through free elections of government responsive to the will 
of the people’.27 
 
D. Self-determination and the United Nations 
The objectives outlined in the Yalta Declaration were concretized by the adoption of the United 
Nations Charter in San Francisco in 1945.28 The Charter categorically affirmed the principle of 
equal rights and self-determination of peoples.29 The purposes of the United Nations were ‘to 
develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and 
self determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal 
peace’.30 It is the recognition and subsequent incorporation of this principle in the UN Charter 
that made the United Nations the undisputed platform in which claims and counterclaims arising 
from the principle were historically advanced.31 Indeed, the United Nations General Assembly 
has unequivocally reaffirmed the right of ‘all peoples to have the right to self-determination’ 
through different resolutions and declarations.32  
 
However, it should be pointed out that the biggest contradiction of the UN’s inclusion of self 
determination in the Charter was that South Africa was one of the founding members of the 
United Nations despite its apartheid system. Similarly, United Kingdom, France and Portugal, 
                                                 
26‘The Atlantic Charter’. Available at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_16912.htm. Accessed 
March 2013. 
27 Patrick Thornberry, ‘The Democratic or Internal Aspect of Self Determination’ in Christian Tomuschat (ed.), 
above note 17, 108.  
28Charter of the United Nations. 
29 Art. 1 (2) of the UN Charter. 
30Ibid., Article 1. 
31Tesfagiorgis, above note 3, 83. 
32 See for example, UNGA Resns 1514 and 1541 of December 1960.  
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founding members of the Charter, had vast colonies which directly contravened the ideal of self 
determination they were reaffirming in the UN Charter. It is this reality which challenges the 
commitment of the UN founding members to the principle of self determination. 
 
It was after the Second World War that self-determination in international law became directly 
linked to colonialism and decolonization.33Even before the war the concept was widely 
recognized as the basis upon which the colonized and the oppressed could base their claims for 
independence, but it was after this period that colonized countries and territories came out to 
assert their independence claims by invoking the right to self-determination.34 The importance of 
the UN Charter in advancing the right to self-determination can be seen in its role in the 
decolonization process. Chapters XI and XII of the Charter provided for the ‘non-self governing 
territories’ and ‘trust territories’. Articles 73 and 76 of the Charter called upon states 
administering non-self-governing territories ‘whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure 
of self government’ to promote ‘self government, take due account of the political aspirations of 
the peoples and assist them in the progressive development of their free political institutions’. 
The significance of these provisions lay in their promotion of self-government regardless of any 
internal ethnic, linguistic or religious divisions.35 
 
While the Universal Declaration of Human rights adopted in 1948 does not expressly mention 
‘self-determination’, nevertheless the declaration has some provisions which can be considered 
to support self-determination. For example, the Declaration states that ‘the will of the people 
shall be the basis of the authority of government; which shall be expressed in periodic and 
                                                 
33 See generally Peter Fitzpatrick, ‘Terminal Legality: Imperialism and the (de)composition of Law’ in Diane Kirkby 
and Catherine Coleborne (eds), Law, History, Colonialism: The Reach of Empire, Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 2001, 9-25.  
34Patrick Thornberry, above note 27. 
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genuine elections by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by 
equivalent free voting procedures’.36 What this provision means is that people should be given 
and guaranteed an opportunity to determine their authority over affairs which concern them. 
This aspect can be considered to relate to self-determination which equally calls for guarantee of 
peoples’ right to determine their destiny. 
 
The adoption of the two international human rights covenants on economic, social and cultural 
rights and civil and political rights further crystallized the right to self-determination beyond the 
confines of decolonization, by explicitly recognizing it as part of human rights.37 The common 
Article 1 addresses self-determination not only on the political front but also on the economic 
and cultural front, by observing that ‘all peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their 
natural wealth and resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international 
economic cooperation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit and international law’.38 What 
is notable in these instruments is that they give self-determination the characteristics of a 
collective right and also a prerequisite for existence and realization of individual rights, mainly 
because the latter cannot be attained without a full exercise of self-determination. Further, the 
significance of the ICCPR in articulation of the rights of minorities can be seen in Article 27 
which reaffirms that ‘in those states in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, 
persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with other 
members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or 
to use their own language’.39 
 
                                                 
36 Art. 21 (3) UDHR. 
37ICCP & ICESCR. 
38 See common Art. 1, ibid. 
39 Art. 27 ICCPR. 
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The 1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with 
the Charter of the United Nations reaffirms that by virtue of the principle of equal rights and 
self-determination of peoples enshrined in the UN Charter, all people have a right to freely 
determine, without external interference, their political status and to pursue their economic, 
social and cultural development.40 Arguably the importance of this Declaration is immense in the 
sense that it explicitly links rights of the governed, territorial integrity and the welfare of peoples. 
Specifically, paragraph 7 of the Declaration states that ‘nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall 
be construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally 
or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States conducting 
themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples as described above and 
thus possessed of a government representing the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, 
creed or colour’(emphasis added). 
 
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has also reaffirmed the inherent right of peoples to self-
determination. For example, in its Advisory Opinion in the case of South West Africa (Namibia) 
the Court reaffirmed the inherent right to self-determination for peoples in a defined territory, 
with a strong support for the demand for secession (from South Africa).41 In this case the Court 
opined that the right to self-determination is generally accepted as part of customary 
international law. For the ICJ, self-determination was more than a guiding principle to be heeded 
and promoted by the United Nations, it was a fully fledged right that could be invoked by its 
holders to claim separate statehood and sovereign independence. Similarly, in the East Timor case 
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between Portugal and Australia, the ICJ agreed with Portugal that the people of East Timor had 
the right to self-determination to determine their destiny. In its decision the Court opined that 
not only do the East Timorese people have the right to self-determination, but also the right to 
self-determination has assumed the character of erga omnes amply recognized by the UN Charter 
and the Court’s jurisprudence.42 
 
However, the key question is, when does internal self-determination become external? This 
question can only be answered by examining the context of Principle 5 of the Declaration on 
Friendly Relation discussed above. To comply with the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples a state must have a government ‘representing the whole people 
belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed or colour’. Thus, if the 
government does not comply with these requirements, it cannot claim to represent the people.43 
What this Declaration demonstrates is that the state is under a basic obligation to protect the life 
and the physical integrity of its citizens for it to claim sovereignty over them. But when does the 
state not represent the whole people without distinction as to race, colour or creed? For 
example, if the state persecutes its own people or specific group of its population by committing 
genocide or war crimes, that particular group cannot be held or expected to remain loyal under 
the jurisdiction of that state.44 In this perspective, self-determination moves from being a legal 
right per se to also connote a principle and process of legitimacy.  
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E. The OAU and the right to self-determination 
The preceding discussion has outlined the development of the right to self-determination in 
international law, and how it has evolved from being a right exercised in the colonial context to a 
fully-fledged right guaranteed by various international human rights instruments. This discussion 
provides a compelling need to further examine the development of the right to self-
determination within the African context and with reference to Southern Sudan in particular. 
This discussion is crucial because Africa is a continent where for the right to self-determination 
continue to be contested by different groups of people. Citing different examples, the discussion 
will demonstrate that in post-colonial Africa various demands for self-determination have been 
premised on the basis of human rights violation and disregard of the rule of law, as in Biafra, 
Eritrea or Southern Sudan.  
 
The right to self-determination has a long and protracted history in Africa. In the struggle 
leading to independence most African countries underwent shared experiences – the debilitating 
effects of the slave trade and colonialism by Western powers and Arabs.45 When African 
countries achieved independence, mostly in the 1960s, they faced a myriad challenges in 
remaining as viable states as had been defined by their departing colonial masters without 
altering their existing territorial boarders.46 This is because with the advent of colonialism, states 
and nationalities had been arbitrarily divided, unrelated communities and people were arbitrarily 
joined together just as united people were torn apart.47 The irrationality and selfishness by which 
the borders had been drawn by the colonial powers were recognized by African countries, but it 
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was hoped by some that independence would be followed by a re-drawing of boundaries in order 
to put split national groups within the same territorial units.48 
 
However, Africa’s post-independence leaders believed that, while there were injustices, they 
could better be dealt with through functional arrangements between sovereign states.49 To 
address this challenge and others, independent African states decided to establish the 
Organization of African Unity (OAU).50 The OAU Charter reaffirmed that ‘determined to 
safeguard and consolidate the hard worn independence as well as the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of our states, and to fight against the neo colonialism in all its forms….the Organization 
shall have the following purposes (c) to defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity and 
independence’.51 As a way of concretizing the aspirations of peaceful coexistence and respecting 
territorial integrity of its member states the African leaders made a provision for the 
establishment of the Permanent OAU Commission on Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration 
to adjudicate any future territorial disputes between African states.52 
 
Closer scrutiny of the application of the concept of self-determination in the African context 
reveals that it was limited to the external dimension, directed against colonial powers. In other 
words self-determination was seen as a right only guaranteed to colonized and oppressed people 
against non-African powers.53 This is shown by the fact that African leaders never replicated 
                                                 
48 Makau Mutua, ‘Why Redraw the Map of Africa: A Legal and Moral Enquiry’, Michigan Journal of International Law, 
vol. 16, 4, 1995, 1113-1177.  
49Thomas Franck, ‘The Stealing of the Sahara’, American Journal of International Law, vol. 70, 1976, 698. 
50 The Charter of the Organization of African Unity, 479, U.N.T.S. 39, entered into force September 13, 1963.  
51 Art. II of the OAU Charter. 
52 Ibid., Art. XIX.  
53 Tom Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995, 154-162. See also 
D. Cass, ‘Rethinking Self determination: A Critical Analysis of Current International Law Theories’, Syracuse Journal of 
International Law and Commerce, vol. 18, 1992, 28-32. 
136 
their efforts at the international level within their own borders. For example, while they claimed 
a right to economic self-determination through the doctrine of permanent sovereignty over 
natural resources against the colonial masters, African leaders did not grant these rights to their 
own people.54 Similarly, while they sought freedom against oppression by the colonizers, they 
were at the forefront of oppressing their own people by denying them what they had demanded 
strenuously from colonial masters. The situation in South Africa under apartheid rule was 
different; it can be considered as ‘internal’ colonization.  
 
It can be argued that human rights violations and disregard of the rule of law significantly 
influenced the embracing of self-determination as an integral component of human rights in 
Africa. Indeed, the gross violations of human rights that characterized post-independence Africa 
led to the negotiation and eventual adoption of the African Charter on Human and Peoples 
Rights in 1981.55 Article 20 of the Charter specifically reaffirms that ‘1. All peoples shall have the 
right to existence and shall have the unquestionable and inalienable right to self- determination 
to freely determine their political status and shall pursue their economic and social development 
according to the policy they have freely chosen. 2. Colonized or oppressed peoples shall have the 
right to free themselves from the bonds of domination by resorting to any means recognized by 
the international community and 3. All peoples shall have the right to the assistance of the States 
parties to the present Charter in their liberation struggle against foreign domination, be it 
political, economic or cultural’.56 
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The African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights has also contributed in the 
reaffirmation of the right to self-determination as stipulated in the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples Rights. In the case of Katangese Peoples` Congress v Zaire, the Commission was very 
keen to balance between the right to self-determination and territorial integrity of Zaire.57 The 
brief facts of this case are as follows: the Katangese Peoples` Congress (KPC) was an 
organization claiming to represent the population of Katanga, a mineral rich region of Zaire 
(currently DR Congo), which had previously attempted to secede from the Congo in 1960. The 
aim of the application in 1992 was to obtain recognition for the organization as a liberation 
movement entitled to international support to achieve independence as an independent state 
distinct from Zaire (DRC).58 
 
Two issues stood out as central to the claim of the Katangese Peoples Congress against the 
government of Zaire: the alleged violations of human rights by the government against 
Katangese people and the claim that the people of Katanga were denied the right to participate 
in government affairs as guaranteed by Art. 13 of the African Charter.59 On both aspects the 
Commission found against the applicants, concluding that ‘the Katangese were therefore obliged 
to exercise a variant of self determination that is compatible with the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of Zaire’.60 What these findings by the Commission demonstrate is that the Commission 
believed that allegations of human rights violation or non-participation of the people in 
governmental affairs were issues that could be addressed within the domestic context of the 
polity concerned, without a region of that polity necessarily opting for independence. However, 
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if the opposite outcome is contemplated, it would have reaffirmed the fact that governments 
have responsibility to ‘represent the whole people without distinction’ as provided for in various 
international and regional human rights instruments.  
 
What is significant in this case is the approach of the Commission, which seems to have been 
concerned to balance the right to self-determination and the territorial integrity of Zaire. 
Addressing the question of self-determination, the Commission opined that this could be 
exercised in a variety of ways such as through ‘independence, self government, local government, 
federalism, confederalism, unitarism or any other form that accords with the wishes of the 
people’.61 However, the Commission was of the view that the exercise of these options had to be 
fully cognizant of other recognized principles of international law such as state sovereignty and 
territorial integrity. Reinforcing its conviction on the latter aspect, the Commission stated that it 
had a duty ‘to uphold sovereignty and territorial integrity of Zaire as OAU member state and a 
party to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights’.62 
 
It can therefore be argued that the decision of the Commission was not different from the 
practice of the OAU and its members, which were keen to preserve the territorial integrity of the 
member states at the cost of alleged violations of human rights and abuse of the rule of law. The 
Commission’s interpretation of self-determination as reflected in the Katangese question 
reaffirms the views that African countries and institutions have been willing to support self-
determination but have wanted to see it limited to responses to foreign domination.  
 
Despite the above discussion which illustrates the strict interpretation of self-determination by 
the OAU as limited to the colonial context, there are some instances where the organization has 
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been willing to support self-determination even if it leads to violation of the territorial integrity 
of its member states. The examples of Biafra, Eritrea and Western Sahara demonstrate the 
consistent nature of the OAU position on self-determination. While it rejected Biafra’s claim to 
self-determination it endorsed Eritrea’s and Western Sahara’s claims albeit based on different 
circumstances. The OAU endorsement of the self determination for Eritrea can be attributed to 
the fact that in Eritrea there was an internal arrangement between the new (1991) Ethiopian 
government and the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front which had fought alongside the 
Ethiopian party forming the new government against the Mengistu regime in Ethiopia. While in 
Western Sahara the OAU and later AU supported self-determination because the situation was 
considered in the context of colonial rule and decolonisation. It can therefore be argued that the 
situations in Sudan and Eritrea both were endorsed by the continental body after internal 
arrangement which had agreed to self determination.  
 
The African Union Constitutive Act, successor to the OAU Charter, similarly makes respect for 
the territorial integrity and sovereignty of states the foundation upon which its members relate. It 
requires all member states to refrain from interfering in internal matters of another without 
express authorization to do so.63 Yet, the Constitutive Act, unlike the OAU Charter, puts 
protection of human rights and advancement of rule of law at the core of its primary objectives. 
It also grants power to the AU and its member states to intervene in internal affairs in cases of 
atrocity crimes or threats to peace and security of the continent. The question to pose is, does 
this departure from the strict interpretation of the OAU doctrine of non-intervention and 
respect for territorial integrity signal a new era when the organization can intervene in case of 
gross violations of human rights and rule of law as stipulated in the Constitutive Act? As 
Southern Sudan’s example shows, the reaction of the AU to claims for self-determination is 
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premised on the need to preserve territorial integrity of its members even when such claims are 
justified by gross violations of human rights and the rule of law. However, the organization has 
been willing to support self-determination when it is a result of an internally agreed arrangement, 
as happened in Sudan.  
 
F. Self-determination and secession 
Where independence is the goal, acceptance of one group’s claim to self-determination 
necessarily implies denial of another group’s competing claim of territorial integrity.64 Naturally, 
the argument would be that no state would accept the principle that at its own choosing some 
segments of people in its territory will be free to secede either to become independent or to join 
a neighbour. Exercising the right to self-determination need not always involve secession to form 
an independent state,65but it is evident that the major challenge in international law has been and 
continues to be reaffirming the right of peoples to self-determination while adhering to the 
doctrine of territorial integrity.66Indeed, this observation is echoed by Crawford who observes 
that ‘Since 1945 the international community has been extremely reluctant to accept unilateral 
secession of parts of independent states if the secession is opposed by the government of that 
state’. He further notes that ‘since 1945 no state which has been created by unilateral secession 
has been admitted to the United Nations against the declared wishes of the predecessor state’.67 
 
There is a tension between territorial integrity and self-determination; while the former seeks to 
preserve the territorial status quo, the latter is at least potentially aimed at territorial 
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reconfiguration. The challenge is due to the reality that the emergence of a new state to the 
detriment of an older sovereign entity disrupts the composition of international society and 
challenges the very foundations of its main actors.68 Despite this fact it is worth noting that the 
decolonization process through which many countries became independent was never 
considered by international law as a case of secession. In fact the UN General Assembly 
reaffirmed this distinction by stating that ‘the territory of a colony or other non self governing 
territory has under the Charter a status separate and distinct from the territory of the state 
administering it’.69 
 
But can we contend that self-determination explicitly leads to secession? To answer this question 
an examination of the decision of the International Court of Justice in the Kosovo Case may be 
helpful.70 While the majority opinion in this case did not address the question of secession in 
international law,71 the Kosovo Case remains a significant legal landmark in the development of the 
principle of self-determination with a possibility of secession in international law.72 The separate 
dissenting opinion of Judge Abdulqawi Yusuf categorically and explicitly reaffirmed the 
recognition of the right to self-determination with the possibility of secession under certain 
circumstances. Judge Yusuf, while conceding that ‘the right to self determination chiefly operates 
inside the boundaries of existing states’,73 went on to opine that: ‘International law does not turn 
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a blind eye to the plight of such groups, particularly in those cases where the State not only 
denies them the exercise of their internal right of self-determination but also subjects them to 
discrimination, persecution, and egregious violations of human rights or humanitarian law. 
Under such exceptional circumstances, the right of peoples to self-determination may support a 
claim to separate statehood provided it meets the conditions prescribed by international law’.74 
 
Judge Yusuf further noted that ‘to determine whether a specific situation constitutes an 
exceptional case which may legitimize a claim to external self-determination, certain criteria have 
to be considered, such as the existence of discrimination against a people, its persecution due to 
its racial or ethnic characteristics, and the denial of autonomous political structures and access to 
government. All possible remedies for the realization of internal self-determination must be 
exhausted before the issue is removed from the domestic jurisdiction of the State’.75 
 
Examining the Opinion of Judge Yusuf, it is evident that a self-determination claim should be 
distinguished from a demand to secede. This is critical because most societies demanding self-
determination have always put secession at the heart of their claims.76 But one can argue that 
secession constitutes a matter of considerable importance to the international community in a 
number of ways. Secession has an impact on the structure of states and how they relate. 
Territories resulting from secession may lack, at least in early years, the economic and military 
strength of the previous unified state able to defend its borders. Taking South Sudan as an 
example, it is clear that secession has resulted in an independent state heavily dependent upon 
the international community for its continued viability, for purposes of economic and social 
                                                 
74 Opinion of Judge Yusuf, ibid., para. 11. 
75Ibid.,para. 16. 
76 See generally David Raic’, Statehood and the Law of Self determination, Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2002.  
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protection.77 But in addition secession, depending on the grounds leading to it, may encourage 
similar movements elsewhere, when people in such territories consider themselves to be in a 
similar situation.78 
 
After examination of various international and regional instruments as pronouncements of the 
International Court of Justice or the African Commission on Human Rights on self-
determination, it is contended that in international law the recognition of and respect forthe 
territorial integrity of a particular state are not protected to an unlimited extent.79 States have an 
international obligation to ensure that their conduct does not disrupt international peace and 
security and they do not commit international crimes such as genocide, war crimes or crimes 
against humanity against their own people. In other words, states must earn the protection of 
their territorial integrity. Indeed, it is on the basis of this basic duty that modern international law 
recognizes the concept of humanitarian intervention and responsibility to protect to avert 
humanitarian catastrophes.80 
 
It can further be argued that there has been inconsistent recognition and application of standards 
when it comes to support forself-determination, especially self-determination with the potential 
for secession. While clearly many states agree that self-determination with the possibility of 
                                                 
77 The UN ranks Southern Sudan as one of the poorest countries in the world with the least likelihood of attaining 
the Millennium Development Goals.   
78 Aaron Kreuter, ‘Self Determination, Sovereignty and the Failure of States: Somaliland and the Case for Justified 
Secession’, Minnesota Journal of International Law, vol. 19, 2010.  
79 An example of this position is well articulated by Switzerland in its submission to the ICJ during the Kosovo 
proceedings. See generally, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, 
‘Written Statement of Switzerland’ (25 May 2009).  
80 See Miles Kahler, ‘Legitimacy, Humanitarian Intervention and International Institutions’, Politics, Philosophy and 
Economics, vol. 10, 1, 2011, 20-45.  
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secession may be exercised as a last resort, as demonstrated by submissions by Germany81 and 
the Netherlands82to the ICJ during the Kosovo case, other states have different views. For 
example, Russia has acknowledged this aspect but with stringent conditions.83 The implication of 
the latter conditions submitted by Russia are so restrictive that they effectively nullify any value 
such a principle regarding secession may have in international law. Other countries such as 
Bolivia,84 China85 and Azerbaijan86 have rejected any possibility of self-determination with the 
                                                 
81 In its submission Germany argued that limiting the right to self-determination to the colonial context would 
‘render the internal right of self-determination meaningless in practice. There would be no remedy for a group 
which is not granted the self-determination that may be due to it under international law’. Germany further 
contended that, in exceptional circumstances, a right to remedial secession arises under two conditions. The first 
condition requires ‘an exceptionally severe and long-standing refusal of internal self-determination by the State in 
which a group is living’. The second condition requires ‘that no other avenue for resolving the resulting conflict’. See 
generally, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, ‘Written 
Statement of Germany’ (15 April 2009).  
82 In its submission the Netherlands argued that the exercise of the right to external self-determination is subject to 
the fulfilment of substantive and procedural conditions that apply cumulatively. Such a right only arises in the event 
of a ‘serious breach’ of (a) the obligation to respect and promote the right of self-determination, or (b) the obligation 
to refrain from any forcible action which deprives peoples of this right (substantive condition). The Netherlands 
further argued that this obligation is breached when fundamental human rights are denied or the government does 
not represent all of the people belonging to its territory. Before exercising the right to secession, ‘all effective 
remedies must have been exhausted to achieve a settlement (procedural condition)’. See generally, Accordance with 
International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, ‘Written Statement of the Netherlands’ 
(17 April 2009).  
83 Russia in its submission contended that the 1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations ‘may be construed as 
authorizing secession under certain conditions. However, these conditions should be limited to truly extreme 
circumstances, such as an outright armed attack by the parent state, threatening the very existence of the people in 
question. Russia further made it clear that secession in such circumstances must be ‘invoked both 
contemporaneously with the extreme circumstances and also, only, as a last resort’. See generally, Accordance with 
International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, ‘Written Statement of the Russian 
Federation’ (16 April 2009). 
84 Bolivia explicitly stated that ‘the fact that a State pursues a discriminatory policy against an ethnic group cannot, as 
such, give rise to a right to unilateral secession’. See generally, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, ‘Written Comments of Bolivia’ (17 July 2009), 4.  
85 China argued that ‘territorial integrity has constituted the most important principle of international law and the 
basic norm governing international relations’. It further rejected any claim of secession by stating that ‘secession is 
not recognized by international law and has always been opposed by the international community of States’: 
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possibility of secession based on claims such as gross human rights violations. Rather these states 
view such claims as foreign intervention with geopolitical interests. Yet it can be argued that the 
restrictive position of these countries should be understood in light of their own position in 
which they are experiencing significant calls for self-determination within their own territories; 
they may consider that endorsing secession on whatever grounds in international fora such as the 
ICJ could indicate that they agree with claims advanced by these movements in their respective 
countries–position which they wish to avoid.  
 
From an international law perspective, the right to self-determination entails the right of the 
people to determine their destiny without external influence. However, it is worth noting that 
progressively international law has reaffirmed the duty of states and peoples to exercise this right 
responsibly. In other words, each state has a responsibility to ensure that its sovereign actions are 
consistent with international human rights standards and the United Nations Charter. For 
example, although a country decides on how it conducts its affairs, it also owes an obligation erga 
omnes to the international community to ensure that its conduct does not endanger international 
peace and security.87 
 
From examination of various cases and situations of self-determination in Africa, it can rightly be 
argued that in post-independence Africa, self-determination has been pursued as the direct 
                                                                                                                                                        
Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, ‘Written Statement of 
China’ (16 April 2009), 2-8. 
86 Azerbaijan, rejecting any right to claim secession in international law, argued that ‘international law does not create 
grounds and conditions for legitimizing unilateral or non-consensual secession in any sense. Such secession from an 
existing sovereign State does not involve the exercise of any right conferred in international law’. Accordance with 
International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, ‘Written Statement of Azerbaijan’ (17 
April 2009), 5. 
87Oscar Schachter, ‘The Legality of Pro-democratic Invasion’, American Journal of International Law, vol. 78, 3, 1984, 
645-650. 
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remedy for disregard of the rule of law. Yet, it is this scenario that provides a compelling need to 
question whether self-determination does indeed create an amenable environment where rule of 
law can be guaranteed and protected. It is in a quest to answer these questions that the following 
discussion will examine these claims in the context of Southern Sudan.  
 
G. Self-determination in the context of Southern Sudan 
Southern Sudan represents a classic example of the tragic failure of one of the many post-
independence African states to involve its diverse nationalities in the management of political as 
well as economic benefits accruing from their resources.88 This example illustrates how 
economic, social and political marginalization of people in the Southby the Sudanese 
government led to the growing chorus in the South not only for economic self-determination 
but also for complete secession to form a new state of Southern Sudan. As is widely recognized 
in international law, a group seeking self-determination is, by definition, one which feels that it 
has been excluded, albeit unjustifiably, from the community of legal individuals and the attendant 
benefits of citizenship recognized under international law.89 
 
A major challenge which faced negotiators of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement concerned 
(i) the identity of the ‘peoples’ who were entitled to exercise the right to self-determination and 
(ii) whether they had such a claim under international law. It was on the basis of this challenge 
that people in Abyei were excluded from the general framework of self-determination agreed 
under the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.90However, until today, seven years after the signing 
of the CPA the parties have failed to agree on who constitute the ‘peoples’ in Abyei for the 
                                                 
88 Graham Thomas, Sudan: Death of a Dream, London: Darf Publishers, 1990, 181-223.  
89 Nathanael Berman, ‘Sovereignty in Abeyance: Self Determination and International Law’, Wisconsin International 
Law Journal, vol. 7, 1, 1988-1989, 52.  
90 While the negotiators adopted a separate protocol providing for a referendum in Abyei, as of 2013 they have 
failed to agree on the ‘composition of peoples’ entitled to exercise this right.    
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exercise of their right to self-determination. Clearly the issue of Abyei is not an isolated case. The 
current disagreement between Morocco and POLISARIO is due to the failure to identify 
‘people’ who should vote in the referendum to determine the destiny of Western Sahara. This 
standoff illustrates the correlation between the collective right to self-determination and the 
individual’s right to participate in co-determininghis or her destiny. In the case of Western 
Sahara, while one side wants to rely on the census results of 1974, the other party proposes the 
inclusion of all people residing in the territory. It is this deadlock that has blocked any realistic 
implementation of the ICJ decision which calls for a referendum for people of Western Sahara to 
determine its destiny.  
 
In the context of Abyei, what does this failure to identify the ‘peoples’ mean? It clearly shows 
that the right to self-determination cannot be taken as a self-evident right which can be invoked 
by a group which perceives itself as being reasonably distinct from its neighbour or marginalized 
by the centre. Why then has the Northern Sudanese government been so reluctant to allow the 
residents of Abyei exercise their right to self-determination as stipulated in the CPA Protocol? 
The definition of ‘peoples’ goes beyond the normative criteria identified by various international 
instruments and scholars identified above. When such residents occupy areas with strategic 
resources like oil, it is highly likely that their identity and plight will be contested between the 
parties, each party keen to identify or define the ‘peoples’ in the way that suits or advances its 
interests. For example, in Abyei the Khartoum government has argued that the Misseriya, a 
nomadic tribe largely from the North, should be considered as one of the ‘peoples’ allowed to 
vote in any referendum to determine the future of the region. That government’s trick is simple. 
Allowing these people to vote would likely tilt the results in favour of the North, handing Abyei 
territory with its potential resources to the North. Because of this fear the Southerners rejected 
this proposal.     
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Examining the situation in Southern Sudan, which aspect of self-determination can be 
considered to have come about? Is it internal self-determination or the external aspect? It is 
argued that there were elements of both in Southern Sudan. Before opting for self-determination 
leading to independence the region had negotiated limited autonomy where it had been granted 
federal status within a unified state and the ability to determine its own affairs, under the Addis 
Ababa Agreement discussed in chapter two.91 Further, the negotiations and eventual signing of 
the CPA did not automatically lead to secession of the South, rather it led to the adoption of 
anew constitutional order for the entire country. Southern Sudan adopted its own constitution 
which granted it its own government and stipulated that the arrangement would last for six years, 
a period during which the central and regional governments had a duty to make the ‘unity 
attractive’. Thusself-determination with an external dimension came as a response to the failure 
of the internal aspect of self-determination. 
 
Southern Sudan’s claim to the right to self-determination is unique in the sense that it was 
historically claimed not against externalforces such as colonial powers, but ratheragainst its own 
government. Unlike Biafra or Katanga where the secessionist forces were acting against the will 
of the government of the day in power and, by proxy, of the international community which 
faithfully adhered to the doctrine of territorial integrity, in Sudan the central government 
willingly agreed to the right to self-determination, albeit through political and military pressure 
from the rebels and desire to bring the war to an end. In other words, in Southern Sudan self-
determination was seen as an internal arrangement to end the protracted conflict between the 
government and the rebels. It is also worth noting that it is in this period external actors assumed 
a prominent role to address the Sudan conflict peacefully. For example, IGAD was keen to 
ensure that the devastating conflict in one of its member state was addressed. Thus one can 
                                                 
91 See chapter two of this work. Pp. 90-98. 
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argue that it was a combination of factors both internal and external that led to the decision of 
the government and the SPLM to negotiate and eventually sign the CPA to end the conflict.   
 
But can a state on its own decision decide to break up and form distinct territories as successor 
states? The sovereign choice of Sudan to determine its internal affairs through self-
determinationfollows a principle affirmed by the International Committee of Jurists 
commissioned by the Council of the League of Nations in its report in 1920 on a dispute 
between Finland and Sweden, when it opined that ‘a dispute over whether a particular group is 
to be granted the right to determine its own political fate is one which under normal 
conditions…..international law leaves entirely to the domestic jurisdiction of the state’.92 Indeed, 
the practice of the UN in rejecting secessionist movements within its member states has 
gradually been discarded in favour of a more conciliatory approach. For example, in February 
2010 the UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon, addressing the AU Summit in Addis Ababa, 
vowed to work towards a ‘no vote’ for Southern Sudan’s pending ‘independence referendum’ in 
2011, but after a strong protest from the regional government of Southern Sudan, the Office of 
the Secretary General later issued a statement which reaffirmed that the role of the UN in the 
process would be neutral and essentially limited to offering its support to the fair and transparent 
conduct of the referendum exercise, and that the Organization was ready to support either 
outcome whether it was secession or affirmation of unity.93 
 
What were the major reasons advanced by Southern Sudanese to claim their right to self-
determination? The region spelled out different factors such as racial discrimination, ethnic 
extermination, widespread violations of human rights, denial of educational opportunities, and 
                                                 
92 League of Nations- Official Journal, October 1920.  
93 United Nations Secretary-General’s speech at the African Union Summit February 2010, available at: 
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economic and social marginalization among many others. Examining these factors, can we 
contend that they provide ground for the right to self-determination and ultimate secession? As 
already argued in this chapter, self-determination can be claimed by ‘peoples’ who have been 
treated contrary to the recognized norms of international law or international human rights 
standards. Yet, one could be tempted to pose a question, who determines the illegality of this 
treatment of the ‘peoples’? As succinctly stated by Cristescu in his UN Report, the right to self-
determination does not automatically entitle a particular population to separate themselves from 
a state of which they form part by simple expression of a wish; rather, a compelling case must be 
made on how continued association with the unified state endangers the existence of the 
‘peoples’.94It can therefore be argued that the government of Sudan failed the test of 
‘representativity’ as provided for in the Declaration on Friendly Relations. Among other things 
the Declaration requires ‘a government representing the whole people belonging to that territory 
without distinction as to race, creed or colour’.95It is on the basis of the government’s failure in 
this respect that the claim of self-determination by Southern Sudan was premised and attained.  
 
H. The nexus between self-determination and the rule of law 
The discussion on self-determination would be incomplete without examining how self-
determination relates to the concept of human rights and the rule of law. The nexus between 
self-determination and human rights is undeniably strong and compelling. Even the strongest 
proponents of self-determination like President Wilson advanced it in the name of ‘liberty and 
freedom’. President Wilson’s guiding beliefs onself-determination were rooted in its ability to 
spread liberal democracy where individual rights and freedoms were respected and defended, 
though it is evident from his pronouncement that Wilson`s approach was more focused on the 
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political aspect of self-determinationrather than social and economic rights.Subsequent 
international instruments and declarations have equally reaffirmed the nexus between self-
determination and human rights.  
 
Perhaps nowhere was self-determination directly linked to human rights and the rule of law more 
than in the decolonization process. Admittedly, in this period nationalism was also a key factor, 
yet it can be argued that the aspect of nationalism was directly linked to colonial disregard of the 
rule of law and gross violations of human rights of the natives. While it is clear that the colonized 
territories fighting for their freedom invoked self-determination as the mechanism within which 
they could attain this freedom and equality as citizens, it is equally true that the human rights 
movement emerged later, after the decolonization movement. Despite this fact it is evident that 
decolonization claims were partly grounded in the quest to address injustice and oppression by 
colonial powers. In fact the Universal Declaration of Human Rights makes it clear that human 
rights, in order to be protected, must be guaranteed by the rule of law. The implication here is 
clear: it is only through the rule of law that people in a given polity can enjoy human rights 
guaranteed under various international instruments. However, as evidenced by post-colonial 
Africa, the realization of the right to self-determination does not automatically lead to improved 
human rights and rule of law.  
 
Despite evidence that self-determination in post-colonial Africa had little impact on the rule of 
law, the events after the collapse of Soviet Union reinforced the claim byWestern powers to 
directly associate self-determination with liberal democracy and the rule of law. For example, the 
Charter of Paris in its introductory section entitled ‘Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of 
Law’ notes that democratic government is based on the will of the people, expressed regularly 
through free and fair elections. The Charter further notes that democracy has its foundation in 
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respect for the human person and the rule of law.96 Indeed, before the final dissolution of Soviet 
Union and Yugoslavia, European countries and the United States explicitly conditioned their 
recognition of the breakaway states on their commitments to democracy, rule of law and human 
rights. While it is questionable if the US and its allies followed through on these conditions, it is 
evident that the decision to recognize these countries was motivated by a desire to spread liberal 
democracy, human rights and the rule of law. 
 
The growing role of different actors such as the USA, the United Nations and the European 
Union in particular to support rule of law reforms in the aftermath of the exercise of self-
determination further reaffirms the nexus between self-determination and the rule of law. As will 
be discussed in chapter four, the European Union under its EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo 
(EULEX) has allocated substantial resources to build the rule of law. This allocation stems from 
the belief that Kosovo lacks the rule of law and it is through such support that self-
determination can become an efficient outcome for the Kosovar society. Further, the United 
States since the fall of Berlin Wall has spent substantial resources on rule of law promotion 
activities such as training of judicial officials in Eastern European countries, on the assumption 
that it is through such support to these newly independent states that they can attain rule of law. 
Similarly, the increased support from the United Nations for rule of law reforms in places such 
as Southern Sudan, Somaliland, Kosovo and other countries in Eastern Europe further shows 
that the international community in the post-Cold War era equates state building with improved 
rule of law and respect for human rights. 
 
Examining the situation in South Sudan, it is contended that advancement of the rule of law goes 
beyond the declaration of independence. It requires an unflinching commitment by the elites and 
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authorities to respect and govern within the law and guarantee fundamental rights of their 
people. While African countries based their struggle for independence on oppression and 
exploitation by colonial powers, they themselves committed oppression and exploitation after 
independence. Mindful of this reality, it is argued that for South Sudan, improved human rights 
and respect of the rule of law will largely depend on the commitment of authorities to the 
constitution and various institutions it creates, such as the Anti-corruption Commission and the 
Human Rights Commission. This commitment will require strong institutions such as an 
independent and effective judiciary, an accountable legislature and executive and law 
enforcement bodies able to guarantee rights and freedoms of all South Sudanese without 
discrimination.  
 
During the negotiations for the two human rights covenants, the major question which later 
emerged between the colonizers and the colonized was not whether self-determination was a 
right but whether the right was immediate or progressive.97 While from its inception the 
‘trusteeship’ and ‘non-self governing’ systems were based on the progressive development of 
self-government dependent on the capacity of a population to govern themselves, this 
assumption contrasted with the provision of Article 1 of both Covenants which stated that 
legitimate political authority resided with peoples. In other words, while the Covenants conferred 
on peoples an immediate right to determine their destiny, the ‘trusteeship’ system required these 
peoples to progressively develop capacity for self rule.  
 
This contrast can be seen in the different views which were advanced by developing and 
colonized countries to counter the assumptions of the trusteeship authority. For example, 
Yugoslavia reminded the delegates at the United Nations that ‘if the colonial powers had not 
                                                 
97 James Summer, Peoples and International Law: How Nationalism and Self Determination Shape a Contemporary Law of 
Nations, Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2007, 176. 
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been able to bring their colonial peoples to an adequate stage of development in two centuries 
they would unlikely be able to do so in the two ensuing decades’.98 Afghanistan opined that 
‘peoples were ready for self determination as soon as they had been awakened and demanded it’. 
Similarly Saudi Arabia noted that ‘the metropolitan states averred that, if they were to withdraw 
from the territories under their control, the peoples of those territories would cut one another’s 
throats, the fallacy of that argument had been proved by experience but even if it were true, that 
risk was preferable to their position of subjugation’99 What is clear from the different arguments 
by these countries is that self-determination was no longer being considered as a principle, rather 
it was seen as an essential element for the enjoyment of human rights and rule of law by the 
marginalized in colonial territories.   
 
It may further be argued that since the common Article 1 of the ICCPR and ICESCR relates 
human rights and self-determination into a legal synthesis, these two primary documents on 
human rights have unequivocally concretized the relationship between respect for human rights 
and self-determination. The inclusion of the right to self-determination in the ICCPR and 
ICESCR and in the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action reaffirms that the right to 
self-determination is an integral component of human rights law which has universal application 
for peoples. In other words, the right to self-determination is a prerequisite for the enjoyment of 
other human rights and fundamental freedoms enshrined in different international human rights 
instruments. It further concretizes the belief that states have responsibility to respect, ensure, 
achieve and guarantee the rights and freedoms specified in human rights instruments.100 
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The interrelation between economic rights and self-determination has been concretized through 
various international instruments which have reaffirmed the right of the peoples to economic 
self-determination. In 1962, the United Nations General Assembly adopted what has been 
considered a landmark resolution, the Declaration on the Principle of Permanent Sovereignty 
over Natural Resources.101 The Declaration reaffirmed that sovereignty over natural resources 
and wealth must be exercised in the interests of the national development and the wellbeing of 
the people. After the adoption of this Declaration in 1962, developing countries became keen to 
have this principle reaffirmed in all major international negotiations related to natural resources. 
For example, the principle was reaffirmed in the negotiations culminating in the establishment of 
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) where it was 
recognized that in the spirit of self-determination each state could freely dispose of its natural 
resources in the interests of the economic development and wellbeing of its own people.102 
 
The protracted negotiation and eventual adoption of the Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples by the United Nations General Assembly in 2007 can be considered as a 
further reaffirmation of international law of the right of the indigenous peoples to exercise their 
right to self-determination on both political and economic fronts.103 The Declaration reaffirms 
that ‘indigenous people have the right of self determination. By virtue of that right they freely 
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
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development’.104 It also provides that ‘indigenous peoples, in exercising their right to self 
determination, have the right to autonomy or self government in matters relating to their internal 
or local affairs, as well as ways and means for financing their autonomous functions’. Yet, in a 
traditional warning against secession, the Declaration states that ‘nothing in this Declaration may 
be interpreted as implying for any state, people, group or person any right to engage in any 
activity or to perform any act contrary to the Charter of the United Nations’.105 
 
Arguably there is a potential conflict of norms between the right to self-determination and the 
protection and enjoyment of human rights especially for the minority groups within a territory, 
mainly because the right to self-determination and rights of minorities are two sides of the same 
coin.106 As amply demonstrated in Southern Sudan, when reasonable demands for local 
autonomy or minority rights have been rejected by the government, that may ultimately compel 
minorities to claim their right to self-determination, even through violent means.107 This 
argument was concretized in the era of the League of Nations by the conclusion of the 
Commission of Rapporteurs in its ‘Aaland Report’ where it stated that secession may be available 
as a ‘last resort when the State lacks either the will or the power to enact and apply just and 
effective guarantees of minority rights’.108 Further, in 1992 the UN General Assembly 
Declaration on Minority Rights called on states ‘to protect the existence’ of the minorities 
granting them the ‘right to participate effectively in cultural, religious, social, economic and 
public life’.  
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Article 27 of the ICCPR states that ‘in those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic 
minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community 
with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their 
own religion, or to use their own language’. Yet, it is more often the failure of governments to 
guarantee the legitimate human rights of their own people to promote and protect their social, 
economic, culture and traditions that has lain behind demands for self-determination. Hence, to 
address this potential conflict of norms between the need to protect the rights of minorities and 
the need to preserve territorial integrity, governments must be subjected to further scrutiny and 
no longer allowed to hide behind the veil of national unity without explaining how minority 
rights are being protected.109 In other words, governments must find appropriate mechanism to 
guarantee effective participation by all citizens in the economic and political life of the country.110 
In fact it has been argued that preservation of the territorial integrity of states is often a reason 
for gross violations of human rights and the rights of minorities and small nations, or even an 
excuse for war and a hotbed for crisis.111 As argued by Cassese, the right to self-determination 
establishes general and fundamental standards of behaviour. Governments must not decide the 
life and future of peoples at their discretion; peoples must be enabled to freely express their 
wishes in matters concerning their conditions.112 
 
                                                 
109 Hurst Hannum, ‘the Specter of Secession: Responding to Claims for Ethnic Self Determination’, Foreign Affairs, 
vol. 77, 1998, 15-17. 
110Ibid.,14. 
111The Submission by Slovenia supporting the Unilateral Declaration of Independence for Kosovo. See generally, 
Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, ‘Written Statement of 
Slovenia’ (17 April 2009).  
112Cassese, above note 8, 68. 
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The nexus linking self-determination and human rights has been expounded not only by 
international human rights instruments but also through interpretation by bodies established for 
that purpose. For example, the Human Rights Committee in its general comment on Article 1 
stated that ‘The right of self-determination is of particular importance because its realization is 
an essential condition for the effective guarantee and observance of individual human rights and 
for the promotion and strengthening of those rights’.113The Committee further noted that ‘the 
provision is particularly important in that it imposes specific obligations on State Parties, not 
only in relation to their own peoples but vis-à-vis all peoples which have not been able to 
exercise, or have been deprived of, the possibility of exercising their right to self-
determination.114 
 
However, it can be persuasively argued that despite the unequivocal recognition of the nexus 
between human rights and right to self-determination, its interpretation has been limited to the 
individual dimension. For example, the jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee has been 
limited in its ability to consider claims by peoples alleging violations of their right to self-
determination because the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR allows only individuals to bring 
claims.115 This position of the Committee is reflected in the case of Lubicon Lake Band which had 
brought a claim of self-determination before the Committee. In this case the Committee stated 
that ‘while all peoples have a right to self-determination as stipulated in the ICCPR, the question 
whether the applicant constitutes a ‘people’ is not an issue for the Committee to address under 
the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR.116 Despite this decision of the Committee, one can argue 
                                                 
113 General Comment No. 12 on Self determination of peoples, Article 1, March 1984. 
114 Ibid. 
115 Robert McCorquodale, ‘Self Determination: A Human Rights Approach’, International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly, vol. 43, 1994, 852-882.  
116 Ominayak and the Lubicon Lake Band v Canada, H.R.C. Report Doc.A/45/40, vol. II, Annex IX. 
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that international human rights jurisprudence has developed largely through concentration on 
violations of individual rights, especially civil and political rights.117 
 
I. Conclusion 
The primary objective of this chapter was to examine the concept of self-determination in 
international law in the context of Southern Sudan. The discussion has demonstrated that self-
determination, while well enshrined in international and regional instruments such as the United 
Nations Charter and the African Charter on Human Rights, does not necessarily result in 
secession with an independent state. Further, it has been shown that while international law 
recognizes and protects the territorial integrity of states, this protection is being challenged by 
the imperative to respect and uphold human rights and the rule of law. States have an inherent 
obligation to guarantee and protect the rights and freedoms of their people if they are to enjoy 
exclusive right to determine their affairs independently.  
 
Citing different examples in Africa and elsewhere, the chapter has argued that self-determination 
with the possibility of secession has been pursued largely against claims of human rights 
violations and disregard of the rule of law. However, the discussion has also argued that available 
evidence suggest that the exercise of self-determination does not automatically lead to improved 
human rights and rule of law for the polity concerned. This is evidenced by the practice of post-
independence African countries that continued practices similar to those of colonial powers, 
contrary to their previous assertion that it was only through independent states that they could 
better promote the rule of law and guarantee human rights for their people.  
 
                                                 
117 Robert McCorquodale, above note 115,872.  
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The impact and implication of this trend are clear, especially as regards to Southern Sudan. While 
the struggle for self-determination in Southern Sudan has significantly addressed challenges 
identified in chapter two, such as the absence of a constitutional legal framework to guarantee 
fundamental rights and freedom, an independent judiciary, access to justice or equality of 
citizenship, it is evident that the successful exercise of self-determination has not led to the 
improved human rights protection and advancement of rule of law enshrined in the 
Constitution. For the right to self-determination to be meaningful and translate into concrete 
value in the lives of the people, the government of South Sudan will have to break from the 
record of the previous government which it accused of gross violation of human rights and 
disregard of the rule of law.  
 
The following chapter will examine and discuss the historical precursors to the current rule of 
law based reforms. This examination will help us understand the basic motives for current 
efforts to build the rule of law in other countries. Citing post-colonial Africa as an example, the 
chapter will demonstrate that current efforts in Southern Sudan essentially build on the previous 
failed efforts to achieve similar objective of advancing rule of law in developing countries.  
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Chapter Four 
IV. The Rule of Law and the Law and Development 
Movement. 
 
A. Introduction 
Prior to the promotion of the rule of law by the UN, AU, and other international actors, notable 
attempts were made by the ‘law and development’ movement to utilise law as an aid to 
development in Sudan and other developing states. This chapter will examine role of the law and 
development movement in this respect and how this movement influenced the current rule of 
law promotion. Are there any parallels between these two initiatives? And if there are, are there 
any lessons that the current rule of law reform can learn from the previous law and development 
movement? Clarifying this will help us understand how the challenges in the current rule of law 
reforms can be addressed. 
 
The underlying claim of rule of law reform is that legal and institutional reforms are critical to 
the political and social economic advancement of a given polity, that only through strong 
institutions can countries attain development and improved welfare of their people. However, 
these initiatives raise some profound concerns relating to their viability and effectiveness. Is 
there any available evidence to suggest that building the rule of law can automatically lead to 
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improved economic conditions?1 The significance of this chapter lies in its potential to establish 
and clarify the linkage between building the rule of law and claims that such measures would lead 
to effective legal institutions and social economic progress.   
 
But before examining the claim that building the rule of law automatically leads to strong legal 
institutions, this chapter will first examine the precursors to the modern rule of law reform 
initiatives. It is argued that it is through an in-depth examination of the previous efforts 
undertaken by external actors to shape African legal institutions akin to those existing in the 
Western countries that we can clearly appreciate limitations and strength of current efforts to 
build the rule of law in a post-conflict context like Southern Sudan.  
 
B. The law and development movement 
In the aftermath of the decolonization period, independent African states were confronted with 
the need to build legal systems and institutions to address the myriad social, economic and 
political challenges facing them. While confronting these challenges it was clear that the 
continent lacked both material and human resources to realize this vision. This inability 
necessitated the continent to look ‘somewhere else’ for resources and support. The law and 
development movement was therefore conceived and undertaken by Western scholars and 
institutions as a direct response to these challenges. It is also worth noting that these initiatives 
were undertaken in the immediate period after the independence of most African countries in 
1960s. It was predicated on the assumption that strong and predictable legal systems were 
essential for sustained economic development. And since Western developed countries went 
                                                 
1 Lawrence M. Friedman, ‘On Legal Development’, Rutgers Law Review, vol. 24, 1969-1970, 11-50. In this article the 
author questions whether Western countries ‘knew enough’ to give meaningful advise to other countries about the 
modernization of law. He rejected the claim that Western countries could ‘export’ law and development without 
taking time to study legal institutions of others in Third World countries.  
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through a similar process to achieve their prosperity, it was assumed that African countries 
should undergo that route to build institutions akin to those existing in the West. 
 
At the outset, it is worth pointing out that Africa was not the first continent to experience law 
and development assistance as conceived and exported by Western countries. Earlier, similar 
initiative had been pursued by a small but influential army of American lawyers who designed 
legal assistance programmes to reform Latin America legal education and legal systems. As 
argued by Gardner, these efforts while ‘well motivated in the usual sense of the term’ were 
poorly equipped for the tasks undertaken. Because these lawyers and professionals did not fully 
understand local dynamics such as language, laws, politics, economics or culture. As a result the 
legal assistance was inept culturally and uninformed, perceiving and assisting these countries in 
Latin America in its own self image.2  
 
Earlier, in chapter one, we have seen that the rule of law is associated with positive attributes of 
the state such as improved social and economic conditions and enjoyment of civil and political 
rights. It was on the basis of this belief in what ‘good’ the rule of law can deliver that 
international actors embarked on different initiatives to build the rule of law in post-
independence Africa. This assumption was premised on different factors, but the chief one was 
the belief that social and economic development was dependent on predictable legal institutions 
and systems and how they responded to the needs and aspirations of citizens.3 The culture of 
corruption and venal governance which characterized most African countries in the post-
independence period reinforced this belief.  
                                                 
2 James Gardner, Legal Imperialism: American Lawyers and Foreign Aid in Latin America, Madison: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1980.  
3 See generally Scott Newton, ‘The Dialects of Law and Development’ in David Trubek, and Alvaro Santos, The New 
Law and Economic Development: A Critical Appraisal, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006, 174-202.  
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But what was the nexus between law and development, and how were these two concepts inter-
related? Essentially, legal development assistance was originally justified as a rational and 
effective method to protect individual freedom, expand citizen participation in decision making, 
enhance social equality and increase citizens’ capacity to control events and shape their social 
life.4 Law was seen as both a necessary element in development and a useful instrument to 
achieve it.5 Governance through law was considered to lead to more inclusion and equality of 
citizens in terms of opportunities and self-development, protect individual freedom, curb 
arbitrary governmental powers and increase government responsiveness to the needs of people. 
Development was assumed to lead to an increase in people’s capacity to control their world and 
thus enhance material well-being. As an ideal, development held the promise of life that would 
be richer and improve the welfare of Third World people.6 Law and development involved 
projects designed to bring about major changes in legal systems and norms in the interests of 
efficiency and justice. So we see that law during this period was considered essential to improve 
both the welfare of the people and development of the state. Indeed, it was this conception of 
the role of law in development that later inspired the adoption of the Declaration of the Right to 
Development in 1986. The key feature of this Declaration was that it reaffirmed the collective 
role of the international community in providing necessary support to developing countries to 
attain development.7 
                                                 
4 David M. Trubek, ‘Toward a Social Theory of Law: An Essay on the Study of Law and Development’, Yale Law 
Journal, vol. 82, 1972, 1-7.  
5David Trubek and Marc Galanter, ‘Scholars in Self-Estrangement; Some Reflections on the Crisis in Law and 
Development Studies in the United States’, Wisconsin Law Review, 1974, 1073. 
6Ibid., 1075. See also Snyder Francis, ‘Law and Development in the Light of Dependency Theory’, Law and Social 
Review, vol. 14, 1980, 723-730.  
7 Law and development has been defined as the specialized area of study in the US concerned with the relationship 
between the legal systems and development (social, economic and political changes) taking place in developing 
countries: see generally Trubek and Galanter, above note 4, 1062-1070.  
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The United States is considered as the major force behind the law and development movement 
because it adopted specific legislation making this initiative a defining element of its foreign 
policy in sub-Saharan Africa. The Foreign Assistance Act was passed in the US Congress in 1966 
specifically to ‘determine ways of assisting developing countries in all spheres including legal 
field’.8 This legislation among other things authorized the US Agency for International 
Development (USAID) to emphasize the assurance of ‘maximum participation in the task of 
economic development on the part of the people of the developing countries, through the 
encouragement of democratic private and local government institutions’.9 Their emphasis, 
consistent with the view of law as a means of social advancement, was that reform of legal 
education and legal profession in these countries was a crucial tool for achieving development 
objectives.10 
 
But why was the US interested in promoting law and development in the first place in African 
countries? And what were the underlying motives in its involvement? The United States, unlike 
European countries, did not have a notable history of colonial administration and therefore had 
not had much occasion to ponder the role of law in the development process, especially in the 
post-colonial context. However, it can be argued that the interests of the US were primarily 
predicated on its desire to promote Western liberal democracy and the market economy, aspects 
considered crucial for social economic development of newly independent countries in Africa. 
There was also its desire to ensure that these countries did not adopt socialist policies 
championed by the USSR, and so the main Cold War ideological rivalry reinforced US 
                                                 
8 Maxwell Chibundu, ‘Globalizing the Rule of Law: Some Thoughts at and on the Peripheral’, Indiana Journal Global 
Legal Studies, vol. 7, 1999-2000, 79-117.  
9 Foreign Assistance Act, 22 U.S.C, 2218 (1970); Quintin Johnstone, ‘American Assistance to Africans’ Legal 
Education’, Tulane Law Review, vol. 46, 1972, 657.  
10Trubek, above note 4, 1-8. 
166 
involvement to promote law and development in developing countries. The emphasis, consistent 
with the view of law as a means of social advancement, was that reform of legal education and 
the legal profession in these countries was a tool for achieving development objectives.11 
 
Western countries and institutions conceived the rule of law through strong legal institutions of 
governance such as an independent and well resourced judiciary, an accountable and equitably 
operating police force, and access to justice to the marginalized – elements they considered 
missing in many African countries. Since the relationship between law and development was 
assumed to be invariable, its core conception was more focused on the export of Western legal 
systems than on efforts to understand the legal systems of Third World countries.12 It was on the 
basis of these assumptions that Western institutions and donors embarked on the process of 
building and reforming legal institutions as a catalyst to promote social economic development. 
Yet, one can ask whether building the rule of law could have conclusively guaranteed the 
presence and functioning of strong legal institutions as conceived by Western actors. The law 
and development movement did not conceive the rule of law as a culture which needed to be 
developed by the society concerned, rather it was seen as something that could solely be attained 
through improved legal institutions supported by Western developed countries which had 
undergone a similar process.    
 
However, one may ask, why was the law and development movement focused on improvement 
of legal education through investment in law schools? This question is relevant because the focus 
ignored the already established institutions in a country like the judiciary, the bar association, the 
police or the legislature. A closer examination of this approach by international actors, ignoring 
                                                 
11 John Merryman, ‘Comparative Law and Social Change: On the Origins, Style, Decline & Revival of the Law and 
Development Movement’, American Journal of Comparative Law, vol. 25, 1977, 473-483.  
12Trubek, above note 4, 11. 
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existing local institutions, would demonstrate that it was reinforced by the belief that changes 
should start from below. Those actors considered legal education as both highly autonomous 
and influential, and by focusing on this they would easily support changes in modes of 
adjudication and methods of lawyering. The bench in most African countries was considered as 
too bureaucratic and resistant to change.13 Legal education was also considered important on a 
long-term basis precisely because it was assumed that this focus would enable more people to 
enter a legal profession where they could contribute to bring about changes envisaged. 
 
But there were other factors in addition. The proponents of the law and development movement 
considered law critical to the promotion of democracy and good governance. In general, strong 
legal institutions were considered critical to promoting of political development, the rule of law, 
participatory democracy and in general more humanistic notions of development.14 From this 
understanding law was considered by the reformers to have a potential to simplify policy making 
and lead to inclusive economic development. To them development was not only seen as a 
universal phenomenon, it also meant the adjustment of developing societies to an economic 
framework of universal validity predicated on the Western model. What the reformers did not 
take into account was the reality that development must mean something different to the specific 
market conditions of transitional or developing societies and to the cultural setting of each 
national economy.15 
 
                                                 
13 David Trubek, ‘The ‘Rule of Law’ in Development Assistance: Past, Present and Future’ in David M. Trubek and 
Alvaro Santos (eds), The New Law and Economic Development: A Critical Appraisal, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2006, 77. 
14 Robert Allen Sedler, ‘Law Reform in the Emerging Nations of Sub-Saharan Africa: Social Change and the 
Development of the Modern Legal System’, St. Louis University Law Journal, vol. 13, 1968, 195-220.  
15 David Kennedy, ‘Law and Developments’, in John Hatchard and Amanda Perry-Kessaris (eds), Law and 
Development: Facing Complexity in the 21st Century, London: Cavendish Publishing, 2003, 17-20. 
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It should also be noted that the need to promote democracy through the law and development 
movement was observed during the Cold War between the West and the East. Much as the 
Western countries wanted to build strong legal institutions in developing countries, it was also 
seen as an opportunity for African countries to adopt neo-liberal economic and social policies 
considered vital not only for building of a market economy but also for limiting the influence of 
the USSR and socialist ideologies on the continent. Western countries wanted to prove that it 
was not necessary to sacrifice freedom for the sake of development, rather it was possible to 
achieve both. And to them, legal reform was one of the mechanisms to achieve both.  
 
For Western countries, the standard development formula was to build three features: 
government institutions, a market economy and a democratic system within which these 
institutions and markets could flourish.16 Despite this belief, it is clear that there was no prior 
consensus or evidence on how law could lead to development or on the precise kind of 
assistance that was suitable to help the continent to transform itself. In other words, the 
proponents of the law and development movement assumed that strong legal institutions would 
translate into economic development and democracy, yet no one could explain how this 
development and democracy would be attained and sustained on along term basis.  That strong 
legal systems and institutions could result in development was taken as self-evident because 
Western countries had developed through embarking on similar reforms. But this assumption 
ignored the reality that what had worked in Western countries was not necessarily going to work 
in Third World countries with different histories, needs and aspirations.   
 
                                                 
16 Brian Z. Tamanaha,  ‘The Lessons of Law-and-Development Studies’, American Journal of International Law, vol. 89, 
1995, 470-486; Brian Tamanaha, ‘The Primacy of Society and the Failure of Law and Development’, Cornell 
International Law Journal, vol. 44, 2011, 209.  
169 
Within the law and development movement there were disagreements on how to achieve the 
objectives of the movement. While a significant number of participants in the movement argued 
that changes could be effected through legal reforms, others were of the view that proper legal 
reforms could only be undertaken when broader changes in a society has already been made.17 
Despite these varying views, still there was consensus that for Third World countries to address 
their economic challenges they needed to adhere to the rule of law, which could only be 
transplanted by Western countries that had undergone similar process.18 What does this 
perspective of the reformers demonstrate? That they did not believe that developing countries 
could address economic and social challenges without adopting Western policies and institutions 
which had enabled the West to attain development. While it is clear that African countries had 
their own laws and legal institutions which had been left by colonial powers on the eve of 
independence, it was widely believed by the reformers that these laws and institutions required 
refinement to reflect the changes in the Western countries. It was on this basis that the gap 
between the law in the books and the law in action in developing countries was widely 
appreciated and one of the solutions was seen to be professional education.19 
 
The popular belief was that improving legal systems offered the hope that constitutional restraint 
and anti-corruption laws would address major challenges, especially poverty and venal 
governance which had consistently bedevilled these countries.20 Similarly there was increasing 
                                                 
17 Charles Sherman, ‘Law and Development Today: The New Developmentalism’, German Law Journal, 2009, vol. 10, 
1260-1264.  
18 John Merryman, ‘Comparative Law and Social Change: On the Origins, Style, Decline & Revival of the Law and 
Development Movement’, American Journal of Comparative Law, vol. 25, 1977, 457–490. 
19 Elliot Burg, ‘Law and Development: A Review of the Literature and a Critique of 'Scholars in Self-Estrangement’, 
American Journal of Comparative Law, vol. 25, 1977, 492–530. See also Beverly M. Carl, ‘Peanuts, Law Professors and 
Third World Lawyers’, Third World Legal Studies, 1986, 1. 
20 Randall Peerenboom, ‘What Have we Learned about Law and Development? Describing, Predicting and 
Assessing Legal Reforms in China’, Michigan Journal of International Law, vol. 27, 2006, 824-830.   
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appreciation that strong property rights could encourage productive activities by allowing people 
to reap the reward of their labour, tax laws could secure investment through a strong legal 
framework, and contract law could allow and enable people to conduct transactions at a distance 
over time, allowing them to reliably calculate costs and benefits of proposed exchanges. 
Effective criminal laws could maintain social order, bring general security, and enable people to 
pursue their private activities rather than expending resources protecting their property or 
themselves.21 However, all these assumptions were determined and imposed by external actors 
denying the beneficiaries freedom to choose what was appropriate to their conditions.  
 
Despite these assumptions behind the law and development movement, it is evident that there 
was a significant disconnect between law as understood by external actors and by the 
beneficiaries. For example, how could colonial judicial institutions constructed on two tier 
systems serve the wide and diverse interests of African polities without modification? This aspect 
is crucial because African countries adopted colonial institutions wholesale without significant 
modification while the elites previously excluded from their administration were asked to assume 
positions of authority in these institutions. As a result any efforts to link law and development 
should have given consideration to the role and place of post-colonial institutions and how they 
were conceived and accessed by various African societies.    
 
C. Evaluating the law and development movement 
Most of these efforts came to a halt in the mid-1970s with little accomplishment of the original 
mission. Different scholars and practitioners have advanced several arguments to explain why 
the law and development movement did not achieve its objectives of transforming social 
                                                 
21Beverly M. Carl, above note 19. 
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economic conditions of the beneficiaries through legal reforms.22 For example, it has been 
argued that the movement failed partly because corruption was endemic among legal and 
government officials, legal institutions were dysfunctional and legal codes amounted to little 
more than words on paper, and generally a supportive legal culture and habits of obedience to 
law and respect for the law were lacking.23 
 
However, it can be argued that it is simplistic to attribute the failure of the law and development 
movement to African institutions and officials; rather, donors and supporters of the law and 
development movement ought to have fully taken responsibility for this failure. The movement 
failed because from the beginning it was premised on wrong assumptions. It took the form of 
refining and consolidating already existing legal institutions and codes which had been 
transplanted by colonial powers before. The danger of this approach was that it never took into 
account existing African institutions and the place of these institutions in African polity. It is also 
worth pointing out that many African countries were happy to maintain status quo of colonial 
laws precisely because they felt that they could use the same laws to oppress or ‘deal’ with their 
opponents considered as a threat to their stay in power. It was therefore in the interests of 
political elites to maintain these laws without pushing for their amendment or repeal.  
 
Further, the exclusive focus on legal professionals and the role of lawyers in affecting the desired 
reforms conveniently ignored the fact that a majority Africans resided in rural areas where they 
had limited or no access to formal justice institutions. How precisely could the law and 
development movement lead to the improved material welfare of the poor majority? If the 
objective of the movement was to champion development in the lives of the people, then it is 
                                                 
22 David Kennedy,  ‘The Rule of Law, Political Choices, and Development Common Sense’ in David Trubek and 
Alvaro Santos (eds), above note 12, 95-97. 
23 Lawrence M. Friedman, ‘Legal Culture and Social Development’, Law and Society Review, vol. 4, 1, 1969, 29-44. 
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clear that strategies were not devised to articulate how common people could benefit from these 
reforms.24 
 
Garth notes the ‘conceptual anarchy’ of the law and development movement – that a lack of 
consensus between legal experts and development theorists, practitioners and agencies on the 
functional meaning of the rule of law contributed significantly to the movement’s failure. He 
argues that continued conflict between legal reformers and donors about the relative advantages 
of investments in corporate law versus public interest law and the precise role that the law 
should play in the state and state reforms led to uneven and poorly sustained efforts to invest in 
the rule of law.25Indeed, the law and development model advanced by the Western scholars 
sharply contrasted with the reality in most African countries. Instead of political pluralism, most 
societies had significant social stratification, sharp class differences, and authoritarian 
governments. More often legal rules were promulgated in the interests of the ruling elites. All 
these things made it difficult for rule of law transfer to succeed.26 
 
Since colonial times Africans had been excluded from using or accessing legal institutions, which 
made them less able to identify themselves with these institutions. The law and development 
movement repeated mistakes made during the colonial period when legal education and 
institutions were built on a Western model without taking into account African institutions. The 
proponents of this approach did not bother to take into account ‘African realities’, nor did they 
ask beneficiaries what was appropriate for their needs and priorities. Initiatives were conceived in 
                                                 
24 Sundhya Pahuja, Decolonizing International Law: Development, Economic Growth and the Politics of Universality, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011.  
25 Bryant G. Garth, ‘Building Strong and Independent Judiciaries through the New Law and Development: Behind 
the Paradox of Consensus Programs and Perpetually Disappointing Results’, DePaul Law Review, vol. 52, 2002, 383-
386.  
26Trubek and Santos, above note 13, 473-474. 
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Western capitals and implemented by top scholars from Western countries who understood 
neither the prevailing conditions in countries where reforms were to be undertaken nor the 
needs of their target groups.27Under such circumstances it was clear that Western expatriates 
were attempting to fashion legal institutions from what they understood to be the situation in 
their own countries.  
 
The movement was predicated on supporting the development of a market economy and 
democratic culture where democracy could facilitate the free market. Yet, it is clear that a 
significant number of countries where these reforms were to be made were not willing to adopt 
the free market system of their former colonial masters because they considered the model ripe 
for exploitation and oppression. For example, Presidents Nyerere of Tanzania, Milton Obote of 
Uganda and Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia rejected the capitalist system as an unsuitable model 
for economic development of their countries. These leaders did not reject the rule of law as a 
concept, rather they objected to the notion that legal institutions as conceived in Western 
countries were an important factor in the development process.28 
 
Further, the desire of Western countries to promote democracy and the market economy raises 
questions as to the kind of democracy the proponents of the law and development movement 
were keen to promote. Democracy and its attributes vary from one country to another. African 
countries were asked to accept support for reform and building of their legal institutions, but 
they were not asked what kind of democracy they thought was suitable for their social-economic 
development. For example, a significant number of African countries adopted ‘African socialism’ 
                                                 
27 Laure Helene Piron, ‘Time to Learn, Time to Act in Africa’ in Thomas Carothers (ed.), Promoting the Rule of Law 
Abroad: In Search of Knowledge, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace:,275-298.  
28 See S. Adelman and A. Paliwala, Law and Crisis in the Third World: African Discourse, Lochcarron, Ross-shire, 
Scotland: Hans Zell Publishers, 1993.  
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as their economic model, and this decision was at odds with the liberal democracy underpinned 
by a free market and foreign investment advocated by Western countries which were major 
supporters of the law and development movement. What these efforts demonstrate is that the 
movement was conceived and advanced largely to satisfy foreign interests of those who wanted 
to create better climate for effective functioning of the market economy.     
 
The assumption of law and development proponents that investment in legal education could 
advance free markets and democracy failed to consider the wider needs of their beneficiaries. 
Chief among them was to attract assistance in areas which they deemed critical for their survival 
as newly independent states. African countries were keen to invest in training in fields such as 
agriculture, health and engineering, which they considered critical for their economic 
emancipation.29 Furthermore, the donors’ insistence on democracy and free markets was seen as 
another display of neo-imperial domination by the West in the guise of assisting African 
countries.30 
 
There was a lack of faith in the political environment in which many African law schools and 
universities operated.31 The reluctance of African countries to support or prioritize legal 
education can in fact be compared with the unwillingness of previous colonial governments to 
support legal education in Africa because they considered it to be a source of radicalism and 
critique of their colonial administration.32 As some scholars have noted, the law and 
                                                 
29 Emmanuel Kwabena Quansah, ‘Educating Lawyers for Transnational Challenges: Perspectives of a Developing 
Country-Botswana’, Journal of Legal Education, vol. 55, 2005, 528.  
30 See generally Muna Ndulo, ‘Legal Education in Africa in the Era of Globalization and Structural Adjustment’, 
Pennsylvania State International Law Review, vol. 20 2002, 487-504.  
31Brian Z. Tamanaha, above note 16, 470. 
32 Sandra Joireman, ‘Inherited Legal Systems and effective Rule of Law: Africa and the Colonial Legacy’, Journal of 
Modern African Studies, vol. 39, 4, 2001, 580.  
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development movement suffered from unfamiliarity with the target culture and society (including 
its legal systems), lack of theory, and relative immunity to consequences of their actions, making 
the whole enterprise ineffectual or harmful as technical assistance and peripheral as scholarship.33 
 
However, it is evident that even African governments greatly contributed to the unsuccessful 
attempt at legal reforms during this period. There was political unrest in many African countries, 
as well as the prevalence of one-party states that were not supportive of legal reforms, which 
significantly contributed to this lack of success.34 Given the geopolitical configuration in post-
independence Africa, few countries were willing to allow the exercise of fundamental rights and 
freedoms as conceptualized by the Western countries. For example, some countries like 
Tanzania, soon after independence, decided to dispense with the Bill of Rights left by the 
previous colonial government in their new constitutions.35This example of Tanzania challenged 
the central claim of law and development proponents who assumed that the inclusion of aBill of 
Rights and fundamental rights and freedoms was essential to guarantee social, economic and 
political development, aspects that were key to the law and development ideas.  
 
The failure of the law and development movement was further manifested in the fact that 
changes the reformers had hoped for did not materialize. The educational institutions such as 
universities and colleges which had attracted strong support from reformers proved more 
resistant to change than the reformers had expected. Even where some changes occurred, they 
failed to have the system-wide impact hoped for.36  Equally challenging was the fact that legal 
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codes transplanted as part of the wider efforts to consolidate legal systems and institutions were 
ignored by the ruling class or else remained in books without any impact. In addition, the ruling 
elites considered these laws as inhibiting their hold on power and their ability to effectively 
govern their countries without interference from Western countries. With the deterioration of 
living conditions of the majority in these countries, venal governance, corruption, and 
suppression of dissenting or alternative voices, the reformers got disillusioned, foundations 
which had been providing financial support lost interest, and for the moment the law and 
development movement ran out of steam.37It is no wonder that by the mid-1970s the law and 
development movement was declared a failure by those who were its ardent supporters.38 
 
Indeed, during the period from 1975 to 1990, attention shifted to ad hoc assistance to legal 
infrastructure, particularly the training of judges and government legal advisers. Scholars who 
had been ardent supporters of the law and development movement argued that a conception of 
the relationship of the law and society based on individualism, legal positivism and primacy of 
formal judicial institutions was highly Western and could find little relevance in countries where 
they were being imported.39 They concluded that the law and development movement had 
privileged the few and the elites at the expense of the majority in whose name these reforms had 
been pursued. In the following period, assistance for the law and development movement was 
scaled down and there were very few donor funded programmes designed to support legal and 
institutional reforms. Indeed, with the intensification of the Cold War there was little incentive to 
continue supporting legal reforms; rather, Western countries decided to focus on creating and 
sustaining alliances with countries notwithstanding their democratic or human rights record. So 
one can argue that the period from 1970s to the end of the Cold War in 1989, Western support 
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for legal institutions to promote development came to be limited to faculty exchanges among 
some African and Western educational institutions. 
 
So what lessons can be drawn from this failure of the law and development movement aimed at 
modern rule of law reforms? From previous discussion in chapter two which examined of the 
impact of constitutional development on the rule of law in Southern Sudan, it is clear that the 
reformers have lessons to learn from the history of that region. A critical examination of the rule 
of law dispensation during the colonial period demonstrates that legal systems and institutions 
created during that period were structured in a context of furthering the interests of the colonial 
powers rather than benefiting the local population. While various laws were imported into 
colonial territories, they were meant to control rather than advance the ability of Africans to 
govern themselves. The fact that the colonial laws were premised on a two-tier justice system 
discriminating between the natives and the citizens of the colonial powers ensured that from the 
beginning natives were prohibited from seeking recourse to colonial law except when specifically 
allowed to do so. This greatly inhibited the ability of Sudanese to benefit from colonial legal 
systems and institutions. Despite these limitations, on the eve of independence Sudanese were 
required to build the rule of law through and within the framework passed onto them by the 
departing colonial masters, from whose creation and application they had been excluded.    
 
There is a compelling need for rule of law reformers to take these complexities into account. The 
challenge confronting rule of law reformers in Southern Sudan is to link the modern 
understanding of the rule of law concept to the existing realities in the country. As argued already 
in this chapter, the major reason for the failure of the law and development movement was the 
evident disconnect between assumptions and outcomes. The assumption that developing 
countries, to attain development, had to undergo a similar process to that experienced by 
Western countries took no account of the time taken by Western countries to build their legal 
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institutions. However, as experience has shown this approach hardly succeeded, because it failed 
to build on the existing local institutions. It is this unsuccessful attempt by Western countries 
and institutions to reform legal institutions in Africa in their own images that brings us to the 
next question. What happened after this unsuccessful attempt? Below we examine the answer.  
 
D. From the law and development movement to rule of law promotion 
The end of the law and development movement in the 1970s did not mean that legal reforms 
came to an end. Rather, legal reforms continued in different countries, though clearly these 
reforms lacked the unifying concept of ‘law and development’ and support from Western 
governments and institutions by comparison with efforts promoted by the law and development 
movement.40The obvious transition was towards the use of the rule of law as a galvanizing 
concept for legal and democratic change. To understand the transition from the law and 
development movement to promotion of the rule of law, one needs to revisit the original 
primary mission of the law and development movement. As discussed earlier, the assumption 
underlying the law and development movement was that growth and cultural transformation 
would lead to democracy, the free market and protection of human rights in developing 
countries. The failure to realize these objectives meant that they had to be pursued independently 
and within a new framework. The challenge was how to create this framework within which 
these objectives could be attained. It is argued that the rule of law became the natural avenue for 
channelling this challenge. But it is important to understand why Western countries and 
institutions continued to work on the ‘promotion of the rule of law’ despite the failure of its 
earlier attempt. There are different reasons, some of which are examined below.  
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The end of the Cold War and the breakup of the USSR provided an opportune moment for 
Western countries and institutions to promote liberal democracy and free markets as the new 
defining element between them and developing countries. In this period there was no longer any 
broad support for reforms that were not based on some forms of democratic market model of 
state economy. Similarly, the fact that many countries in Africa had become embroiled in 
protracted internal conflicts, such as Somalia, Rwanda, Burundi, Liberia and Sierra Leone, 
provided a window for intervention by Western countries to reinforce their claim that it was only 
through the rule of law that countries can achieve economic development and effective legal 
institutions to guarantee fundamental rights of their people. It was at the beginning of the 1990s 
that Western countries supported peace processes and constitutional reforms in post-conflict 
countries. Support for reforms was seen as key in promoting the rule of law and respect for 
human rights. Indeed, Western commentators stated in this period that the end of the Cold War 
represented the end of history and the beginning of a new era where Western liberal democracy 
and values would be universal.41 
 
The law and development movement emerged before the human rights movement which had 
sought to reaffirm the realization and universality of human rights. While it is true that during 
the law and development movement period in the 1960s and early 1970s the international 
community had made significant progress in adopting human rights norms and creating different 
mechanisms to enforce them, it is evident that inadequate protection of human rights at the 
domestic level was still common. Indeed, this aspect is well captured by the Helsinki process on 
human rights launched in August 1975, which drew attention to the inadequate enjoyment of 
fundamental rights at domestic levels in developing countries, which meant a need for legal 
reforms to ensure adequate protection of human rights. One of the objectives of rule of law 
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reform after the Cold War was therefore to reinforce the enjoyment of fundamental rights and 
freedoms, as reflected in various human rights instruments adopted during and after the Cold 
War.42 
 
In the post-Cold War period, the rule of law was seen both by donor countries and by influential 
multilateral institutions like the United Nations and the European Communities as an important 
factor in rebuilding of countries emerging from conflict, as in the post-Second World War era. 
As discussed in the following chapter, while the rule of law was conceived as a panacea for 
developing countries emerging from conflict, the approach taken by the reformers was not 
neutral but rather represented a set of values, aspirations and subjective experiences of 
statehood. Both institutions and donors emphasized that in an ideal world the rule of law would 
be central to attempts to build the institutions necessary for a peaceful and prosperous state and 
in the process enhance the ability of states to promote reconciliation and accountability for 
crimes of past regimes.43 The assumption here was that modern Western, secular, political 
structures were the norm or the aspiration of much of the world, even though most rule of law 
reform activities took place in non-Western, underdeveloped, conflict-ridden,and in some cases 
non-secular societies.44 
 
There are many factors that compelled developed countries to invest their resources in the 
reconstruction of other countries that were affected by conflict. Rebuilding these countries was 
considered essential to allow them become part of the ‘international community’ underpinned by 
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‘universal values’ of the respect of human rights and democracy.45 The latter objectives had been 
declared essential by Western powers in the wake of the fall of the Berlin Wall.46 It can further be 
argued that helping these countries to ‘stand on their own feet again’ was consistent with the idea 
of globalization whose success depended on stable countries guaranteeing markets for global 
trade. But in addition the challenge of refugees flocking into Western shores to seek asylum and 
prevailing insecurity emanating from these countries meant that they needed international 
support to address these challenges within their borders. Further, since failed states were likely 
sanctuaries for terrorists and other elements with potential to destabilize international peace and 
security, helping countries to effectively defend their borders and citizens was in the best 
interests of the international community, especially at the turn of the 20th century and after the 
9/11 terror attack on the US.  
 
Many assumptions underlay the nexus between the rule of law and post-conflict peacebuilding. 
The assumption was that the rule of law was a transferable technology transmitted by 
international organizations, states and donors, the main actors involved in peacebuilding in post-
conflict countries. This approach failed to appreciate that the rule of law is an outcome of a long 
and varied social, political and context which may be distinct from the experience and history of 
rule of law reform in a particular country. It is further assumed that there is local commitment to 
democratic forms of governance and human rights as espoused by the reformers. The 
understanding is that countries emerging from conflicts will subject themselves to the expert 
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advise and programming of external reformers who themselves are subject to and consent to the 
same rule of law.47 
 
For the reformers in Southern Sudan to validate their assumption that building the rule of law 
can automatically lead to effective legal institutions and states based on constitutional order, they 
must address the social, economic, cultural and political roots of the conflict which provided the 
basis for their involvement in Southern Sudan in the first place. They should not merely engage 
with local elites but should also identify themselves at the local level beyond political, social, 
cultural and economic elites in the country.48 
 
The increasing articulation of human rights and democracy in international organizations such as 
the United Nations and in individual countries, especially those in the West, provided another 
opportunity to examine how countries could be helped to advance institutions critical for 
development and realization of human rights and democracy.49The international community 
made great progress in specifying human rights norms, creating mechanisms for their 
enforcement and ensuring that global human rights norms became part of the discourse in 
domestic context.50 It is worth noting that a few years before the end of the Cold War, the 
United Nations General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Right to Development which 
among other things recognized the central role of the rule of law, respect for human rights and 
good governance in realizing the social economic development.51 What this articulation of the 
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language of rights connotes is that the importance of the rule of law in the development 
narrative gradually shifted from individual countries and became incorporated in the mainstream 
agenda of global institutions.  
 
The implication of this shift was clear – the rule of law debate was ‘internationalized’ while 
ensuring that Western countries could push for the rule of law as a ‘universal shared value’ 
because most countries were involved in its negotiation and advancement.52 Indeed the 
subsequent World Human Rights Conference, held in Vienna in 1993, reaffirmed the role of 
developed countries in assisting weak countries to build necessary institutions to support the rule 
of law. It is this Declaration that provided a decisive legal framework for external actors to build 
the rule of law in developing countries and post-conflict countries in particular. Admittedly, the 
‘rule of law’ had been earlier enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, 
yet it can be argued that the impact of this Declaration was minimal because of the Cold War 
which started about the time of its adoption.   
 
But also, some developments and changes in Africa convinced African countries that they 
needed to embrace the rule of law. For example, immediately after the end of Cold War and the 
fall of the Berlin Wall, African countries desirous of improving human rights and public 
participation in decision making adopted a Declaration on Public Participation in 
Africa.53Although it can be argued that this decision to develop the rule of law was reinforced by 
the new realities of the end of the Cold War, it is clear that African countries were aware that 
public participation in decision making and respect for the rights of their citizens were critical for 
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the progress of the continent. Indeed, this decision validated the claim that people’s participation 
in decision making was the legitimate concern of the international community through different 
international instruments which had been adopted to that effect.      
 
It can thus be argued that the need to promote human rights at the global level, and international 
recognition that such efforts would be insufficient without strong domestic institutions, 
galvanized the desire of international community to support rule of law reform in the post-Cold 
War period. How was the link between human rights and the rule of law squared? Human rights 
champions convinced of the universalism of human rights began to look at domestic institutions 
as a critical mechanism in realizing human rights objectives. Countries notorious for dictatorship 
and abuse of human rights were encouraged to reform their constitutions to guarantee 
independence of state institutions such as the legislature and the judiciary. Indeed, in this period 
countries were encouraged to establish national human rights institutions which were seen by 
international actors as key to guaranteeing of fundamental rights and freedoms and advance the 
rule of law. Examining these developments, one would rightly argue that it was only a matter of 
time before the rule of law was to be adopted as an official lexicon and a condition by donors 
and international institutions when dealing with developing countries.        
 
Who were the major actors in the reform process? As noted earlier, the law and development 
movement was guided by assumption that developing countries needed to undertake legal and 
institutional reforms similar to those already undertaken by Western countries. Yet, these 
reforms were ‘pre-packaged’ items with no inputs from those required to implement them and 
ultimately reap their benefits. This failure raises some questions as to how the reformers were 
planning to carry out their vision of building the rule of law and a ‘culture of human rights’ in 
post-Cold War era. What was to be done differently this time? Were there any lessons learnt or 
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identified in the first movement that were relevant in this new initiative? And if there were any, 
how did the reformers envisage addressing these lessons?     
 
While the law and development movement was promoted under the auspices of foreign 
governments through prominent institutions such as the United States Agency for Development 
(USAID) and educational institutions including universities, rule of law promotion goes beyond 
this confine of institutions and educational establishments.54 Its chief disseminators include 
foreign governments, international institutions, non-governmental institutions and international 
financial institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. 
 
The Washington consensus and globalization, which laid emphasis on the market economy and 
privatization, were also key factors in the rule of law reforms, in contrast to the previous 
approach under the law and development movement, which focused on central planning and 
import substitution industrialization. The need to promote human rights at the domestic level 
and the desire to reform legal institutions to make them effective for the operation of a globally 
linked market economy also underlay the rule of law objectives. As argued by Trubek, from the 
domestic perspective rule of law reforms were considered essential to attract foreign investors 
while at the international level they were seen critical in helping foreign investors take advantages 
of scale and other economies created by dramatic changes in the global market economy.55 
 
What prompted agencies like the World Bank and the IMF, whose focus had primarily been on 
investment in infrastructures and setting economic policies, to get involved in promoting 
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democracy and human rights?56 In fact, it can be argued that the World Bank and the IMF were 
not pioneers in promoting democracy and rule of law in Africa rather this leadership had been 
assumed by some African intellectuals and higher learning institutions who had unsuccessfully 
attempted to demand democratization and fundamental rights in their countries, efforts that 
were thwarted by African politicians through marginalization and state sanctioned repression. In 
fact the World Bank can be considered to have been an obstacle in the promotion of rule of law 
in this period because it insisted that it could not involve itself in domestic affairs of its member 
states. The Bank’s founding Articles of Agreement categorically state that ‘the Bank and its 
officers shall not interfere in the political affairs of its members’.57  
 
But many changes occurred which reinforced the Bank’s role concerning the rule of law. These 
changes were influenced by the Bank’s role in public sector reform, structural adjustment policies 
and the deteriorating economic conditions in developing countries. With this changing scenario, 
the Bank argued that it was time for the Articles of Agreement to be interpreted in a manner 
which reflected the modern challenges.58 Writing in 1990, Ibrahim Shihata, the Legal Counsel to 
the Bank, stated that ‘rule of law was the aspect of the legal system in client countries which fell 
within the Bank’s ordinary sphere of intervention, comprising a set of systemic norms that are a 
basic requirement for a stable business environment for modern state’. He further contended 
that the Bank must have a legitimate interest in safeguarding the rule of law in member states, 
since its absence ‘could render meaningless any process of economic reform’.59 For the Bank, 
any meaningful and successful economic reforms were dependent on the rule of law.    
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The involvement of the Bank in promoting rule of law reforms raises some questions pertinent 
to development of the rule of law in developing countries and countries emerging from conflicts 
in particular. How did the Bank conceive and understand the rule of law? And how did this 
understanding influence its policies related to reforms? It is important to understand and answer 
these questions because of the central role of the Bank in funding rule of law reform activities 
and its influence in determining which countries qualify for the loans/aid/debt relief, in most 
cases using the rule of law as a determining factor. The Bank’s understanding of the rule of law is 
underpinned in the rubric of ‘good governance’ and ‘private sector development’. To the Bank, 
good governance means ‘the manner in which a community is managed and directed, including 
the making and administration of policy in matters of political control, as well as in such 
economic issues as may be relevant to the management  of the community’s resources.’60 It also 
means maintenance of efficient and accountable institutions, entrenchment of pro-development 
principles, respect for the rule of law and the provision of a mechanism for popular participation 
in governance and decision making.61 To the Bank, the alleviation of poverty is dependent on 
economic growth; this is said in turn to depend on the nurturing of a market economy and 
integration in the global market, both of which depend on the rule of law.62 
 
However, it is evident that the involvement of the international financial institutions such as the 
World Bank in building the rule of law cannot be solely attributed to their desire to assist their 
member states build legal institutions for the benefit of their people. It should be noted that the 
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Bank is a profit making institution and among its objectives is to create an enabling environment 
for business and successfully promote its trade and investment policies. While the Bank has 
consistently argued that it promotes the rule of law as a prerequisite for the accountability of 
programmes it supports and money it lends, this conveniently ignores the motives of its 
involvement as explained above. Examining its preference for private sector as the engine of 
economic growth, it can be argued that the kind of ‘rule of law’ being promoted by the Bank is 
not characterized by the traditional ‘rule of law activities’ such as access to justice, prison reforms 
or codification of customary law. Rather the Bank is preoccupied with legal reforms in areas with 
direct relevance to its mission, such as reform of tax codes, contract laws, international trade 
agreements and intellectual property laws among other legislations. This reaffirms the core 
argument in this research that international actors’ involvement in rule of law reforms is often 
informed by the need to advance their primary objectives.63 
 
Are there any parallels between the earlier law and development movement and the 
contemporary rule of law reform efforts? It is argued that both in substantive and perfomative 
aspects, there is a clear resemblance in their motivating themes. On the one hand economic, 
social, and political development has been an underlying factor motivating the involvement of 
international actors in building the rule of law in other countries.64 On the other hand, the mode 
of intervention concentrates on reforming the criminal justice system, drafting legal codes, 
building market structures, building judiciaries, training judicial officers and administrators, all 
with a view to allocating and safeguarding economic and political capacities. Similarly, as in the 
law and development movement, activities aimed at rule of law reforms prefer an expedient 
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legislative process working with a small group of reform minded locals to achieve lasting 
effects.65 Yet, despite these similarities, it is useful to acknowledge that the two operate in 
different conditions and periods. While law and development operated mostly in the aftermath 
of independence, rule of law reform efforts came much later when countries had had an 
extended opportunity of trial and error in the process of governing themselves.  
 
Despite some similarities between law and development and post-Cold War rule of law 
promotion, modern rule of law reform efforts are distinct because of the motives and actors 
involved. While the law and development movement was primarily dependent on the willingness 
of the beneficiaries to cooperate, modern rule of law reforms are conceived as a ‘universal’ 
condition which developing countries must fulfil to attain a certain level of development already 
determined by the reformers. The implication of these changes has been immense. While 
previously donor institutions interacted directly with governments as the primary focus or target 
of assistance, the new language of the rule of law has increasingly alienated governments and 
instead embraced civil societies and private actors who work independently of governments. The 
latter groups are considered to represent the people by working at the grassroots level, while 
governments are considered corrupt and inefficient. Further, it should also be acknowledged that 
these private actors increasingly operate in a difficult environment in that they have to struggle to 
produce modest changes in extremely hostile terrain and in turn have to painstakingly 
demonstrate to the donors that their cause is real and produces some tangible changes.66 
 
Can we say that democracy which involves election of leaders in a free and fair process is 
sufficient to augment the rule of law? Similarly, what precise level of development should a given 
society attain to be considered as rule of law compliant? The rule of law is no longer a country’s 
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choice, rather is considered by the developed countries as a prerequisite to attract foreign 
assistance through aid, favourable international trade regime or debt relief. Despite this 
insistence on the primacy of the rule of law in social-economic development, it is clear that the 
assumptions and dissemination strategies have not changed from those that characterized the law 
and development movement. Programmes are conceived outside and implemented in countries 
without asking for the opinions or inputs of those who are to benefit from them. And the central 
assumption that Western inspired democracy, a human rights protection regime and ‘legal 
culture’ are critical to all countries working towards development continue to be a major defining 
element of the modern rule of law promotion agenda.   
 
There are no specific indicators of the rule of law, rather each donor determines these indicators 
in a way that advance its specific interests. For example, adopting and having a constitution that 
enshrines a Bill of Rights, or conducting free and fair elections regularly, may not necessarily be 
enough to augment the rule of law. Depending on the donor, the rule of law may require 
compliance with favourable terms of international trade, foreign investments, strong legal 
institutions to address potential disputes between states and foreign investors, among other 
things. For the United Nations, the rule of law is increasingly seen as a prerequisite to the 
realization of Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and other reforms undertaken in the 
statebuilding context. It is precisely this approach of Western countries and other international 
actors that contrasts with the Chinese approach to the rule of law. While China claims to respect 
the rule of law, it emphasizes the right of states to determine their internal affairs without 
external interference. It is the Chinese approach that increasingly appeals to developing countries 
who feel that Western donors, while supporting rule of law reform, excessively interfere in their 
internal affairs.   
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E. Parallel lessons for modern rule of law reforms 
Having examined how the rule of law became a global agenda defining the foreign policies of 
donor countries, powerful international financial institutions and other international institutions 
such as the United Nations and its plethora of affiliated agencies, it is pertinent to ask how these 
institutions promote the rule of law in practice. Have they learned any lesson from the previous 
law and development initiatives? How do these institutions conceive the rule of law, and – 
perhaps crucially – how are their activities informed by local realities and needs of their target 
groups?67 Decades after the failure of the law and development movement, have these 
institutions understood that ‘local conditions matter’? Or they have maintained the ‘businesses as 
usual’ attitude?  
 
We cannot determine whether rule of law reforms have been effective without understanding the 
needs of the beneficiaries and how they perceive such reforms. As argued earlier in this chapter, 
rule of law reforms continue to largely reflect the interests and desires of reformers. This has 
greatly inhibited reforms that have direct impact on and relevance to those for whom these 
reforms are pursued. For example, while most reform activities are undertaken from a desire to 
build strong legal institutions and systems, these institutions rarely take into account how people 
‘on the ground’ are likely to benefit. The World Bank serves a good example. While one can 
argue that reforms in tax codes, contract law, property laws, intellectual property laws, or 
investment laws are critical to a country’s development, these elements hardly constitute a 
priority to the majority who lack access to these institutions or do not understand the concept of 
the free market and how the markets work. The danger of this kind of reform lays in the fact 
that success or effectiveness of reforms tends to be viewed in light of the priorities of reformers. 
Reforms in investment laws tend to be measured through the volumes of foreign investment in a 
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country or the way investors’ business is facilitated, rather than the way people have benefited 
from these investments, in the process improving their living conditions or quality of life.  
 
The majority of international institutions continue to define and conceive the rule of law in a 
highly aspirational context. Just as was the practice in the law and development movement where 
the rule of law was associated with democracy, development and improved social economic 
conditions of the beneficiaries, so the current rule of law reform efforts pursue those aspirations.  
Today the rule of law is conceived as accommodating all positive attributes of the ‘ideal state’. 
For example, the United Nations has conceived the rule of law as leading to good governance, 
electoral reforms equated with free fair and periodic elections, democracy, and respect for 
human rights among many other elements.68 Just like the World Bank, the United Nations does 
not articulate how these elements can be attained.  
 
Furthermore, one would wonder how these elements associated with the rule of law can be 
attained through reform programmes undertaken on an ad hoc basis by foreign organizations and 
governments. The international conception of the rule of law is highly idealistic because these 
attributes would be difficult to attain even in major developed countries, let alone countries 
emerging from conflicts. The challenge of viewing the rule of law as a universal common good 
reflected in the ‘ideal state’ is not only limited to international institutions like the World Bank 
and the United Nations, rather it has also influenced the work of different NGOs working to 
promote the rule of law. NGOs and foundations continue to promote the rule of law on the 
basis of what they consider to be essential for countries to attain social economic development 
akin to what they see in their own countries, without precise articulation of how to achieve it. 
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It is no longer the international financial institutions like the World Bank and the IMF that have 
adopted the rule of law as their defining element in their relationship with developing countries. 
Increasingly, foreign donor governments make their financial and technical support to 
developing countries conditional on rule of law reforms. Countries are compelled to adopt 
specific measures to satisfy these conditions as long as they want to qualify for economic 
assistance. For example, the United States in its quest to promote democracy and good 
governance decided to establish its own private initiative independent of the UN and the World 
Bank. It established the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) which primarily extends financial 
assistance to those countries considered to have complied with the goals of advancing 
governance and the rule of law, investment in their people and economic freedom.69 But who 
determines the criteria for countries to qualify for financial assistance from this Account? 
Essentially, it is the United States that determines whether the country complies with the 
objectives establishing the Account. The government relies on information from some influential 
US think tanks such as Freedom House and the Heritage Foundation which have on some 
occasions been accused of advancing their own conservative agendas and bias.  
 
It is argued that this practice of conditioning economic assistance on rule of law reforms has led 
to confusion and despair among many developing countries, because donor countries are not 
homogeneous, rather they have different foreign policy priorities and interests. As developing 
countries receive economic assistance from multiple sources, equally they have to undertake 
                                                 
69 This Account is run by the Millennium Challenge Corporation. It bases its decision on three criteria: ruling justly 
(the level of civil liberties, political rights, accountability, rule of law, control of corruption and government 
effectiveness), investing in people (immunization of children, public expenditure on health, girls’ primary education 
completion rates, and public expenditure on public health,) and economic freedom (natural resources management, 
business startup, inflation, trade policies, fiscal policy and land rights and access).  It relies on data from different 
sources but chiefly from Freedom House, Brookings Institutions, the World Bank, the IMF, the Heritage 
Foundation, the World Health Organization, IFAD and education institutions such as Yale University. See 
www.mcc.gov. Accessed March 2013. 
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different reforms to satisfy wide range of interests as demanded by countries in question. What is 
the implication of this state of affairs? Reforms tend to be modelled on donors’ priorities with 
little or no consideration of the relevance of reforms in the lives of those in whom these reforms 
are undertaken. Examining rule of law reforms in different countries, especially those emerging 
from or still trapped in protracted conflicts, it is clear that such reforms continue to pose greater 
challenges because there is a lack of coherence in priorities between the donors and beneficiaries.     
 
What constitutes a post-conflict situation, and specific issues relating to the rule of law in this 
context, is another issue that requires clarification from international actors. Whether it is in 
countries or regions with or without active armed conflict, like Darfur, Somalia or Southern 
Sudan, international practice appears to be one of joining such cases together under the banner 
of ‘rule of law in post-conflict situations’. Yet there are significant differences between these 
situations in terms of needs and challenges peculiar to each designation. The practice seems also 
to be common in countries not having experienced high intensity conflict but with severely weak 
institutions of governance, such as Chad or the Central African Republic. The implication of this 
practice is that international financial institutions and donor countries tend to conceive ‘rule of 
law projects’ with a post-conflict context in mind. It is contended that there is a need to make a 
practical distinction between these different situations, because the way the term is used to 
describe a situation affects the overall initiatives to build the rule of law in terms of resources 
provided by donors to achieve this objective.   
 
It has been a practice of external actors to cast the rule of law in a negative perception, 
associating the term with poor countries, countries emerging from conflicts and countries in the 
global South in general. It is argued that if there is a consensus that the rule of law is a ‘common 
good’ desirable for both the rich and the poor, then its dissemination should not be confined to 
a specific group of countries or societies. For example, although there are huge social-economic 
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differences between a country like Russia and countries like Chad, the Central African Republic 
or Sudan, to rule of law reformers all these countries seem to lack ‘rule of law culture’.70 Yet, no 
country with an advanced economy is associated with rule of law reforms, irrespective of its type 
of democracy.71 In fact, as a country advances economically its association with rule of law 
reforms recede. For example, while previously South Korea and Taiwan were associated with the 
law and development movement, today these countries have joined ranks with other Western 
countries such as the US, Britain and Japan which consider themselves as rule of law compliant.  
 
As stated by Tamanaha, a wholly negative criterion for inclusion deprives the rule of law of 
shared qualities upon which to build and justify these reforms.72 Indeed, it is this negative 
association of the rule of law with poverty and conflicts that casts doubt on the effectiveness of 
reforms suggested and coordinated by foreign institutions and donor countries. This is because 
experience in countries considered to uphold the rule of law does not necessarily become 
relevant to countries where these reforms are undertaken. The practice of viewing rule of law 
reform as the preserve of the poor countries and those emerging from conflicts deprives the rule 
of law of the universality claim advanced by its proponents, precisely because it is seen as a one 
way exercise prescribed and exported by the rich and powerful to the poor and those less 
fortunate.   
 
To understand how the impact or effectiveness of reforms is established, it would be worth 
considering an example of USAID whose involvement in rule of law reform spans more than 
                                                 
70 See Thomas Carothers, ‘The Problem of Knowledge’, in Thomas Carothers (ed.), Promoting the Rule of law Abroad, 
Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment, 2006.  
71 There have been no rule of law initiatives championed by Western countries and organizations in countries such 
as Saudi Arabia or Bahrain.  
72 Tamanaha, ‘The Primacy of Society and the Failure of Law and Development: Decades of Stubborn Refusal to 
Learn’, Faculty Research Paper, Washington University St. Louis School of Law, paper no. 10-03-02, 2010. 
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100 countries, most of them in the global South. The mission of the Agency in market reform is 
inter alia to promote legal reform in commercial laws, revision of national constitutions, facilitate 
business environment by enhancing corporate governance. The Agency also supports 
commercial dispute resolution, property rights, WTO accession, anti-corruption measures and 
intellectual property protection. An interesting question would be how the Agency establishes 
whether its programmes have had an impact.  
 
For example, international actors tend to measure the outcome of rule of law efforts through 
legislation enacted in particular countries or numbers of judges or magistrates trained, yet one 
can challenge whether the rule of law is enhanced by merely assisting countries to draft  
legislation. This concern is addressed by Humphreys who convincingly argues that rule of law 
promotion extends well beyond technical assistance for drafting laws to support capital markets 
and business transactions. He contends that reforms require nurturing the multiple interlocking 
constituencies who will cumulatively ensure that the law comes to life. Business groups and 
lawyers must be shown how to activate these laws to their benefit.73 
 
Explaining the imperative of the case management system in overall goal of rule of law reform, 
USAID contends that ‘improved case management leads to a more effective justice system by 
decreasing case backlog and case disposition time’. In the 2011 financial year, the organization 
contends that as a result of US assistance, a total of 742 courts improved their case management 
systems, exceeding the target of 624.74However, one may be inclined to ask, how does USAID 
measure the improved case management systems of courts? The Agency assumes that delays in 
disposal of cases can be attributed to the lack of proper training of the court officials. Ample 
                                                 
73 Humphreys, above note 62, 130.  
74 See http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/perfrpt/2011performancesummary/html/191492.htm. Accessed March 
2013. 
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evidence in places like Southern Sudan demonstrate that it is a combination of many factors that 
leads to this state of affair. For example, corruption and inefficiency exist in the judiciary not 
because court officials lack training but rather because of poor working conditions, lack of 
morale and weak institutions to address these problems. It is highly simplistic to contend that 
offering training courses in case management to a certain number of people or officials will 
automatically lead to improved rule of law in a given jurisdiction.    
 
From examination of modern rule of law reform activities, it is clear that there are many lessons 
of the previous law and development movement which have not been learned. While the failure 
of the law and development movement was attributed to the lack of ‘legal culture’ of the 
recipients, so is the failure of the modern rule of law reforms in a given context. The failure of 
reforms is always attributed to national rather than international rules, norms and institutions. 
Yet it is clear that there are well recognized economic, political and social pressures on countries 
which limit their capacity to act independently or implement policies reflecting their needs and 
conditions.75 When these policies fail to achieve their objectives it is always blamed on internal 
factors such as ‘rampant corruption, dictatorship and unwillingness to reform’. To most 
international institutions any failure in the rule of law reforms is attributed to domestic 
institutions and leadership.76 
 
It is argued that if modern rule of law reforms are to succeed and attain their objectives, external 
reformers must accept their role in the failure (or success) of their initiatives. This acceptance 
could provide a compelling need for reformers to re-examine their reform strategies and perhaps 
                                                 
75 See Korinna Horta, ‘Rhetoric and Reality: Human Rights and the World Bank’, Harvard Human Rights Journal, vol. 
15, 2002, 227-240. See also Gerald K. Helleiner, ‘Markets, Politics and Globalization: Can the Global Economy be 
Civilized?’ UNCTAD 10th Raul Prebisch Lecture, CIS Working Paper Series No. 2000-1, Dec. 2000.  
76 Kerry Rittich, ‘The Future of Law and Development: Second Generation Reforms and the Incorporation of the 
Social’, Michigan Journal of International Law, vol. 26, 2004, 208. 
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change the way they deal with the local actors by integrating their views when formulating 
reform packages. The practice of solely laying blame on internal actors clearly fail to admit the 
truth that most of these policies and reforms are conceived and implemented largely by foreign 
experts with little or no input from the beneficiaries, who in most cases are considered incapable 
of undertaking these reforms. Admittedly, internal factors do play a part in reform failure, but 
these factors must be examined from the local perspective and the desire of beneficiaries not 
only to assert authority over these reforms but also to condition them to their needs and realities. 
If modern rule of law reform is to be different from the previous law and development 
movement, it must mark a difference through its reform strategies. Effective reforms cannot be 
achieved while the overall reforms are dictated by and dependent on the interests of the 
reformers. More often, reforms are funded and carried out in the name of the people but these 
people clearly lack agency and participation in determining the kind of reforms relevant to their 
conditions.  
 
F. Conclusion 
The key argument in this chapter was that any meaningful reforms must reflect the needs and 
aspirations of the local polity. While international standards may be useful in informing the 
reform process, it should not be undertaken at the expense of legitimate concerns of those who 
are likely to live under these reforms. It is obvious that modern rule of law reforms build on the 
previous failed attempt under the law and development movement, based on the claim that 
building rule of law would automatically lead to improved social economic conditions and 
effective legal institutions in countries where these reforms were undertaken. However, the 
available evidence demonstrates that there was a significant disconnect between claims made and 
the outcome of the process itself. The discussion has also shown that modern rule of law reform 
efforts have failed to learn any lesson from the previous attempt of the law and development 
movement. This failure is reflected in the similar approach used by the reforms where local 
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beneficiaries lack agency in reform process. The next chapter will examine the legal basis of the 
UN and AU for engaging in rule of law reforms in Southern Sudan, because of the central role 
played by these institutions in the post-conflict rule of law reform process.  
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Chapter Five 
V. The Legal Basis of the UN and AU for Building the 
Rule of Law. 
 
A. Introduction 
This Chapter examines the legal framework of the United Nations and the African Union in 
building the rule of law in countries emerging from conflict, with specific reference to Southern 
Sudan. In doing so, the chapter will investigate how these two organizations approach the rule of 
law, since both have embraced rule of law as the underlying objective in their involvement in 
countries emerging from conflict, especially in Africa, to strengthen legal institutions such as an 
independent judiciary and police service. This involvement is carried out despite the fact that 
these two organizations’ primary role is to regulate relations among states rather than interfering 
in their domestic affairs. It will further be shown that there is a significant disconnect between 
activities by these organizations in the rule of law reform process and the objectives 
underpinning their involvement. It is this that shows a need to inquire further into the legal 
framework within which both organizations implement measures to realize their objectives of 
building the rule of law.  
 
The chapter further demonstrates that while the United Nations and the African Union have 
assumed a central role in rule of law reforms, behind the scenes there are several NGOs and 
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philanthropic foundations, especially from the developed countries, involved in a wide range of 
activities under the banner of rule of law reform. Although clearly these NGOs and foundations 
hardly attract attention similar to that of the UN or AU from international policy makers, they 
play a key role in the reform process. In fact some of these NGOs have far more ‘on the ground’ 
contacts with the local polity than the UN and the AU bureaucracy, and this tremendously 
increases their clout and influence in countries where they work.   
 
The chapter will first examine the UN Charter and the institutional mandate of the UN to build 
the rule of law in post-conflict countries. How does the United Nations understand and 
distinguish rule of law at the national and international levels? This distinction is important in 
order to demonstrate how the rule of law concept is applied within and between states. This 
aspect will further our understanding of the role of international institutions in building the rule 
of law at both national and international levels. International actors depend upon state 
frameworks and their institutions, taking them to be universal in their inspiration and intent. 
They assume that the rule of law institutions and process that regulate these interactions between 
people and their governments employ universally accepted norms, practices and neutral 
institutions. The assumption is that the rule of law is universal rather than a choice among 
many.1 Yet, one must ask how this claim of universality of the rule of law gets implemented.  
 
Since the thesis is focused on Southern Sudan, the discussion will address the specific role of 
international actors such as the UN Mission in South Sudan, UN agencies and NGOs in building 
the rule of law in Southern Sudan. The chapter will discuss how the UN’s understanding of the 
rule of law at the international level informs its continued involvement in building the rule of law 
in Southern Sudan. Recognizing the significant role of regional institutions, the chapter will 
                                                 
1 Oliver P. Richmond, ‘The Rule of Law in Liberal Peacebuilding’ in Chandra Lekha Sriram et al. (eds) Peacebuilding 
and Rule of Law in Africa: Just Peace? London: Routledge, 2010, 44.  
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further examine the role of the African Union in post-conflict reconstruction by focusing on the 
AU Constitutive Act and the Post Conflict Reconstruction Policy respectively. The underlying 
objective of this chapter is to build on the first chapter which discussed the rule of law concept 
and how it is understood by different actors involved in its realization. This chapter strives to 
establish an institutional framework within which the rule of law is implemented with a focus on 
Southern Sudan.      
 
B. The UN Charter and the institutional mandate to build the rule of law 
The United Nations Charter has been the centre piece for the maintenance of international peace 
and stability since the UN’s founding in 1945. However, nowhere in the United Nations Charter 
is building the rule of law in post-conflict areas indicated as a primary responsibility of the 
organization. So it is necessary to examine the reasons behind the organization`s involvement to 
build the rule of law in post-conflict countries. In fact it may be argued that the UN’s 
involvement in building the rule of law is a significant shift from its core role, which is to 
regulate interstate relations and not domestic governance issues within its member states.2 To 
reaffirm this point, the Charter specifically states that ‘nothing in the present Charter shall 
authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic 
jurisdiction of any state or shall require the members to submit such matters to settlement under 
the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement 
measures under Chapter VII’.3 
 
                                                 
2 Erika De Wet, Chapter VII Powers of the United Nations Security Council, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2004.  
3 Art. 51 of the UN Charter. See also, Edwin M. Smith, ‘Collective Security, Peacekeeping and ad hoc 
Multilateralism’ in Charlotte Ku and Harold K. Jacobson (eds), Democratic Accountability and the Use of Force in 
International Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, 85-87.  
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The pertinent question to ask then is: can the failure or inability of a UN member state to 
promote the rule of law constitute a threat to international peace and security such as to warrant 
intervention of the world body? To answer this question one has to examine the purposes and 
objectives of the United Nations Charter. Among the principles of the Charter are to achieve 
international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural or 
humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.4 The 
Charter imposes an obligation upon all member states to provide assistance required by the 
organization to carry out its functions.5 It also establishes the UN to be a centre for harmonizing 
the actions of nations in the attainment of its common aims.6 
 
It can therefore be argued that, under the Charter, it is within the responsibility of the United 
Nations to promote the rule of law if failure to observe it inhibits the attainment of its 
objectives. Indeed, as already discussed in chapter three, Article 56 of the Charter lays down 
international cooperation as the basis of achieving the objectives of the Charter. The Preamble to 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) makes an express provision that the rule of 
law is necessary in the advancement and realization of human rights. This link between human 
rights and the rule of law can be seen in the United Nations Secretary General’s definition of the 
rule of law discussed in chapter one. 
 
While the UDHR does not define the rule of law, by juxtaposing the desired protection of 
human rights through law, the provision can be construed or inferred to suggest that rule of law 
is the formal and procedural safeguard for advancing human rights. The inclusion of ‘rule of law’ 
                                                 
4Article 1(3) UN Charter. 
5Article 25, UN Charter. 
6Article 114, UN Charter. 
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in a landmark document like the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is significant because it 
concretizes and legitimizes the role of the United Nations to promote rule of law as an essential 
requirement to guarantee the realization of human rights. The Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights provides the foundational basis for the activities of the United Nations and its agencies in 
promoting human rights. The definition of the rule of law advanced by the former UN Secretary 
General and discussed in the introductory chapter equally notes that individuals and institutions 
must be accountable to laws which are not only publicly promulgated and independently 
adjudicated but also consistent with international human rights norms and standards.  
 
In 1993, during the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna, the rule of law was noted as 
the essential element to protect and enjoy human rights.7The Conference noted the fall of the 
Iron Curtain, and reaffirmed and encouraged the promotion and protection of human rights, 
peace, democracy, justice, equality, self-determination, pluralism, development and the rule of 
law.8 The Conference condemned systematic violations of human rights and other situations that 
constitute obstacles to the full enjoyment of all human rights, while encouraging the promotion 
of the rule of law as the direct remedy for this situation.9 The Vienna Declaration, while 
recommending measures to address human rights violations, stated that countries which so 
requested should be assisted to ‘create conditions’ whereby each individual could enjoy all 
human rights.10 
 
The adoption of this Declaration was significant in two ways; it recognized that breakdown of 
the rule of law was a major cause of violations of human rights and an impediment to the full 
                                                 
7World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, Doc. A/CONF.157/23, July 
1993.  
8Ibid., Preamble of the Declaration. 
9Ibid.,para 30. 
10Ibid., para 9. 
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realization of human rights, and it recommended reforms in critical areas such as penal and 
correctional establishments, education and training for lawyers, judges and security forces, and in 
human rights and any other sphere of activity relevant to the good functioning of the rule of 
law.11 Admittedly this Declaration was not a binding legal document, but the fact that it was 
endorsed almost by all members of the United Nations attending the meeting in Vienna 
provided a much needed platform for the United Nations to engage in activities geared to 
improving the rule of law.12 
 
However, the key question is, how did the UN jump from recognition of the breakdown of the 
rule of law as a source of instability to direct engagement in specific countries to build rule of 
law? As discussed in chapter four, this decision, while it can be attributed to the end of the Cold 
War which enhanced the legitimacy of the UN as the primary institution to address global 
challenges, both developed and developing countries considered the UN an ideal institution to 
help countries realize these norms at the domestic level. It can therefore be argued that this was 
a significant shift in the international community, from recognition of the breakdown of the rule 
of law to allowing the UN to engage in activities to strengthen the rule of law. Can the UN 
intervene to build the rule of law in absence of a request or consent by the state concerned, as 
provided for under the Vienna Declaration? It is argued that the Security Council can authorize 
intervention in the absence of a specific request or consent as part of its mandate to maintain 
international peace and security. While the Council`s action may not be premised on building the 
rule of law, experience demonstrates that activities undertaken in the process either by the 
peacekeeping missions or by UN agencies are closely aligned with the rule of law reform process. 
 
                                                 
11Ibid.,para 69. 
12 The United Nations General Assembly subsequently endorsed the Declaration through Resolution 48/121, 
December 1993.  
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It is important to note that some developing countries’ mistrust of the political agenda and self-
interest of developed countries underpinning various rule of law reform initiatives in developing 
or post-conflict countries have elicited resistance from these countries. Developing countries 
have increasingly asserted their right to sovereignty and non-intervention. Reflecting this 
resistance, China has argued that ‘development of the rule of law in a country is by nature a 
sovereign matter, as such, in principle, allows no intervention from any other country or 
international organization unless with the consent of the country concerned’.13The example of 
China demonstrates the ongoing challenge facing developed countries and international 
organizations in assisting the rule of law in developing countries or post-conflict situations. To 
address this problem it is essential for these actors to ensure that they pattern reforms in 
accordance with local needs and priorities reflected in the minimum attributes identified in the 
introductory chapter.  
 
C. The rule of law at the international level 
The preceding discussion has demonstrated that the UN involvement in rule of law reform is 
predicated on the UN Charter, GA resolutions, declarations and policy statements adopted to 
enhance the role of the organization to attain wider objectives contained in the UN Charter. 
Building on the discussion in the introductory chapter which examined different facets attributed 
to the rule of law, this section aims to examine the framework within which the rule of law is 
realized in the international context.14 However, it is important first to distinguish rule of law at 
the national and international levels. Rule of law at the national level addresses the rule of law 
within domestic context – for example, the way rule of law institutions discussed in chapter one, 
                                                 
13 Duan Jielong, ‘Statement on the Rule of Law at the National and International Levels’, Chinese Journal of 
International Law, vol. 6, 1, 2007, 185-188.  
14Mattias Kumm, ‘The International Rule of Law and the Limits of the Internationalist Model’, Virginia Journal of 
International Law, vol. 44, 2003-2004, 22. 
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such as the judiciary, the police or human rights institutions, perform their functions or respond 
to the needs of their beneficiaries. Rule of law at the international level essentially addresses rule 
of law between states – for example, how states uphold their international obligations contained 
in the UN Charter and various international human rights instruments.  
 
Despite the lack of precise definition of international rule of law, in general it can be argued that 
the concept connotes reliance on law as opposed to arbitrary power in international relations; 
substitution of settlement by law for settlement by force; and realization that law can and should 
be used as a means for the cooperative international furtherance of social and economic justice, 
in such a fashion as to preserve and promote the values of freedom and human dignity for 
individuals.15 But it is also worth noting that development of and respect for the international 
rule of law has been gradual, largely dependent on a wide range of state interests that promote 
the rule of law in international relations.   
 
International rule of law is underpinned by the establishment of the International Court of 
Justice as an integral part of the UN Charter. The legal regime for the peaceful settlement of 
disputes is part of the mechanism to enhance international rule of law. Article 92 of the Charter 
designates the Court as the ‘principal organ of the United Nations’ whose primary role is to settle 
legal disputes between states peacefully.16 While other organs stipulated within the Charter such 
as the General Assembly or the Security Council may take measures toward peaceful settlement 
                                                 
15 William W. Bishop, ‘The International Rule of Law’, Michigan Law Review, vol. 59, 4 1961, 553-574.  
16 Ole Spiermann, International Legal Argument in the Permanent Court of International Justice: The Rise of the International 
Judiciary, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press:, 2005; Vaughan Lowe and Malgosia Fitzmaurice (eds), Fifty Years 
of the International Court of Justice: Essays in Honor of Sir Robert Y. Jennings, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. 
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of disputes through different mechanisms such as mediation and reconciliation, it is only the 
Court that is mandated by the Charter to legally adjudicate disputes among states.17 
 
While the first chapter discussed how the UN and member states conceive the rule of law, it is 
important to understand also how they conceive the rule of law at the international level, because 
of the importance of the rule of law concept in regulating relations among states. In 1999 the 
UN Secretary General, while launching his report on the key policy goals for the Organization in 
the new century, identified the international rule of law as one of the most important objectives, 
noting that ‘establishing the rule of law in international affairs is a central priority’.18 From the 
Secretary General’s point of view, the international rule of law could contribute to the 
maintenance of international peace and security, peaceful settlement of disputes, and protection 
of human rights, and in the process enhancing international peace and security.The Secretary 
General also saw international rule of law as the ability of states to carry out their international 
obligations in good faith. He noted that ‘realizing the promise of the framework of global norms 
developed by the international community is of critical importance. Without such a commitment, 
the international rule of law will remain little more than a remote abstraction’.19 However, despite 
this recognition, the Secretary General did not articulate strategies for realizing his vision of 
international rule of law. 
 
                                                 
17 Rosalyn Higgins, ‘The ICJ, ECJ and the Integrity of International Law’, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 
vol. 52, 2003, 1-23; John Collier and Vaughan Lowe, The Settlement of Disputes in International Law: Institutions and 
Procedures, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. See also speech by the then President of the ICJ Rosalyn Higgins, 
‘The ICJ, the UN System and the Rule of Law’ given at the LSE in 2006. At: 
http://www2.lse.ac.uk/newsAndMedia/news/archives/2006/Judge_Higgins.aspx. Accessed March 2013. 
18Report of the Secretary General on the Work of the Organization, U.N. Doc. NO./a/55/1 (2000). 
19Ibid. 
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In 2005, UN member states unanimously recognized the need ‘for universal adherence to 
implementation of the rule of law at both the national and international level’ and reaffirmed 
their commitment to an ‘international order based on the rule of law and international 
law’.20There are many reasons to explain the basis of this uncommon consensus between the 
developed and developing countries, though clearly each side had its own distinct reasons. For 
developing countries insistence on the international rule of law was reinforced by the existing 
disparity among states and the quest to have all countries, both weak and powerful, operate 
within the existing legal framework of the UN Charter, especially in matters related to the 
maintenance of international peace and security.21 
 
Asymmetries in power and the potential for political abuse that such asymmetries entail 
galvanized the developing countries’ desire for international rule of law. The practice of rich and 
powerful countries to intervene in the domestic affairs of weak countries further concretized the 
desire of developing countries to insist on a global order based on the international rule of law.22 
It is only within the UN Charter framework that poor and weak countries can realistically 
restrain powerful countries from taking actions which may affect their wellbeing and 
sovereignty.23 Certainly, to some extent any asymmetries of power are likely to be reflected in the 
rules of the international legal system. Even so, the existence of such rules, if obeyed, provide 
                                                 
20UNGA Res. 60/1/2005 World Summit Outcome Document Para 11. See also Simon Chesterman, ‘An 
International Rule of Law?’ American Journal of Comparative Law, vol. 56, 2008, 331-362. 
21 See the Declaration adopted after the Bandung Conference in Indonesia, 1955. 
22 See generally Balakrishnan Rajagopal, International Law from Below: Developments, Social Movements and Third World 
Resistance, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. See also an address by Jack Straw, ‘We are in Iraq to Bring 
about Democracy’, given to the Labour Party Conference, Brighton, 28 September 2005, 
http://www.globalpolicy.org/empire/humanint/2005/0928strawspeech.htm. Accessed March 2013. 
23 Christine Chinkin, ‘Rethinking Legality/Legitimacy after the Iraq War’ in Richard Falk et al. (eds), Legality and 
Legitimacy in Global Affairs, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, 219-245. 
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some degree of protection and security for the weak nations.24 For developing countries the rule 
of law at the international level requires respect for the authority of the UN Charter by all 
countries and joint management of international affairs through negotiations on an equal footing, 
and no country should be above the international law or apply it selectively or with double 
standards.25 
 
Developed countries had distinct motives in supporting the international rule of law. In the West 
the consensus was that the lack of democracy, accountability and good governance, and human 
rights violations continued to inhibit development in the South.26 In fact, in the World Summit 
Outcome document it was agreed that rule of law at the international level was ‘essential for 
sustained economic growth’.27 The argument was that ‘a highly developed legal system leads to a 
highly developed economy’.28 This recognition of the nexus between the rule of law and 
economic development was premised on the developed countries’ eagerness to advance liberal 
democracy which considered periodic elections and respect for civil and political rights as not 
just necessary but largely sufficient to advance rule of law.29 
 
But also international rule of law can be considered in the context of legitimacy in international 
relations. It is through respecting international law and norms that powerful countries can urge 
developing countries to respect and observe the rule of law. While it is true that powerful 
                                                 
24Mattias Kumm, above note 14, 25. 
25Statement of the Chinese Representative to the General Assembly, above note 13. 
26 Roland Paris, ‘International Peacebuilding and the Mission Civilisatrice’, Review of International Studies, vol. 28, 4, 
2002. See also ‘Declaration of G8 Foreign Ministers on The Rule of Law’, Potsdam 2007.  
27UNGA Res. 60/1/ 2005, para 11. 
28Brian Tamanaha, ‘The Primacy of Society and the Failures of Law and Development’, Cornell International Law 
Journal, vol. 44, 2011, 211. 
29 Sundhya Pahuja, Decolonizing International Law: Development, Economic Growth and the Politics of Universality, Cambridge: 
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countries have not always respected international rule of law, their ability to influence developing 
countries to observe rule of law largely depends on how they enforce and uphold these norms at 
the international level among themselves and  among themselves and developing countries. 
 
It was therefore essential to internationalize these elements as universal ideals shared between 
both the rich and the poor. Demonstrating the West’s desire to promote democracy in post-Cold 
War era, developed countries meeting under the auspices of the OSCE in 1990 reaffirmed that 
‘democracy is an inherent element of the rule of law’30. As argued by Franck, in this period the 
question was not whether democracy was necessary but rather whether global society was ready 
for an era in which only democracy and the rule of law could validate governance.31 Hence it can 
be argued that the quest for liberal democratic legitimacy significantly motivated Western 
countries to push for the rule of law in the post-Cold War period.  
 
The fact that the growing threat of terrorism mostly emanates from countries considered to be 
failed such as Somalia, Pakistan or Afghanistan has reinforced the belief by Western powers that 
it is through internationally accepted standards that they can take measures to address these 
threats without being seen as imperialists trying to impose their values on others. Indeed, it was 
through this perspective that developed countries strongly supported the Responsibility to 
Protect and humanitarian intervention, unlike their Southern counterparts who were skeptical of 
these developments.32 Despite these divergent goals regarding the international rule of law, this 
consensus has helped elevate the rule of law at the international level with support from both 
                                                 
30Charter of Paris, 1990. 
31 Tom Franck, ‘The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance’, The American Journal of International Law, vol. 86, 
1992, 46-50.  
32International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), Ottawa, 2001. See also Carsten Stahn, 
‘Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm?’ The American Journal of International Law, vol. 
101, 1, 2007, 99-120.  
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powerful and weak countries. In other words, the international rule of law can be considered as 
‘unqualified human good’ precisely because it serves the interests of both rich and poor countries 
albeit in different perspectives.33 
 
But what is the usefulness of the international rule of law? Why should it be embraced? In 
addition to the different motives of the developed and developing countries already identified, 
there are some other tangible benefits from embracing the international rule of law at the global 
level. It is assumed that international rule of law may contribute to the protection and 
enhancement of rights of the citizens guaranteed under international law, which is reflected 
through the oversight role of international human rights institutions established for that 
purpose.34 An effective institutionalization of the international rule of law may limit a domestic 
authority’s opportunity to insist on non-interference in domestic affairs and use this as 
justification to trample on the rights of their citizens. But crucially, international rule of law can 
also provide a valuable institutional resource by serving as an effective instrument enabling and 
fostering the establishment of welfare-enhancing cooperative endeavours among nations and 
support a globalized economic system.35 
 
D. The rule of law at the national level 
How are rule of law commitments made at the international level implemented within the 
domestic setting? This aspect is important because ultimately international commitments, to be 
translated from theory into reality, require national implementation. In other words, the strength 
of a country’s adherence to the international rule of law is directly linked in substantial measure 
                                                 
33 Judith Shklar, ‘Political Theory and the Rule of Law’, in Allan C. Hutchinson and Patrick Monahan (eds), The Rule 
of Law: Ideal or Ideology, Toronto: Carswell, 1987, 1-16.  
34 Kathryn Sikkink, the Justice Cascade: How Human Rights Prosecutions are Changing World Politics, New York: W.W. 
Norton, 2011. 
35Mattias Kumm, above note 14, 25. 
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to the extent to which international law can be enforced through national mechanisms.36 This 
implementation is premised on the relationship between international law and national law in 
domestic legal systems, which varies from one country to another and is also fluid and shifting.37 
 
Implementation of the international rule of law in the national setting largely depends on the 
availability of strong institutional and legal mechanisms to ensure that states fulfil their 
obligations. International obligations anchored indifferent instruments require strong institutions 
such as the legislature, judiciary, police force and correctional services to translate them from 
mere ideals into a reality. For example, the Commonwealth’s Latimer House Principles (2003) 
require that ‘judiciaries and parliaments should fulfil their respective but critical roles in the 
promotion of the rule of law in a complementary and constructive manner.’38 While legally not 
binding, they provide a clear framework for states to advance rule of law. 
 
It is further argued that the ability of countries to implement their international commitments 
differs from one country to another. Indeed it is in recognition of this fact that the international 
community through various forums such as the United Nations, regional organizations and 
individual countries has worked to create a framework to provide international assistance to 
countries unable to fulfil their international commitments to advance the rule of law. This 
framework firmly anchored under Article 56 of the United Nations Charter has further been 
reaffirmed by the Vienna Declaration and the Programme of Action discussed earlier.  
 
                                                 
36 John Murphy, The United States and the Rule of Law in International Affairs, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2004, 74. 
37Ibid. 
38Commonwealth Latimer House Principles, 2003. See also Conference Report by the Venice Commission on 
Democracy through Law on ‘Sustaining Rule of Law to Promote Social-Economic Development in the Eastern and Southern 
African Region’, Kasane, Botswana, 7-8 August 2009. www.venice.coe.int.  
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However, it is important to question whether a state that fails to uphold the rule of law at the 
domestic level can uphold it at the international level.Consider these facts: Mike Campbell, a 
white farmer in Zimbabwe sought to challenge a government threat to expropriate his property 
with little or no compensation. After unsuccessful attempt for legal redress in Zimbabwe, he 
went to the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Tribunal (of which Zimbabwe 
is a founding member) where he won the case.39But his request to have the decision enforced 
was rejected by the High Court in Zimbabwe on the ground that the Tribunal`s decision was 
contrary to national public policy.40 
 
This action of the High Court demonstrates the challenge of upholding international rule of law 
if the state does not respect the rule of law domestically. It further shows that enforcing the rule 
of law goes beyond the requirement of strong institutions and requires political will and 
commitments to enforce national as well as international obligations. What is worth noting is 
that this Tribunal was suspended in 2010 by SADC member states at the instigation of 
Zimbabwe. This suspension challenges the commitment of SADC member states to the 
international rule of law, if they can suspend institutions simply because they disagreewith their 
decisions.  
 
Despite the growing consensus of the international community on the primacy of the 
international rule of law, it should be acknowledged that there is also a significant disagreement 
among states on how to frame and attain it. While developing countries insist on the importance 
of social and economic conditions as the basis upon which countries can attain international rule 
of law, developed countries contend that it is through respect for human rights and civil liberties 
that developing countries can attain social economic progress. It is on the basis of this sharp 
                                                 
39Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd & Others v. Republic of Zimbabwe (2/2007) 2008 SADCT 2 (Nov. 2008).  
40Gramara (Pvt) Ltd & Colin Bailie Cloete v. Zimbabwe, HH 169-2009, HC/33/09.  
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disagreement that the next discussion will examine the development of the international rule of 
law within the United Nations` two most important organs, the Security Council and the General 
Assembly. How do these organs conceive and implement their visions of rule of law? We cannot 
answer this without examining how the development of the rule of law by these two important 
organs has unfolded.      
 
i. TheUN General Assembly and international rule of law 
The debate in the United Nations on the international rule of law as an international agenda has 
been largely championed and shaped by the UN General Assembly where developing countries 
dominate. Many reasons have influenced this development. The UN Charter designated the 
General Assembly as the principle organ to spearhead progressive codification of international 
law and social and economic issues.41Hence development of international rule of law within the 
Assembly has been undertaken in a general framework of international law development. Indeed, 
in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War the General Assembly designated 1990-1999 as the 
‘UN decade of international law’.42 Among the main objectives of this Decade were (a) to 
promote acceptance of and respect for the principles of international law, (b) to promote means 
and methods for the peaceful settlement of disputes between states, including resort and full 
respect for the International Court of Justice, (c) to encourage progressive development of 
international law and (d) to encourage teaching and dissemination and wider appreciation of 
international law. One can argue that in adopting this declaration the primary objective of the 
General Assembly was to promote the rule of law in international relations based on the United 
Nations Charter, which had been marginalized bythe big powers during the Cold War period. In 
other words the declaration was geared towards promoting the rule of law between states in their 
                                                 
41Article 13 of the UN Charter. 
42 R. Abeyratne, ‘The United Nations Decade of International Law’, International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society, 
vol. 5, 3, 1992, 511-523. 
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dealings with each other, an aspect which would be achieved through peaceful settlement of 
disputes through the UN-sanctioned mechanisms such as the International Court of Justice.      
 
Other efforts by the Assembly to position the rule of law as an ‘international common good’ can 
be seen in the period after the end of Assembly’s designated decade of international law. In 2006 
two UN member states, Mexico and Liechtenstein, addressed a letter to the UN Secretary 
General requesting the inclusion in the agenda of 61st Session of the General Assembly of an 
item ‘The Rule of Law at the National and International Level’.43 The explanatory note annexed 
to the letter explained the importance these countries attached to the concept of the 
‘international rule of law’. The note stated that: ‘The international and national dimensions of the 
rule of law are strongly interlinked. The international legal order serves not only as a framework 
relation and source of rights and obligations for states and other actors, but also as a source of 
inspiration for the development of national legal standards, in particular in the field of human 
rights. The strengthening of the rule of law at the international level thus has a direct impact on 
the rule of law at the national levels’. The note concluded by observing that ‘the General 
Assembly, as the United Nations’ chief deliberative policy making and representative organ, with 
its central role in the area of development and codification of international law, is uniquely 
positioned to fill that gap and to promote universal adherence to the concept of the rule of law, 
in particular at the international level’.44 
 
                                                 
43 Doc.A/61/142 of May 2006. ‘Request for the inclusion of an Item in the provisional Agenda of the Sixty-First 
Session, the Rule of Law at the National and International Levels’, Letter dated 11 May 2006 from the Permanent 
Representatives of Liechtenstein and Mexico to the United Nations Secretary General.  
44Ibid. 
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On the basis of this request, the General Assembly adopted resolution A/RES/61/3945. This 
reaffirmed inter aliathe General Assembly’s ‘commitment to the purposes and principles of the 
Charter of the United Nations and international law’. It reaffirmed that ‘human rights, the rule of 
law and democracy are interlinked and mutually reinforcing and that they belong to the universal 
and indivisible core values and principles of the United Nations’. The Resolution further 
reaffirmed the need for universal adherence to and implementation of the rule of law and a 
‘solemn commitment to an international order based on the rule of law and international law’, 
and emphasized the existing nexus between the rule of law, development, human rights and 
international security. This linkage emanates from the Assembly`s belief that it is through respect 
for international law that the rule of law in international affairs can be enhanced.46 
 
A salient feature we see in this resolution is that it linked the rule of law and development, which 
had been the major concern of developing countries. This meant that developing countries 
considered development a prerequisite for the rule of law. The resolution ends by stating that 
‘the promotion of and respect for the rule of law at the national and international levels, as well 
as justice and good governance, should guide the activities of the United Nations’. This 
paragraph is significant because it places justice and good governance at the centre of the UN`s 
objectives to promote the rule of law.   
 
More recently, in September 2012, the General Assembly adopted a Declaration entitled ‘Rule of 
Law at the National and International Levels’.47What is notable about this Declaration is that it 
                                                 
45 A/RES/61/39, Dec 2006, adopted upon recommendation by the Sixth Committee.  
46 Ibid. 
47Declaration of the High Level Meeting of the General Assembly on the Rule of Law at the National and 
International Levels, September 2012.A/Res/67/1. For example, during the debate the President of Benin 
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equates the rule of law with virtually everything that reflects the international legal order 
underpinned by the UN Charter, so that it becomes difficult to determine whether it can be 
achieved at all. For example, the UNGA equates the rule of law with sustainable development, a 
fair international trading system, the fight against terrorism, good governance, social cohesion, 
access to justice and an independent judiciary. It also equates the rule of law with informal justice 
mechanisms, rights of children, conflict prevention, peacekeeping, respect for international 
humanitarian law, combating impunity, and prevention of corruption.48Yet, as with the UN 
Secretary General’s Report cited earlier, the General Assembly did not explain how this long list 
of objectives would be achieved.   
 
Despite this commitment of the General Assembly in elevating the rule of law to the 
international agenda, the Assembly has not responded to the major challenge of defining the rule 
of law, a challenge which has also faced national levels in addressing the same subject. The 
struggle to come up with a definition of the rule of law at the international level is reflected in 
the multiple definitional concepts advanced by different countries during the deliberations in the 
General Assembly on the subject, as already discussed in chapter one. Indeed some countries 
                                                                                                                                                        
rule of law promoted development and, in turn, development strengthened the rule of law’, while the President of 
Iran stressed that ‘regulating sound social relations and establishing order, peace, freedom, public welfare and long-
term security depended on the implementation of the rule of law’. The President of Kenya said that ‘the rule of law 
was essential for democracy and ensuring sustainable development for all’. The President of South Africa argued 
that ‘the rule of law and human development were inextricably linked’. The representative of Venezuela stated that 
‘without the existence of a truly democratic system within the United Nations, particularly regarding the make-up 
and decision-making mechanisms of the Security Council, the rule of law will forever be a utopian dream’. Belgium’s 
representative noted that ‘there could be no sustainable development without the rule of law because businesses can 
not invest in countries where it was weak’, and Eric Holder, Attorney General of the United States, stated that 
establishing the rule of law was ‘essential in the fight against terror threats and efforts to strengthen civil society’. 
www.unrol.org. Accessed March 2013.  
48Ibid. 
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were against attempts to define the term at the international level.49 Those which favoured the 
attempt at definition acknowledged that a definition could only encompass some common 
denominators and would not be exhaustive.50However, critical examination of efforts of the 
UNGA to create an international system premised on the rule of law shows clearly that these 
efforts reaffirm the primary objective of the 1970 Declaration on the Friendly Relations among 
States, which is to create an international system based on equality and justice.51 
 
From the General Assembly perspective, countries agree, despite their differences, that the rule 
of law is central in the conduct of international affairs and the realization of the goals of the UN 
Charter and other international treaties. An implicit challenge facing the rule of law at the 
international level is how to create the synergy of rule of law at the international level and the 
national level. A further challenge is how to realize rule of law norms conceived at the 
international level within the domestic setting of countries with varying legal systems and 
economic capabilities. Critics in both the developing and the developed world argue that laws 
will always be inseparable from the greater geographical, political and cultural context, and that 
the Western pursuit of reforms is a function of desire for global hegemony through the 
universalization of Western values.52 
 
For example, the proponents of the ‘Asian and African values’ have consistently argued that 
Western and Asian or African notions of culture are simply incompatible and that the former 
                                                 
49 For example see comments submitted by France, Doc. A/62/121, 16, 2007. 
50 Statement by Mexico, Doc.A/C.6/62/SR.14, para 51. 2007.  
51 See Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States 
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seeks to destroy the latter.53 The critics of the international rule of law concept are also quick to 
underline the limited participation of developing states in the fora where important policy 
decisions are made, which means that the rule of law and human rights agenda covers many 
issues which previously would be considered beyond the remit of any international organization. 
However, the debate on the formulation of the international rule of law cannot be considered to 
be dominated by developed countries. Infact, if we are to go by statistics, the General Assembly 
is overwhelmingly dominated by developing countries. Hence it will be useful for developing 
countries to get fully involved in the discussion to ensure that they are part of the norm creation 
process as the attempts to defining international rule of law and all its attending norms unfold.   
 
This section has demonstrated that the debate on the international rule of law crystallized in the 
General Assembly as part of the overall objective of both developing and developed countries to 
promote the rule of law in the conduct of international affairs within the UN Charter framework. 
It has further been shown that while the international community essentially agrees on the 
importance of the international rule of law, it has come short on the precise definition of the 
concept. It is because of this failure that countries define and understand the rule of law in 
waysthat advance their respective objectives, whether in the domain of peace and security or 
social economic development. It has also been noted that while the General Assembly has taken 
efforts to ‘internationalize the rule of law’ through debates in the Assembly, the task of 
translating the debate from political ideals into concrete actions has been undertaken by the UN 
Security Council. For that reason the next section will turn to examine the primary role of the 
Council’s involvement in building the rule of law.     
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ii. The United Nations Security Council and the rule of law 
A primary question under this section is, why precisely should the Council be interested in 
promoting the international rule of law?54 The rule of law assumed a prominent position in the 
Council’s debates in the aftermath of the Cold War, a fact which can be attributed to two main 
reasons. First, as already discussed under chapter four on the law and development movement, 
the end of the Cold War provided an opportunity for Western powers to define and build a 
global order based on liberal Western democracy, something they were unable to do during the 
Cold War because of the competing ideologies between West and East. These debates also 
provided a convenient basis for arguing that human rights as set out in various conventions and 
treaties were universal. As remarked by Henkin, the universality claim was reinforced by the fact 
that the end of the Cold War did not produce any call for major revisions of the human rights 
standards.55The second reason was that during the Cold War the rule of law carried some 
ideological baggage,56 being most often equated with liberal democracy, and developing countries 
with no permanent representation on the Security Council were critical of the concept for the 
failure to guarantee equitable distribution of wealth among citizens.57This was especially true in 
the aftermath of the failure by developing countries to push for the New International Economic 
Order (NIEO) in the General Assembly. Indeed, examination of the record of the UN Security 
Council in addressing the rule of law during the Cold War period, one would note that the 
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55 Louis Henkin, ‘A Post Cold War Human Rights Agenda’, Yale Journal of International Law, vol. 19, 1994, 249-255.  
56 Jeremy Farrall, ‘Impossible Expectations? The UN Security Council’s Promotion of the Rule of Law after conflict’ 
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Council made a reference to the rule of law just once,in a resolution on the Congo crisis in 
1961.58 
 
In 1992, during the Summit of world leaders on the theme ‘the Responsibility of the Security 
Council in the Maintenance of International Peace and Security’ leaders from different countries 
committed themselves to strengthen the rule of law in international affairs. This was the first 
Security Council meeting held at the Summit level to underline the importance of the rule of law 
in international relations of states.59 However, what was the basis for this sudden change in the 
Council’s approach? To answer this question we have to refer to the previous discussion in this 
chapter, where we saw that the UN Charter prohibits intervention in domestic affairs unless the 
intervention is predicated on the maintenance of international peace and security.However, it is 
evident that continued instabilities and proliferation of conflicts significantly influenced the 
Council to embrace the rule of law as the core aspect of reasserting and maintaining international 
peace and security.60Over the period the Council has adopted different resolutions reaffirming 
the importance of the rule of law in addressing various challenges, for example gender equality 
and the role of women in peacemaking (Res. 1325/2000) and the rule of law as a tool for conflict 
prevention and statebuilding.61 
 
It is on the basis of this linkage between denial of the rule of law and conflicts that since the end 
of the Cold War the Security Council has extensively made reference to the importance of the 
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60 The UN Security Council has made reference to the rule of law in almost all country specific and thematic 
resolutions since the early 2000s. See Security Council Report: Cross Cutting Report on the Rule of Law, No. 3, 
2011, 15. Available: http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/cross-cutting-report/lookup-c-glKWLeMTIsG-b-
7829857.php. Accessed March 2013.   
61 UNSC Res. 1366/2001. 
223 
rule of law, by reaffirming its support indifferent ways without embracing a particular definition 
or model of the rule of law. Examining the practice of the Council in supporting the primacy of 
the rule of law, one can argue that its understanding and application of the term have been 
imprecise. Over time the concept of the rule of law has been used or invoked to signify different 
things in different contexts as determined by the Council.62 The interests of the Council in the 
rule of law can be considered to reflect the general trend of the United Nations in the post-Cold 
War period when the organization assumed a greater role in internal affairs of its member states 
in the belief that such involvement could enhance international peace and security. At least five 
basic clusters of meaning of the rule of law as understood by the Security Council can be 
identified.63 
 
The first cluster of meaning is that which connotes the preservation of law and order. It on this 
basis that the Council authorized peacekeeping missions to restore law and order in areas such as 
the DRC,64 Ivory Coast,65 Angola66 and Libya67. The second meaning of rule of law in the 
practice of the Security Council equates the rule of law with efforts to hold alleged war criminals 
accountable for human rights atrocities and war crimes, as in Rwanda. The Council has invoked 
the rule of law as a mechanism to fight drug trafficking in the Americas and West Africa.68It has 
also invoked the concept when calling on the international community to act against piracy off 
the coast of Somalia69 or re-establish independence of the judiciary in countries like Guinea 
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Bissau70and Sudan.71Lastly, the Security Council has emphasized the role of rule of law in conflict 
prevention.72 
 
Although these general clusters of attributes emerge from the Council’s reference to the rule of 
law, the Council does not apply any specific term to a particular situation; rather, it incorporates 
different clusters in similar or different circumstances.73On the basis of these attributes, it can be 
contended that the Council’s understanding of the rule of law consists of (i) the maintenance of 
law and order, (ii) addressing impunity, (iii) peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with 
the law, and (iv) protection and advancement of human rights. The Security Council has also 
reaffirmed the importance of the rule of law in relation to women, peace and security.74The 
diversity of meaning ascribed to the rule of law by the Security Council demonstrates yet again 
the difficulty of identifying a comprehensive definition of the rule of law. Despite this it is useful 
to note that all these clusters are consistent with the attributes of rule of law identified in chapter 
one, especially those that equate the rule of law with principled and accountable governance and 
the protection and advancement of human rights.75 Examining the various ways the Security 
Council uses the rule of law, it can therefore be argued that the Council invokes the concept to 
justify its use of a chapter VII mandate. 
 
Having established how the Security Council prescribes the rule of law in different situations to 
pursue its objectives, it is worth examining how the Council implements its rule of law visions. 
Since early 1990s the Security Council resolutions on peacekeeping have authorized peacekeepers 
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to conduct activities which directly affect the development of the rule of law. These missions 
have been involved in a wide range of functions including but not limited to peace agreements, 
disarmament, strengthening of judicial and state institutions, correctional services and general 
reconstruction of economic infrastructure. This jump from understanding the rule of law 
concept to direct intervention by the Council to build the rule of law should be seen in the 
context of achieving the Council’s primary objective of maintaining international peace and 
security. In the Council’s view, peacekeeping is a mechanism to help countries torn by conflicts 
create conditions for stability and security through assistance in preserving peace agreements and 
ceasefire regimes and serving as a guarantor of peace and stability. This involvement of the 
Council is undertaken under the authorization of Chapter VII of the UN Charter which 
empowers the Council to take measures it may deem appropriate to maintain international peace 
and security. 
 
It may further be argued that, from the Council’s perspective, peacekeeping can be for peace 
enforcement or prevention of further conflict. The purpose is to ensure that there are minimum 
conditions for peace and stability so that political negotiations can take place to resolve the 
causes of the conflict especially when the mission was established to resolve an existing conflict. 
While as already stated the objectives of the mission are stated in its mandate, in general, 
peacekeeping missions are considered by the Council as ideal avenues to promote institution 
building in conjunction with their mandate to advance rule of law.     
 
A few examples demonstrate the practice of Security Council involvement in building the rule of 
law. In Haiti the Council invoked the rule of law to establish the UN Stabilization Mission in the 
country.76 In the earlier report by the UN Secretary General on the situation in Haiti, he 
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described the Haitian National Police (HNP) as under-resourced, heavily politicized and corrupt. 
He further observed that the human rights situation was dire and extra-judicial killings, arbitrary 
arrests, wrongful detentions, human trafficking and use of child soldiers were rampant.77On the 
basis of this Report, the Council mandated the Mission to monitor and report on the human 
rights situation, re-establish the correctional system and investigate violations of human rights 
and humanitarian law. The mission was further tasked to help rebuild the country, restore the 
rule of law, and reform and restructure the Haitian National Police, which was to be subjected to 
a vetting system checking whether its personnel have committed grave human rights violations.78 
 
In his report proposing the establishment of the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) the Secretary 
General observed that Liberia’s judicial institutions had greatly suffered because of the long 
running conflict. The police force was not only a symbol of oppression but was also endemically 
corrupt and heavily politicized, correctional services were barely functioning, and court 
infrastructures were completely worn out. The report further noted that the conflict had opened 
the way to gross violations of human rights, including arbitrary killings, disappearances, rape and 
the use of child soldiers.79 Following these observations, the Secretary General recommended a 
UN Mission to assist the transitional government of Liberia in its efforts to enhance the rule of 
law through a wide range of activities such as security and justice sector reform.80 
 
Identifying a ‘long list’ of what ails these countries, the Council assumes that the best answer is 
to set up peacekeeping missions to address these challenges. However, this approach is fraught 
with problems because it does not distinguish the legal or practical challenges in different 
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countries. For example, while peace missions were established in both Liberia and Haiti, the 
sources of challenges in the two countries were quite different. While Liberia had experienced 
civil conflict for many years, Haiti had not. Haiti, though devastated by natural disasters, has had 
no major conflict apart from sporadic fighting which can purely be attributed to the breakdown 
of law and order. Rather, what affects Haiti is poverty and economic challenges. Yet, in the eyes 
of the Council these two countries require the rule of law which can only be attained through the 
establishment of peacekeeping missions. This is apparent because in both countries 
peacekeeping missions were tasked with efforts to build rule of law institutions, train police 
forces, and support social and economic reconstruction.  
 
It is difficult to discern the underlying assumptions behind the Council’s response to the ‘dire 
situation’ facing such countries like Haiti or Liberia. For example, if it is clear that the police are 
heavily politicized, under-resourced and corrupt, how precisely does a UN mission address these 
challenges? While the Council’s resolutions provide a mandate for the missions to assist 
rebuilding or building judicial infrastructures, it is not clear how the mission can go about 
depoliticizing the entire police force or eliminating corruption in the entire system. Asking the 
mission to assist with the restoration and maintenance of the rule of law, as in the Haiti 
resolution setting up MINUSTAH, the Council takes these challenges as self-evident, assuming 
that the presence of the mission will automatically address them.81 It is clear that challenges 
facing Haiti can only be addressed through comprehensive measures of economic reforms which 
would potentially empower citizens to improve their social-economic conditions. Indeed, given 
the ongoing impact of natural disasters and difficult social-economic conditions, peacekeeping 
forces have hardly managed to re-establish the rule of law as mandated by the UN Security 
                                                 
81 UNSC Res. 1542/2004. 
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Council. This failure can be attributed to the reality that it is easier for the Council to identify 
challenges than to address structural concerns facing the country.  
 
It is simplistic to assume that by identifying corruption as a problem international actors can 
effectively address such challenges by simply setting up a peacekeeping mission. In most post-
conflict situations such as Southern Sudan or Liberia, many cases of corruption in the judicial 
system stem from the reality that officials get extremely meagre salaries and corruption is 
considered a means to ‘top up’ their government income. In such situations the challenge is 
more structural and requires a long-term solution to improve the working conditions of judicial 
workers and in the process disincentive them from engaging in corruption. This challenge cannot 
be addressed by ad hoc peacekeeping missions, rather it requires long-term institutional and policy 
commitments and bringing together national and international actors and their programmes, 
which can hardly be attained by the mere presence of a UN mission.  
 
From two examples of Haiti and Liberia, it may rightly be argued that while the United Nations 
Security Council remains pivotal in addressing the rule of law, its approach remains flawed and 
purely technical. The approach assumes a willingness on the part of host country authorities to 
engage in strengthening the rule of law as internationally understood, on the grounds that it is 
good for the country and will strengthen the state authority and consolidate peace. This 
approach by the Council fails to sufficiently consider both internal and external actors’ incentives 
in the process and it does not provide a mechanism to address situations in which national actors 
with the power to effect change are not willing to do so.82 
 
                                                 
82Robert A. Pulver, ‘Rule of Law, Peacekeeping and the United Nations’ in Chandra Lekha Sriram et al. (eds), above 
note 1, 60. See also R. May and G. Cleaver, ‘African Peacekeeping: Still Dependent?’, International Peacekeeping, vol. 4, 
2, 1997, 18. 
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Worth noting is that while the Security Council has justified its intervention in the affairs of the 
member states on the basis of the rule of law, it has on different occasions failed to uphold rule 
of law values in its own practices. For example, the existence of permanent Security Council 
membership with veto power undermines the Council’s capacity to ensure that all states are 
treated equally when Chapter VII powers are invoked. While it is true that all members of the 
United Nations are equal in theory and have a potential to sit on a Security Council, some are 
entitled not only to sit permanently on the Council but also to prevent the Council from 
adopting decisions with which they disagree or which impact their interests or those of their 
allies. It is further argued that the Council needs to give greater consideration to the question of 
accountability for those who violate human rights while acting under its authority in 
peacekeeping missions. This aspect is crucial because such violations have the potential to erode 
the legitimacy and credibility of the missions before the people among whom they are stationed. 
It is therefore suggested that the Council should reform its working practices to ensure that its 
decisions reflect transparency, equality among states, non-selectivity and due process for 
individuals and institutions affected by its decisions.83All these elements constitute minimum 
attributes of the rule of law such as equality before the law and transparency in decision making, 
discussed in chapter one. In the following section, we examine the specific role of the Council in 
building the rule of law in Southern Sudan. 
 
iii. UNMIS and rule of law reform in Southern Sudan 
The preceding discussion has shown how the General Assembly and the Security Council 
conceive and implement their rule of law visions. While the UN General Assembly is involved in 
the rule of law debates, the Security Council, in additional to the norm creation process, has 
taken concrete steps of building the rule of law primarily through the creation of peacekeeping 
                                                 
83 Joyner Daniel, ‘The Security Council as a Legal Hegemon’, Georgetown Journal of International Law, vol. 43, 2, 2012, 
225; Rudiger Wolfrum and Volker Roben (eds), Legitimacy in International Law, Heidelberg: Springer, 2008. 
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missions, as evidenced by the resolutions setting up peacekeeping missions in Sudan and 
elsewhere.84 However, it has also been argued that the Security Council approach is based on 
flawed assumptions that the presence of the missions can automatically enhance the rule of law.  
 
Peacebuilding has been defined by the former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan as actions 
undertaken by the United Nations at the end of a conflict to consolidate peace and prevent 
recurrence of armed confrontation between parties.85 Peacebuilding missions can therefore be 
considered as part of larger efforts by the United Nations to prevent recurrence of conflict in 
countries that have emerged from protracted conflicts, such as South Sudan. In the practice of 
the United Nations these missions comprise military personnel contributed by member states 
and civilian personnel hired by the UN on the basis of their knowledge and skills relevant to the 
goals of the mission. However, it is also important to note that in some cases governments 
contribute civilian personnel and private contractors who work in these missions.  
To fully appreciate the extent to which the UN Security Council has been involved in building 
the rule of law in Southern Sudan it is useful to consider the work of the United Nations 
Peacekeeping Mission in Southern Sudan (UNMIS),86 a mission authorized by the Council with 
explicit mandate to promote the rule of law and assist the parties to the CPA.  
 
The mandate of UNMIS is set out in resolution 1560 adopted by the Council in the aftermath of 
the signing of the CPA between the government of Sudan and the SPLM. The decision of the 
Council to authorize a peacekeeping mission in Southern Sudan was premised on the belief that 
such a mission would be key to assisting parties to implement the CPA. A closer examination of 
                                                 
84 UNSC Res. 1590/2005. 
85 ‘The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa’, Report of 
the Secretary General to the Security Council, S/1998/318, para. 63. 
86 This Chapter will address the work of UNMIS which was later transformed into UNMISS after the independence 
of South Sudan in July 2011. This Mission was set up by UNSC Res. 1996/2011.  
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this resolution demonstrates the Security Council’s continued belief that simply setting up 
peacekeeping missions will automatically address peace and security challenges by strengthening 
the rule of law. However, as already discussed in the context of Haiti and Liberia, these 
assumptions are seen to be flawed precisely because they hardly lead to the hoped-for outcome, 
owing to the unrealistic way they are conceived and implemented. They are unrealistic because 
they are conceived to achieve a wide range of objectives without taking into account peculiar 
challenges facing, for example, Southern Sudan, such as a high level of illiteracy, extreme poverty 
or a high level of insecurity and rampant corruption in key state institutions.  
 
Specifically, Resolution 1590 mandated UNMIS, among other things, to perform the following 
tasks: 
1. Assist the parties to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in promoting 
understanding of the peace process and the role of UNMIS by means of an 
effective public information campaign, targeted at all sectors of society, in 
coordination with the African Union.  
2. Assist the parties to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in addressing the need 
for a national inclusive approach, including the role of women, towards 
reconciliation and peacebuilding. 
3. Assist parties to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, in coordination with 
bilateral and multilateral assistance programmes, in restructuring the police service 
in Sudan, consistent with democratic policing, to develop police training and 
evaluation programme, and to otherwise assist in the training of civilian police.  
4. Assist the parties to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in promoting the rule of 
law, including an independent judiciary, and the protection of human rights of all 
people of Sudan through a comprehensive and coordinated strategy, with the aim 
of combating impunity and contributing to a long term peace and stability and to 
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assist parties to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement to develop and consolidate 
the national legal framework.  
5. To ensure an adequate human rights presence, capacity and expertise within 
UNMIS to carry out human rights promotion, civilian protection and monitoring 
activities.  
 
An examination of the mandate of UNMIS raises some questions regarding the role of this 
mission to build the rule of law in Southern Sudan. In the resolution, the Council conceives the 
mission as a tool to achieve an independent judiciary, protection of human rights, and measures 
against impunity, and also as a means to consolidate national legal framework. However, reading 
these objectives, one can argue that the resolution takes the rule of law as self-evident, assuming 
that once the mission is established it will automatically lead to the realization of these objectives. 
For example, how precisely does the presence of the mission contribute to the enjoyment and 
advancement of human rights or combat impunity? The resolution lists all ‘good attributes’ 
which can be assumed to reflect a society that upholds the rule of law but neither the resolution 
nor those tasked to implement it clarify how exactly this society can attain these attributes. 
 
The resolution neither makes provisions for nor requires cooperation by the Mission with local 
institutions to enhance the latter’s capability to promote the rule of law. The assumption here is 
clear – it is only through institutions built by international actors that rule of law that meets 
‘universal standards’ of human rights can be successfully promoted. This marginalization of or 
indifference to the critical role of local actors complicates an already complex situation because it 
assumes that local societies that have experienced the conflict for many years lack requisite skills 
to contribute to the process. But one can challenge this assumption because it is highly unlikely 
that international actors understand challenges facing local people better than the latter 
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themselves who live and experience these challenges in their day to day lives.87 Indeed, this 
marginalization is evident in Southern Sudan, where local institutions of dispute settlement were 
left outside the rule of law building process by the Mission and other actors.   
 
A closer look at the Mission’s operation in Southern Sudan shows that while it was involved in 
various activities under the rubric of the rule of law, it largely concentrated on its ‘core mandate’ 
of monitoring implementation of the CPA. Its activities included observation of the 
implementation of the Joint Forces Unit and ensuring that the protagonists (SPLM and GoS) 
observed the ceasefire. Activities to further the rule of law mainly focused on the police and 
correctional services. While acknowledging the fact that these clusters are crucial, building the 
rule of law is a daunting task which goes beyond these two security sectors. It requires a holistic 
approach including supporting an independent judiciary, capacity building for the judges, legal 
advisers, and empowering the local population to understand and identify themselves with the 
reforms being undertaken. In general it requires changing political culture to ensure social 
acceptance of these reforms.  
 
It is argued that peace missions like UNMIS should move beyond seeing their efforts as mere 
technical assistance, to see them rather as a long-term engagement to address rule of law aspects 
which can contribute to the attainment of peace and stability. While the implementation of the 
CPA was critical for peace and stability in the country, the failure of the Mission to adequately 
focus on other rule of law aspects such as support for the judiciary greatly undermined its ability 
to contribute to the general realization of the rule of law in Southern Sudan. Admittedly, long-
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term involvement would require significant and extended commitment to provide resources to 
achieve these objectives. However, if these reforms are to make a real impact, the international 
community should be prepared to undertake this task and ensure that strategies are drawn up to 
make these reforms sustainable. Further, it is crucial that officials recruited to run the mission 
have adequate skills and knowledge of the country; they should understand the historical basis of 
the ongoing challenges and propose acceptable framework within which to address them. While 
most senior officials running the mission are recruited within the guidelines of the United 
Nations, most of these officials assume their duties with scanty or no knowledge of peculiar 
challenges facing Southern Sudan. With inadequate knowledge of the challenges facing the 
country it has been easier for these officials to develop a ‘one size fits all’ attitude to the 
detriment of the beneficiaries.  
 
Theoretically UNMIS was the overall lead agency in Southern Sudan because of its Security 
Council mandate, which expressly empowered the Mission to promote the rule of law. Indeed 
UNMIS was headed by a Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General (DSRSG) who 
reported directly to the SRSG.88 But in practice, different organizations involved in the rule of 
law activities in Southern Sudan work independently of each other. This trend was reinforced by 
the reality that each organization raises required resources independently. As experience over 
time has demonstrated in Southern Sudan, it is difficult to identify the lead organization for the 
coordination purposes since resources are independently acquired and projects are independently 
negotiated and executed by organizations that manage to secure financial resources.    
 
Despite these challenges, UNMIS had significant achievements in promoting the rule of law in 
Southern Sudan. For example, as part of the wider efforts to enhance its rule of law delivery 
                                                 
88 After South Sudanese independence in July 2011, UNMISS was headed by an SRSG.  
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capability, UNMIS established the Rule of Law and Judicial System Advisory Unit as a 
coordinating body for its rule of law activities in Sudan. The main task of the unit was 
‘monitoring parties adherence to their rule of law commitment in the CPA and providing 
technical assistance where needed’.89 The Mission managed to conduct training for the police and 
judiciary which significantly contributed to the improved performance of the officers in these 
departments in addressing human rights violations.90 Yet this emphasis on the observance of the 
peace agreement meant that the capability of the Mission to deliver on other aspects of the rule 
of law was highly constrained. This confirms that peace missions tend to focus on the rule of law 
aspects which have a direct linkage to the underlying conflict. In Southern Sudan the major cause 
of the conflict was the hostility between the SPLM and government forces, hence the interest to 
resolve this conflict being designated as the ‘core activity’ of the Mission. 
 
In this section I have demonstrated that UNMIS (and now UNMISS) is the major actor in rule 
of law promotion in Southern Sudan. The mandate of the mission was derived from the 
resolution adopted by the Security Council as part of its overall responsibility to maintain 
international peace and security. Despite the critical role of the Mission, the discussion has 
shown that it faced serious challenges in fulfilling its mandate. It is because of this uninspiring 
record of the Mission in promoting rule of law in Southern Sudan that the next section will 
examine the work of other major actors involved in rule of law reform in Southern Sudan. 
 
                                                 
89UNSC Res. 1590/2005, para 4. 
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iv. The mandate of other UN Agencies to promote the rule of law: the 
case of the UNHCR and UNDP 
A closer examination of the UN agencies’ involvement in building the rule of law, especially in 
post-conflict contexts, demonstrates that a significant number of organizations within the UN 
system like UNICEF, UNHCR, UN Habitat and UNDP undertake rule of law reforms over and 
above their original mandate prescribed in their founding instruments.91As the discussion on the 
role of international financial institutions in chapter four has shown, this involvement has been 
accomplished by broadly realigning their mandates with the evolving challenges they face in their 
day to day functions, which in some cases were not or could not be foreseen at the founding of 
these institutions. The recurrence of conflicts and the assumption that the absence or 
deterioration of the rule of law has been a major cause of these conflicts have equally reinforced 
the involvement of different UN institutions in building the rule of law.92 
 
The UNHCR is an example of how UN agencies have realigned and broadened their original 
mandate to include the promotion of the rule of law.93 UNHCR involvement in rule of law 
promotion has mainly covered challenges related to property rights of returning refugees in their 
countries of origin. This aspect has been necessitated by the fact that most refugees when they 
return to their countries of origin after a long absence in exile find most of their property, 
especially land that they had owned before occupied or taken by others. Considering also the 
weak and at times absent dispute settlement institutions in these countries, the UNHCR assumes 
that it is only strengthening of these institutions that can contribute to resolving disputes before 
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they give impetus to fresh conflicts. Indeed, at its 46th Session, the Executive Committee of the 
High Commissioner’s Programme endorsed the need for the UNHCR to promote rule of law 
reforms as a means to enhance legal and judicial institutions for dispute settlement.94 
 
To support the claim that forced displacement is a result of rule of law breakdown, the 
Executive Committee of the High Commissioner noted that ‘for states to fulfill their 
humanitarian responsibilities in receiving refugees and in reintegrating returning refugees, and in 
addressing some of the causes of refugee movements, an effective human rights regime is 
essential, including institutions which sustain the rule of law, justice and accountability; and in 
this connection call on UNHCR to strengthen its activities in support of national legal and 
judicial capacity-building, where necessary, in cooperation with the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights’.95 The UN General Assembly later reaffirmed in its resolution 
that the effective promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms are an 
essential means of addressing some of the causes of refugee movement and helping states to 
reintegrate their returning refugees. In this connection it called on the Office of the High 
Commissioner to strengthen its support of national efforts at legal and judicial capacity 
building.96 To implement this mandate UNHCR continues to take measures to support rule of 
law institutions critical to resolve property related disputes such as land disputes, to ensure that 
returning refugees and non-refugees can co-exist peacefully. 
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v. The UNDP and rule of law reform in Southern Sudan 
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) as the United Nations’ biggest UN 
development agency is extensively involved in the rule of law field.97 The organization has been 
in Southern Sudan since 1994, first as a humanitarian agency providing relief services to the 
displaced refugees in the war zone and since the beginning of 2000 by supporting peace 
process.98 After the signing of the CPA in 2005, the UNDP focused on both the programmatic 
and capacity building activities for the judiciary, various departments of the ministry of legal 
affairs, civil society organizations, law enforcement and general strengthening of the legal 
profession.99It may be argued that while the UNDP is an independent development organization 
with its own governing board, its rule of law activities are undertaken in the collective framework 
of the United Nations, often underpinned by Security Council resolutions especially in the post-
conflict context.  
 
UNDP has aligned its original mission of supporting and promoting development goals to 
include a wide range of issues such as human rights, good governance, gender and equality and 
constitution making assistance.100 In 1978 the UNDP concluded a Standard Basic Assistance 
Agreement (SBAA) with the Government of Sudan providing the basis for the organization`s 
work in the country.101 Country Programme Documents are signed between the UNDP and host 
countries from time to time to mandate the organization to promote rule of law activities. For 
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example, the Country Programme Document102 for Sudan for 2009-2012 provides that as one of 
its overall objectives in Sudan, the UNDP will ensure that human rights are upheld and 
protected through accountable, accessible and equitable rule of law institutions.103 The document 
further notes that the organization will provide capacity development support to the judiciary, 
the Ministry of Justice and law enforcement institutions, with special attention to equitable access 
to justice for vulnerable groups including women and people living with HIV/AIDS. It further 
commits the UNDP to help address the challenges arising from the dual system of formal courts 
and customary/traditional norms and values.104 
 
Justifying the UNDP’s involvement in building the rule of law, the former UNDP Administrator 
Mark Malloch Brown argued that rule of law is not only an element of democracy promotion 
and post-conflict peacebuilding, but also an element of conflict prevention.105As a result of this 
broad interpretation by international institutions like the UNDP and UNHCR of their original 
mandates, other organizations like UNICEF have assumed greater roles in rule of law reform. 
These organizations have focused on particular areas of reform with a direct relevance to their 
work. For example, UNICEF has interpreted its mandate to cover areas such as juvenile justice 
and children’s rights, partly by integrating and defining these issues broadly to fit in their original 
mandate of promoting children’s welfare. It can therefore be rightly argued that increasingly the 
United Nations and its specialized agencies have developed an understanding of the rule of law 
that continues to align with their core mandate reflected in their founding instruments. While 
previously different organizations carried out their rule of law based reforms independently, 
increasingly the Secretary General has argued various UN bodies and funds to coordinate their 
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work for coherence and impact optimization.106Despite this initiative, in South Sudan 
international organizations continue to struggle to coordinate their rule of law work, precisely 
because each organization pursues its mandate independently in line with its original objectives. 
This divergence continues to have a negative impact on reforms, as evidenced by the current 
efforts in South Sudan.  
 
However, it can be pointed out that while these agencies are involved in building the rule of law, 
there continues to be a significant disconnect between the objectives of building the rule of law 
and the actual outcome. This disconnect continues because different agencies tend to promote 
rule of law activities closely aligned with their original mandates, which hinders a holistic 
approach to promote rule of law. As shown by the examples of the UNDP and UNHCR, each 
organization undertakes rule of law reform that closely aligns with its original mandate which 
underpins its existence in the first place. The implication of this disconnect is that rule of law 
activities that do not form core part of the original mandate of these organizations are hardly 
taken into account during the planning and carrying out of these reforms.  
 
E. The AU Legal framework for the rule of law reform in post-conflict 
societies 
i. The AU Constitutive Act 
While the preceding discussion dealt with the role of international institutions in promoting the 
rule of law in post-conflict Southern Sudan, it should be noted that there are also some regional 
actors involved in this process. Although their activities may not equal those undertaken by 
international organizations in terms of technical and financial resources, it is nevertheless 
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important to examine their role. This importance stems from their significant influence through 
both policy and concrete actions undertaken to build rule of law in Southern Sudan.  
 
Africa’s commitment to post-conflict reconstruction predates the African Union.107The 
Organization of African Unity (OAU) was established in 1963 and its central role was to 
promote African solidarity, while the rule of law and human rights were marginal issues. 
Specifically, the objectives of the Charter included: to coordinate and intensify member states’ 
cooperation and efforts to achieve better life for the peoples of Africa, to promote international 
cooperation, having due regard to the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, and to defend their sovereignty, territorial integrity and 
independence.108 The OAU was more concerned with the struggle against colonialism than with 
the aftermath of the struggle.109 Despite the fact that several countries slid into violence during 
the existence of the OAU, the organization hardly intervened in any of them to support 
peacebuilding and the rule of law.110 Admittedly, there was not only a lack of institutional 
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framework to respond to these challenges, but also inadequate or non-existent commitment on 
the part of African leaders.111 
 
In 1993, the OAU adopted the Declaration on the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, 
Management and Resolution charged with consultation with other relevant stakeholders to 
deploy efforts and take necessary initiatives to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts. From 
Africa’s standpoint the rule of law was conceived as a critical factor in preventing and resolving 
conflict. Earlier, in 1992, the Joint OAU/IPA (International Peace Academy) Task Forcehad 
described peace-building as a continuous process that involves a broad range of activities aimed 
at consolidating peace, and seeks to address both the root causes of conflict and measures for 
bolstering peace agreements in the aftermath of conflict.112 Specifically regarding the rule of law, 
the Declaration stated that the Mechanism will be responsible for undertaking peacemaking and 
peacebuilding functions in order to facilitate the resolution of conflicts while enhancing the rule 
of law.113 
 
In the wake of the adoption of the Constitutive Act (CA) in 2001 creating the AU as the 
successor to the OAU, the organization’s role in promoting the rule of law in post-conflict 
countries took a new trajectory.114 The Constitutive Act of the African Union makes the 
promotion of the rule of law and democracy core objectives.115Subsequently, the organization 
                                                 
111 See Abdulqawi Yusuf, ‘Reflections on the Fragility of State Institutions in Africa’, African Yearbook of International 
Law, vol. 2, 1994, 2.  
112 See generally Ian Johnstone and Tandeka Nkiwane, The OAU and Conflict Management in Africa, Report of the Joint 
OAU/IPA Consultation, Addis Ababa, May 1993.  
113 Art. 15 of the Declaration. See also Jeremy Levitt, ‘Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution: Africa-
Regional Strategies for the Prevention of Displacement and Protection of the Displaced Persons: The Case of OAU, 
ECOWAS, SADC & IGAD’, Refugee Survey Quarterly, vol. 20, 1, 2001, 156-90.  
114Constitutive Act of the African Union, above note 107. 
115 Ibid., Art. 4. 
243 
has adopted various institutional and legal measures which reaffirm its commitment to promote 
the rule of law in its member states. Some of these instruments include the Peace and Security 
Council Protocol,116 the African Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption,117 the 
African Charter on Democracy, Election and Governance,118the Maputo Protocol on the rights 
of women119 and the Declaration on the Rejection of the Unconstitutional Change of 
Government.120 At the sub regional levels there are also instruments which reaffirm the 
commitment of sub regional states to the ideals reflected in the AU Constitutive Act. For 
example, the founding treaties of the Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS), 
Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) and the East African Community (EAC) 
reaffirm the primacy of the rule of law and commitment to fundamental rights and freedoms in 
improving social and economic conditions of Africa and its people. Similarly, the decision to 
revamp the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights, and the establishment of the Pan 
African Parliament, the Commission on the Rights and Welfare of Children and the African 
Commission for Human and Peoples’ Rights concretized the desire of the African Union to 
position the rule of law as its defining objective.  
 
Another instrument which provides a legal basis for the AU to enhance its involvement in post-
conflict reconstruction is the AU Protocol of the Peace and Security Council (PSC). The PSC is 
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119The Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, 2003. 
120Decision on Unconstitutional Changes in Government, AHG/Dec. 142 (XXXV), 2000. 
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tasked with promoting peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction under Article 6 (e). It is 
also required to promote and implement peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction activities 
to consolidate peace and prevent the resurgence of violence, in Article3(c). As part of the overall 
goal to promote the rule of law and peacebuilding in post-conflict countries, the PSC is further 
tasked with consolidation of the peace agreements that have been negotiated, establishing 
conditions for political, social and economic reconstruction of a country’s society and 
government institutions and implementation of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration 
programmes (Article 14 (3)).  
 
Examining these legal and policy initiatives, one can ask, how then has the organization 
succeeded in promoting the rule of law in countries emerging from conflict? In practice, the 
involvement of the organization in building the rule of law in these areas has been abysmal or 
non-existent. Historically most of the OAU-approved and later AU-approved peacekeeping 
missions were meant to monitor violations of ceasefire agreements rather than getting involved 
directly in substantive initiatives for building the rule of law. Indeed these missions could not go 
further than expressing their concerns about any violations or potential violations of human 
rights in their final reports. Even after the establishment of the AU in 2002, the organization’s 
involvement in rule of law issues remain constrained by the limitation of resources and lack of 
political will of most member states to defend rule of law and human rights ideals as reflected in 
various AU instruments. 
 
ii. The AU Post-conflict Reconstruction Policy Framework 
Perhaps in recognition that the Constitutive Act and the subsequent PSC Protocol did not 
provide a specific legal framework to deal with post-conflict reconstruction, the AU Executive 
Council resolved to adopt a Decision mandating the AU Commission to develop a 
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comprehensive AU policy on post-conflict reconstruction in Africa.121 It was in response to this 
Decision that the Commission working together with NEPAD prepared the Post Conflict 
Recovery and Development Policy (PCRDP) of the AU. This Policy, established in 2006, was 
envisaged as a specific instrument to operationalize the contents of the AU Constitutive Act and 
PSC Protocol provisions on post-conflict reconstruction.122 The primary objective is to guide the 
organization in its efforts to deal and coordinate its support in areas emerging from conflicts. At 
least theoretically, the Policy reaffirms the commitment of the organization to promoting the 
rule of law in post-conflict areas. The instrument provides a clear mandate for the organization 
to fully assist post-conflict societies to promote the rule of law and good governance.123 The 
importance of this policy may be seen in its potential to provide an overall guidance framework 
for countries and institutions keen to provide assistance for countries emerging from conflicts. 
 
The adoption of this Policy stems from the realization by the AU that post-conflict 
reconstruction which lacks sufficient local involvement can hardly be sustainable in the long 
term. This Policy is therefore conceived to serve as a guideline for international actors (Africans 
and non Africans) involved in post-conflict reconstruction efforts in Africa. It is premised on the 
promotion of democracy, upholding the rule of law and respect of human rights as the 
cornerstone of assistance to states in the aftermath of conflicts. The Policy also has key 
dimensions such as maintenance of security, political transition, good governance, popular 
participation, social economic progress, justice and reconciliation and respect for human rights. 
In order to achieve effective reconstruction of states emerging from conflicts, the Policy calls for 
mutual reinforcement between these dimensions.  
                                                 
121Decision EX.CL/191(VII), July 2005.  
122AU Post Conflict Recovery and Development Policy, 2006. See also, Tim Murithi, ‘The AU/NEPAD Post 
Conflict Reconstruction Policy: An Analysis’, Conflict Trends, 2006, and Dirk Kotze and Hussein Solomon (eds), ‘The 
State of Africa: Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development, Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa, 2008.  
123Articles 3 and 4 of the Constitutive Act. 
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A closer examination of the role of the AU in post-conflict reconstruction demonstrates that 
major challenges facing the organization in promoting the rule of law are not due to lack of a 
comprehensive mandate. Rather, the cause is that most of its members who are supposed to 
implement AU’s vision to build the rule of law are in the first place struggling to establish 
themselves as stronger states after decades of conflicts which have affected virtually all sectors of 
their governance structures.124 In other words a considerable number of AU members are either 
in conflicts or just emerging from conflicts and need external support to promote rule of law in 
their own borders. This further complicates the AU’s efforts to promote the rule of law on the 
continent, especially in weak countries emerging from conflict. Below the discussion examines 
what role the organization has played in rule of law reforms in Southern Sudan.  
 
F. The African Union and rule of law reform in Southern Sudan 
Having discussed the Constitutive Act, the AU Protocol on PSC and the Post-conflict 
Reconstruction Policy which underpin the involvement of the African Union in building the rule 
of law in countries emerging from conflicts, it is pertinent to examine the extent of this 
involvement. How does the organization ensure that its rule of law vision reflected in those 
instruments is translated into concrete results? A closer examination of the AU engagement in 
Southern Sudan demonstrates that its involvement stems from the decision of the African Union 
taken during its Assembly of Heads of State and Government to establish a Ministerial 
Committee for Post Conflict Reconstruction in Southern Sudan, chaired by South Africa.125 The 
Committee’s functions include supporting efforts of the organization and member states to build 
                                                 
124 See Dirk Kotze, ‘Post Conflict Reconstruction’ in Dirk Kotze and Hussein Solomon (eds), note 122, 107-115.  
125 The decision was made in Maputo in 2003. The original Committee members were: Algeria, Egypt, Ethiopia, 
Gabon, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal and Sudan.  
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the rule of law, good governance, promotion and protection of human rights, justice and 
reconciliation and infrastructure development.  
 
In February 2008 the then Chairman of the African Union Commission, Alpha Oumar Konare, 
appointed a Nigerian diplomat, Ambassador Oluyemi Adeniji, as the Special Envoy for Southern 
Sudan. He also appointed Ambassador Mahmoud Kane as the head of AU’s Liaison Office in 
Sudan.126 The Envoy was specifically tasked with monitoring the implementation of the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the government and the SPLM. Similarly the 
President of Kenya, Mwai Kibaki, who was instrumental in the negotiations and subsequent 
signing of the CPA, appointed the former President of Kenya, Daniel Toroitich Arap Moi, as his 
regional envoy for Sudan to monitor the implementation of the agreement. It would be an 
overstatement to contend that these efforts of the Commission had a major impact on the 
overall strategy of the organization in supporting the rule of law in Southern Sudan. Nevertheless 
they demonstrated how far the African Union has come in committing itself to promote rule of 
law and democratic institutions in post-conflict situations on the continent by taking actions to 
preserve peace and stability. But these initiatives also reaffirm the arguments made earlier in the 
discussion that the AU conceives the rule of law from the peace and security perspective.  
 
Rather than taking direct initiatives to support rule of law institutions, such as strengthening the 
judiciary or police, the African Union devotes much of its efforts and resources to promote 
dialogue among the warring parties to ensure that they don’t return to conflict. For example, 
since the signing of the CPA, the AU through its mediator has supported and facilitated 
negotiations to resolve boundary disputes between the parties and provided a framework to 
implement the Abyei Protocol which requires the parties to hold a referendum as agreed in the 
                                                 
126 See ‘AU Appoints Special Envoy for Sudan’s CPA’. http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article26111. 
Accessed March 2013.   
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CPA. The AU High Level Panel on Sudan, otherwise known as the Mbeki Panel, has taken 
concrete measures to resolve some of the problems between Sudan and South Sudan. For 
example, in its recent report in 2012 the Panel made a wide range of recommendations to the 
parties such as withdrawal of forces from the contested area in Abyei, withholding of support by 
either party from rebel groups seeking to destabilize the other, and resumption of talks between 
the parties under the auspices of the AU. Indeed the UN Security Council has endorsed these 
recommendations and encouraged the Panel under the leadership of ex-President Mbeki to 
continue with its work. These efforts, though not directly linked to institutional building, can be 
considered as reflecting the role of the organization in preventing conflicts and promoting 
peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the CA to enhance the respect for the rule of 
law.  
 
G. NGOs and the process of building the rule of law 
As argued at the beginning of this chapter, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) continue to 
play a major role in building the rule of law in countries emerging from conflicts.127 No vibrant 
democracy can develop in the absence of strong civil society as a check on governance. It is this 
importance that provides a compelling need to discuss their role in the situation in Southern 
Sudan. Increasingly NGOs are a visible and active part of international life. They work in a large 
variety of areas and promote a wide range of aims and goals.128 The most prominent examples of 
NGOs’ involvement are found in the fields of human rights, the rule of law, environment, 
development assistance, humanitarian aid and peace. The increasing intensity of their activities 
                                                 
127 Lester M. Salamon and Helmut K. Anheier, The Emerging Non Profit Sector: An Overview, Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1996; Stephen Hobb, ‘Global Challenges to Statehood: The Increasingly Important Role of Non-
governmental Organizations’, Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, vol. 5, 1997, 192-105.   
128 Kerstin Martens, ‘Examining the (Non-) Status of NGOs in International Law, Indiana Global Legal Studies Journal, 
vol. 10, 2, 2003, 1-24. See also Michael Posner and Candy Whittome, ‘The Status of Human Rights NGOs’, Columbia 
Human Rights Law Review, vol. 25, 1993-1994, 269-290.  
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that were traditionally considered a preserve of sovereign governments, like the rule of law and 
human rights, demonstrate that they have become an integral part of the procedures and 
structures of global governance.129 
 
It is also important to clarify the relationship between NGOs and international organizations in 
the context of Southern Sudan. Because of their contacts with and proximity to the local people, 
most NGOs, in addition to their primary functions in rule of law reforms, also work as 
Implementing Partners (‘IPs’) of international organizations. This role entails the NGOs getting 
funds from IOs to perform various activities on their behalf. Indeed in South Sudan most 
NGOs perform various activities such as human rights training for civil society, training for 
lawyers and judges or building physical infrastructure on behalf of IOs such as the UNDP, 
UNICEF or UNHCR.  
 
At present, there are no regulations under international law governing the establishment, 
requirements, and legal status of NGOs.130 NGOs are obliged to accept the national legislation 
of the state in which they have been established and where they are based.131 National laws differ, 
however, from country to country, and therefore NGO status also varies. Recognition, rights, 
and duties depend on the respective national conditions.  
 
The main questions on the operation of NGOs in Southern Sudan revolve around two key 
issues: whether there is a legal framework defining the legal status of NGOs and thus setting 
rules for their involvement and the modality of such involvement, and whether there is a 
                                                 
129 Ibid. 
130 Kerstin Martens, NGOs and the United Nations: Institutionalization, Professionalization and Adaptation, Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, 20.  
131Ibid. 
250 
mechanism for subsequent monitoring of accredited NGOs. Determining the legal basis upon 
which NGOs operate in Southern Sudan is complex. Extensive inquiry in South Sudan indicates 
that there is no legal framework regulating the work of NGOs promoting the rule of law in the 
country. As a matter of practice one cannot even consider a national legal framework for NGOs 
in the context of Southern Sudan, because even if such a framework had existed in Sudan it 
could hardly have extended to the South. NGOs basically operate on the basis of personal 
relationship between specific organization and the department concerned. Despite the fact that 
before independence in July 2011 foreign affairs and immigration, were matters reserved to the 
national Sudanese government, most NGOs operating in Southern Sudan hardly registered in 
Khartoum.132 The Government of Southern Sudan, through its ‘technical missions’ abroad, had 
the right to issue ‘SPLM travel permits’ for people who wanted to travel to Southern Sudan 
without following national immigration requirements.  
 
Indeed the majority of people, including NGOs’ personnel, who travelled to Southern Sudan 
applied for these permits to enter Sudan without acquiring a Sudanese visa. This meant that 
unlike NGOs operating in the North or in Darfur, NGOs working in the South did not have 
serious problems to enter Southern Sudan and conduct their work. For example, one of the 
biggest NGOs operating in Southern Sudan, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) which deals 
extensively with issues such as land rights, access to justice for women and health care, started 
operating in Southern Sudan well before the signing of the CPA.133 Similarly, when the National 
Government expelled ten humanitarian NGOs from Darfur in early 2009, the President of 
Southern Sudan not only deplored the action of the national government (of which, incidentally, 
he was a part as the First Vice President) but also asked the expelled NGOs interested in 
                                                 
132 Schedule A, Art. 5 of the Interim National Constitution placed immigration and aliens affairs among those 
reserved to the national government. 
133 Interview with the Head of NPA Office in Juba, December 2008.  
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transferring their services to Southern Sudan to do so.134 This demonstrates that even if there 
was a national legal framework regulating the work of NGOs, it did not apply in Southern 
Sudan.  
 
A question to pose is, how are NGOs involved in rule of law reform in Southern Sudan to 
operate in the absence of regulatory legal framework? This question takes into account the 
central role and significant resources spent by NGOs in promoting rule of law. It also recognizes 
that the activities of NGOs, especially those transcending national boundaries, are required to 
conform to the national laws of countries where they operate. But examining the practice ‘on the 
ground’ shows that this has not been the case, because the government hardly has a mechanism 
in place to provide sufficient oversight on the work of these NGOs. In Southern Sudan, the 
practice is for NGOs to negotiate directly with the department concerned, whether it is the 
Ministry of Justice or the Judiciary, and agree on the work to be done. There are nobinding rules 
that NGOs are required to observe, and no accreditation formality. For example, if an NGO 
wants to work with the judiciary it will present a ‘concept paper’ or a ‘proposal’ to the Chief 
Justice or his representative who will then discuss the proposal with the organization and 
determine its work. Rarely are such proposals rejected.135 However, this aspect can be attributed 
to the fact that most NGOs came in with their financial resources already, so that they hardly 
need an agreement with or support from the relevant department to secure funding, which 
simplifies their interaction with government authorities.   
 
Do the NGOs consider the absence of a regulatory legal framework to be a pressing concern or 
something that affects their activities? The government and NGOs have different perspective on 
                                                 
134 See ‘Sudan expels ten aid NGOs and dissolves two local groups’, available at: 
http://www.sudantribune.com/Sudan-expels-10-aid-NGOs-and,30382. Accessed March 2013. 
135 Interview with government officials in the Advocate General`s Office, Juba, July 2009.  
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this issue. While most of the NGOs feel that this absence partly eliminates the perpetual 
bureaucracy prevalent in the government departments, so allowing these NGOs to provide 
critical assistance unhindered, the government officials have different views. They feel that the 
absence of legal regime to regulate the work of NGOs provides a free pass to NGOs to conduct 
rule of law reform without being held accountable by the government.136 In general the absence 
of a regulatory legal regime reflects the weak institutional capacity common in South Sudanese 
governance. Indeed it has enabled some NGOs to be accountable solely to their donors who 
give them funds, with little governmental oversight.137 
 
The apparent ease with which NGOs work in South Sudan, it should be noted, is limited to 
international NGOs. Local NGOs involved in specific clusters of rule of law building hardly 
exist, and where they exist not only are they underfunded and weak but their survival depends on 
funding from international NGOs and donor countries.  Hence the work of local NGOs in 
Southern Sudan is extremely marginal and limited to advocacy.138 In contrast NGOs from 
Western countries have more clout with various government departments in Southern Sudan 
primarily because of their significant human and financial prowess compared with that of their 
local counterparts.    
 
The importance of a regulatory legal framework for NGOs cannot be underestimated. NGOs 
play a critical role in rule of law promotion activities. With the weak government institutional 
capacity in place, NGOs conduct various activities including capacity building for judicial 
personnel, legal advisers, and members of the civil society, and help for infrastructure 
development necessary to sustain the rule of law, among other functions. The absence of a 
                                                 
136Ibid. 
137Interview with the senior official in the judiciary (name withheld on request). 
138Interview with the private lawyer in Juba, October 2009. 
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comprehensive regulatory legal framework to verify whether NGOs conform to relevant 
substantive values and norms may not only hamper their effectiveness but also render their rule 
of law reform activities less useful and relevant to the needs of the local beneficiaries.    
 
Despite the arguments made in this section, it is important to differentiate between oversight and 
control. This section does not advocate for the enactment of draconian legislation to control the 
work of NGOs especially those that may not always support the position of the government on 
a particular matter. Indeed, we have seen how government decision to enact laws to ‘regulate’ the 
work of NGOS (Zimbabwe for example), have lead to disastrous consequences such as the 
banning of some NGOs for contravening the ‘national security or economic interests’ or being 
accused for serving as ‘agents of imperialism’. It is therefore argued that for national laws to 
provide effective oversight on the work of NGOs, must be crafted in a way that it advances 
transparency and accountability in a democratic and pluralistic society.    
 
H. Conclusion 
The primary objective of this chapter was to examine the legal framework of international actors 
such as the UN, the AU and NGOs involved in building the rule of law in Southern Sudan. It 
was also interested in determining how these actors build the rule of law in practice. The 
discussion has shown that the involvement of the UN in rule of law reform is underpinned by 
the United Nations Charter, international human rights instruments and other policy statements 
issued by the United Nations and its organs. It has further been shown that the General 
Assembly and the Security Council continue to play key roles in the way the concept is conceived 
and implemented both at the international and national levels. 
 
However, it has been argued that despite this involvement the approach of the UN remains 
flawed and purely technical. Despite the efforts of the Secretary General to support various 
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initiatives for UN to coordinate its rule of law reform work, the discussion has shown that 
different organizations such as the UNHCR, UNDP and UNICEF continue to push reforms 
directly aligned with their original mandates. The implication of this has been discussed as well. 
The chapter has also discussed the role played by the AU in rule of law reform, arguing that the 
legal framework of the organization is grounded in the Constitutive Act, the Peace and Security 
Council Protocol, the Post Conflict Reconstruction Policy and other decisions that may be made 
by the Assembly.  
 
This chapter has further demonstrated that even though the AU has adopted a score of 
instruments to underpin its post-conflict reconstruction involvement, its rule of law based 
reforms remain minimal. Rule of law activities undertaken by the organization are in most cases 
linked to the preservation of peace and security rather than reform of domestic legal institutions. 
It is against this fact that the chapter has examined various initiatives of the AU to address rule 
of law in Southern Sudan, such as the work of Mbeki Panel and its recommendations and the 
work of the AU Ministerial Committee for post-conflict reconstruction in Southern Sudan. Since 
this thesis is attempting to challenge whether rule of law reforms can lead to attributes such as 
improved social economic conditions or strong and effective judicial and law and order 
institutions in countries where these reforms are undertaken, the next chapter will provide an 
examination of these claims. 
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Chapter Six 
VI. Building Rule of Law Institutions in Southern Sudan. 
 
A. Introduction 
In the introductory chapter we saw that judicial independence is one of the core attributes of the 
rule of law, and that the rule of law and human rights are interlinked. For example, both Rawls 
and Dicey agree that for the rule of law to exist laws must be prospective and interpreted by the 
judiciary as an independent and judicial body. But how does this theoretical attribute translate 
into institutions capable of interpreting laws independently? This chapter will examine whether 
the rule of law reforms undertaken by international actors can contribute effectively to the 
building of an independent judiciary and law and order institutions in the reconstruction of 
South Sudan. The focus on the judiciary is due to its key role in safeguarding human rights, 
checks and balances of other arms of government and guaranteeing the rule of law.  In terms of 
the rule of law this discussion will draw attention to the fact that fair trials are critical not only to 
guarantee individual human rights but also in the overall administration of justice including the 
independence of the judiciary to review executive actions. It is through the standards governing 
the right to a fair trial that the independence, impartiality and competence of the judiciary are 
determined in international human rights law. In addition, the value of an independent judiciary 
inheres in its potential to guarantee access to justice and a fair trial, both of which connote the 
rule of law.      
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Parts I, II and III of this chapter examine the nexus between judicial independence and fair trial 
and how the former can be realized in the context of the latter. This examination will serve two 
purposes. It will help clarify how an independent judiciary can foster the rule of law and also 
inform the participation of international actors in achieving this objective. Clarifying these issues 
will help us understand how the concept of the rule of law at both the international and national 
levels can be transformed from an abstract ideal into stronger institutions to guarantee the rule 
of law.  
 
The chapter will further attempt to demonstrate the nexus between an independent and impartial 
judiciary and the separation of powers. The question is important in considering whether an 
independent judiciary can contribute to an equitable and stable balance of power within a 
government through executive accountability. This examination is especially crucial in the 
Southern Sudan context given that the current governing party and senior government office 
holders are mostly former guerrillas who are attempting to transition from a rebel movement 
into a viable political party respecting the rule of law and the constitution. In addition, the fact 
that the constitution grants wide powers to the executive branch is a reason for further inquiry 
into how an independent judiciary can contribute to provide check and balances to the exercise 
of these powers.  
 
Earlier, in chapter two, the discussion has shown that in a society emerging from conflict, more 
often vital institutions like the judiciary, police and correctional services are either non-existent 
or weak and corrupt, and so incapable of fulfilling their core functions of protecting people and 
dispensing justice. The subsequent question is: how does the rule of law reform help or 
contribute to addressing these challenges? And what are the role and contribution of 
international actors in addressing these challenges? A closely related question is, how do these 
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actors reconcile their quest for maintenance of international standards with the ‘one size fits all’ 
problem? These questions stem from the fact that often international actors assume that rule of 
law reform will automatically lead to stronger institutions such as the judiciary, police or 
correctional services. However, this chapter will show that while rule of law reforms can indeed 
help strengthen an independent judiciary, actors involved in this process take these assumptions 
at face value.       
 
While discussing judicial independence it is essential to reaffirm that this means individual 
independence for the judges and institutional or collective independence fora court or tribunal as 
an independent entity.1 Commenting on the nexus between individual and institutional 
independence, the Human Rights Committee noted that ‘States parties should specify the 
relevant constitutional and legislative texts which provide for the actual independence of the 
judiciary from the executive branch and the legislature. They should also specify the manner in 
which judges are appointed, the qualifications for appointment, and the duration of their terms 
of office and conditions governing their functions’.2 
 
Despite the imperative nature of judicial reform in a post-conflict context, it is clear that its 
realization continues to face serious challenges. The challenges and obstacles vary in different 
countries, but common challenges tend to be generally associated with transparent and merit 
based appointments procedures, relevant training, building structural protection for impartial 
decision making by increasing the transparency and accountability of judicial operations, 
providing adequate resources and budgets including adequate pay, supporting independent court 
                                                 
1Judith Resnik, ‘Judicial Independence’, in Vikram David Amar and Mark V. Tushnet (eds), Global Perspectives on 
Constitutional Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, 25.  
2 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 13: Equality before the Courts and the Right to a Fair and Public 
Hearing by an Independent Court Established by Law (Art. 14), 13/04/1984. 
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monitoring organizations, and investing in legal education.3 Despite the varying opinions on how 
to establish judicial independence, it may persuasively be argued that the ability of the judiciary to 
dispense justice without fear of external influence or repercussions is a hallmark of judicial 
independence.4 It is worth examining the concept of judicial independence in detail and how 
building the rule of law can enhance its effectiveness. The starting premise here is that the 
independence of the judiciary is an essential attribute of the right to a fair hearing by an 
independent impartial and competent tribunal. 
 
i. Right to a fair trial and an independent judiciary 
The right to a fair trial is well enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,5the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other international treaties and 
instruments.6 Relevant provisions on this right are also reflected in declarations and non-treaty 
instruments which have been adopted by the UN General Assembly and other organizations 
with the aim of codifying basic principles on matters such as the independence of the judiciary 
and the role of lawyers in the administration of criminal justice.7 Human rights courts and 
tribunals and other supervisory bodies have also contributed in the elaboration of fair trial 
standards.  
 
                                                 
3 Jane Stromseth, David Wippman and Rosa Brooks (eds), Can Might Make Right? Building the Rule of Law after Military 
Intervention, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006, 247. 
4 M.P. Singh, ‘Securing the Independence of the Judiciary-The Indian Experience’, Indiana International and 
Comparative Law Review, vol. 10, 1999-2000, 245-250. 
5 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 10 & 11. 
6 ICCPR, Article 14. See also European Convention on Human Rights Art. 6, American Declaration of the Rights 
and Duties of Man, Arts. XVIII and XXVI, American Convention on Human Rights, Art. 8, African Charter on 
Human and Peoples Rights, Arts 7 and 26 and Commonwealth of Independent States Convention on Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Art. 6.  
7 General Assembly Resolutions 40/32 of 29 November 1985.  
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International human rights law reflects a fundamental requirement of the rule of law, that trial 
should be by an independent and impartial court or tribunal established by law and competent to 
determine the matter.8 It is because of this requirement that we need to examine how attributes 
associated with an independent judiciary can contribute to enhance a right to a fair trial. 
Reaffirming the nexus between an independent judiciary and a fair trial, especially regarding the 
use of ‘special courts’ to try civilians, the Human Rights Committee observed that ‘while the 
Covenant does not prohibit such categories of courts, nevertheless the conditions which it lays 
down clearly indicate that trying civilians by such courts should be exceptional and take place 
under conditions which genuinely afford full guarantee of fair trial’.9This observation by the 
Committee reaffirms the critical role of an independent judiciary in making the right to a fair trial 
effective. 
 
At the regional level both the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights10 and the European 
Charter of Human Rights11 have reaffirmed the critical role of an independent judiciary to 
enhance the right to a fair trial. For example, in one of its decision the Commission stated that 
‘Article 26 of the African Charter reiterates the rights enshrined in Article 7 but is even more 
explicit about State Parties’ obligations to ‘guarantee the independence of the Courts and allow 
the establishment and improvement of appropriate national institutions entrusted with the 
promotion and protection of the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the present Charter’.12 While 
Article 7 focuses on the individual’s right to be heard, Article 26 speaks of the institutions which 
are essential to give meaning and content to that right.13So it can be argued that international law 
                                                 
8 Susan Marks and Andrew Clapham, International Human Rights Lexicon, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, 154.  
9Human Rights Committee, General Comment 13, above note 2, para. 4.  
10 Articles 7 & 26 of the Charter guarantee the right to a fair trial and an independent judiciary respectively.  
11 See for example, the European Charter on the Statute for Judges, Adopted by the Council of Europe in July 1998.  
12 See Civil Liberties Organization v Nigeria, Communication 129/94 9th Annual Activity Report 1995 – 1996 
13Ibid. 
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considers judicial independence essential in the general realization of the rule of law, mainly 
because it guarantees the fundamental rights and freedoms of citizens.  
 
One of the major elements of a fair trial relates to the character of the tribunal or the court 
before which the defendant is tried. From the international law perspective the relevant question 
here is: what key constituents of a fair trial pertain to the independence of the judiciary as a 
requisite of the international human rights law? Fair trial standards apply to a wide range of 
processes, actors and institutions. They apply to all kinds of legal proceedings and all parties 
affected, both defendants and victims.14 For the victims of crime, they have rights to redress 
where human rights violations have occurred, and failure to initiate criminal proceedings due to a 
general amnesty for crime perpetrators may violate the victim`s right to a fair trial.15 
 
Scholars like Dicey and Fuller, and institutions like the United Nations and the Nuremberg 
Tribunal discussed in the introductory chapter, cite an independent judiciary as the key 
component of the rule of law on account of its role to ensure access to justice and equality 
before the law. Despite judicial independence being a well established legal doctrine, which has 
been recognized by national laws, case law and the international community through different 
instruments, still there has been no precise definition of what it is; rather, different entities seem 
to agree on what judicial independence should consist of, rather than its precise definition.16 The 
United Nations General Assembly has attempted to describe the attributes of judicial 
independence.17 For example, the Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary18 state 
                                                 
14 ICCPR, Art. 14. See also Marks, above note 8, 152. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Robert Stevens, The Independence of the Judiciary, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993, 3-20. See also Steven 
Lubet, ‘Judicial Discipline and Judicial Independence’, Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol. 61, 1998, 59-74.  
17 See the United Nations Basic Principles on the Independence of Judiciary, 1985 endorsed by the United Nations 
General Assembly Resolutions 40/32 (1985).  
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that: ‘The independence of the judiciary shall be guaranteed by the State and enshrined in the 
constitution and it is the duty of all governmental and other institutions to respect and observe 
the independence of the judiciary’.19 Similarly, the Latimer House Principles adopted in 2003 by 
Commonwealth countries reaffirm that ‘an independent, impartial, honest and competent 
judiciary is integral to upholding the rule of law, engendering public confidence and dispensing 
justice’.20 And the Universal Charter of the Judge reiterates similar commitments.21 While these 
Principles are not legally binding, they reflect international commitment to further the rule of law 
and provide guidance for states to guarantee judicial independence.  
 
Going back to the discussion in the introductory chapter on the core attributes of the rule of law, 
it can be argued that the right to a fair trial is key to enhance the integrity and independence of 
the judiciary to administer justice in accordance with the law and the facts without improper 
influence.22 Judicial independence further requires (i) that judges should decide lawsuits free from 
any outside pressure, personal, economic, or political, including any fear of reprisal, (ii) that the 
courts’ decisions should be final in all cases except as changed by general prospective legislation, 
and (iii) that there should be no tampering with the organization or jurisdiction of the courts for 
the purposes of controlling their decisions upon constitutional questions.23 Examination of these 
                                                                                                                                                        
18UNGA Res. Note 7. 
19Above note 17, Principle 1 &2. 
20 Latimer House Principles, available at:  
http://www.thecommonwealth.org/Templates/Internal.asp?NodeID=37744.  
21 The Charter was unanimously approved by the delegates attending the meeting of the Central Council of the 
International Association of Judges in Taipei (Taiwan) on 17 November 1999. 
22 Chris Maina Peter, ‘Independence of the Judiciary in Tanzania: Many Rivers to Cross’ in Frederick Jjuko (ed.), The 
Independence of the Judiciary and the Rule of Law: Strengthening Constitutional Activism in East Africa, Kampala: Kituo cha 
Katiba, 2005, 59.  
23 Archibald Cox, ‘The Independence of the Judiciary: History and Purposes’, University of Dayton Law Review, vol. 21, 
1995-1996, 566-580.  
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attributes confirms that the judiciary has the task of keeping every organ of the state within the 
limits of the law and thereby making the rule of law meaningful and effective.24 
 
The realization of an independent judiciary is closely linked to the doctrine of the separation of 
powers discussed in the introductory chapter. The doctrine means that the three arms of the 
government, the legislature, judiciary and executive, should be clearly separated from each other 
and each should operate independently of the others. In its broader sense the doctrine means 
that one branch of government should not be in a position to dominate the other. In reality, 
however, it is impossible to have pure separation of powers where each organ of the state acts 
independently, largely because the business of a constitutional government is so complex that it 
cannot define the area of each department in such a manner as to leave each one independent 
and supreme in its allotted sphere.25This separation is mainly to ensure that powerful organs such 
as the executive do not use their influence and resources to interfere with the judiciary, especially 
when the latter gives decisions which may disagree with policies of the executive. 
 
The Kenyan and South African Constitutions both guarantee separation of powers in their 
respective countries. For example, the 2010 Kenyan Constitution provides that ‘in the exercise of 
judicial authority, the judiciary shall be subject to the constitution and the law and shall not be 
subject to the control or direction of person or authority’.26 The importance of this provision is 
that it guarantees the ability of the judiciary and the judges to dispense justice without fear of 
reprisal from the executive. This aspect is also crucial to ensure that the judiciary can be relied 
upon by citizens as an independent and fair arbiter of disputes between and among themselves 
                                                 
24 Yash Vyas, ‘The Independence of the Judiciary: a Third World Perspective’, Third World Legal Studies, 1992, 127-
145.  
25 William Wade and Christopher Forsyth, Administrative Law, (10th Ed), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, 1-
10.  
26Article 160, 2010 Kenya Constitution. 
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and the state. Similarly, the South African Constitution designates the judiciary as the ‘sole and 
independent organ to determine all disputes resulting from the Constitution’. This designation 
essentially reaffirms the crucial attributes of the rule of law identified earlier, which require that 
the judiciary must be capable to interpret the law without interference.       
 
ii. Independence of the judiciary in the Southern Sudanese context 
In the introductory chapter it was shown that one of the minimum attributes of the rule of law is 
an independent judiciary. An independent judiciary promotes the rule of law by restoring the 
faith of the public in institutions of public authority, by ensuring equality before the law and 
non-discrimination among citizens. In Southern Sudan, during the colonial period, the judiciary 
was an integral branch of the executive with primary responsibility to enforce law and order and 
uphold colonial rule and the status quo. This had implications for the general development of the 
rule of law in Sudan because it violated one of the core attributes of the rule of law, which 
require equality before the law among individuals and the state. To most people the judiciary was 
considered an oppressive tool by the state and hence viewed with suspicion. This attitude which 
depicted the judiciary as an instrument of oppression did not change with independence, because 
leaders continued to manipulate judicial institutions for their own end at the expense of their 
citizens.27 
 
Because of this situation in Sudan where the judiciary was always viewed with suspicion, the 
assumption of international actors that building the rule of law can automatically enhance judicial 
independence is questioned. Arguably, the major concern of international actors in building the 
rule of law is the belief that the existence of the rule of law reflected in institutions like an 
independent judiciary can further guarantee the enjoyment of fundamental rights and freedoms 
                                                 
27 See Lino J. Lauro and Peter A. Samuelson, ‘Towards Pluralism in Sudan: A Traditionalist Approach’, Harvard 
International Law Journal, vol. 37, 1, 1996, 65-120.  
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enshrined in various international human rights instruments. The major challenge however is not 
only building the rule of law conceived in the form of institutions like the judiciary, but also 
creating institutions that respond to the expectations and concerns of their beneficiaries.     
 
In Southern Sudan judicial independence derives its origin from the Interim Constitution of 
Southern Sudan (ICSS)28 and a number of international instruments which Sudan has ratified.29 
The constitution regulates in general ways crucial features of the independent judiciary including 
the role and position of the judge in the administration of justice, the procedures for the 
appointment and dismissal of judges, the remuneration and tenure of judges, case assignment 
and the qualifications for serving as a judge. While the CPA and the Constitution list these 
important elements to further the independence of the judiciary, they do not provide how they 
will be achieved. Rather the task of creating conditions in which these elements can be realized is 
assumed by the ‘international community’ represented by donor countries, international 
organizations and NGOs. This is based on the belief that since Southern Sudan is in a post-
conflict situation it cannot on its own create conditions necessary for advancement and 
realization of these objectives, and therefore requires external support. However, this support is 
more often grounded in what is called ‘international standards’ which essentially discard anything 
considered inconsistent or incompatible with the assumptions of international actors.   
 
In the previous chapter various reasons were identified to explain why countries and 
organizations not affected by strife decide to promote or build the rule of law in countries 
affected by conflict. It is argued that this involvement should be informed by local realities of the 
beneficiaries. While international actors may have a role to play in helping post-conflict South 
                                                 
28Article 128, Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan. 
29 Article 13 (3) ICSS states that ‘all rights and freedoms enshrined in the international human rights treaties, 
covenants and instruments ratified by the Republic of the Sudan shall be an integral part of this Bill’. 
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Sudan to build an independent judiciary, it is important to recognize that their help has 
limitations. For example, although donors can provide funds to support various initiatives like 
building judicial infrastructure or providing essential legal materials, ultimately it will be South 
Sudanese who are required to sit in the courtrooms and adjudicate cases, interpret the 
constitution and laws and ensure that justice is done to victims of injustice. Similarly, while 
donors can provide financial resources or technical expertise to enable a ministry to draft laws, it 
is for the domestic players to ensure that these laws serve the interests of the people by applying 
them fairly and making them available to the wider polity. The next section will examine how 
building the rule of law can enhance individual independence of judges and hence contribute to 
the realization of an independent judiciary.   
 
iii. Individual independence of judges 
As already discussed, independence of the judiciary requires not only institutional independence 
but also individual independence of the judge.30 This aspect was reiterated by Judge Bingham, 
quoted in chapter one, who contends that to exercise fair trial judges should be independent of 
anybody or anything that might compel them to decide issues on any other basis than the law 
and facts before them. Individual independence of the judge and his or her ability to conduct a 
fair trial are associated and mutually interdependent. Article 134 of the Interim Constitution of 
Southern Sudan provides for the individual independence of judges, specifically that:  
 
134.   (1) Justices and Judges of Southern Sudan are independent and shall perform their 
functions without interference. The provisions of this constitution and the law shall 
protect their independence. 
 
                                                 
30 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 32, Article 14: Right to Equality before Courts and Tribunals and 
to a Fair Trial, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/32, 2007.  
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(2) Justices and Judges shall uphold this constitution and the rule of law and shall 
administer justice without fear or favour; they shall enjoy such immunities as shall 
be determined by law. 
 
From this provision it is clear that the Constitution provides for both rights and obligations of 
judges as part of the independence of the judiciary. On the one hand judges’ independence is 
guaranteed by the Constitution and the ‘law’. Although the provision does not specify the exact 
law apart from the Constitution itself, one can argue that the law includes any legislation which 
may be enacted to protect the independence of judges. Further, the Constitution imposes an 
obligation on judges to uphold the Constitution and the rule of law. This requirement can be 
attributed to a desire of the drafters to ensure that judges uphold and operate within the confines 
of the Constitution as a prerequisite for enhanced rule of law. But reading this provision of the 
Constitution raises some questions relevant to the independence of the judiciary. The provision 
talks of ‘justices’ and ‘judges’ as the individuals protected by this provision. But how about the 
low ranking judicial officials? They seem to be ignored. Below the judges and justices there are 
many court officers such as magistrates who are involved in the dispensation of justice in day to 
day functions of the courts. Admittedly, it is possible to assume that these low ranked officials 
are included in this categorization as spelt out in the Constitution. But reality in day to day 
practice demonstrates the contrary, as will be seen in this discussion.  
 
If the judiciary cannot be relied upon to decide cases impartially and in accordance with laid 
down laws, without being subjected to external pressures and influences, its role is greatly 
compromised and public confidence in the government may be undermined.31 As noted in the 
introductory chapter, impairing judicial independence undermines confidence in the courts as a 
                                                 
31 Antoine Garapon, ‘A New Approach for Promoting Judicial Independence’ in Randall Peerenboom (ed.), Judicial 
Independence in China: Lesson for Global Rule of law Promotion, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010, 37-50.  
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dispute settlement mechanism because it can threaten social order and stability. This belief in the 
independence of the judiciary was echoed by the then President of Tanganyika Mwalimu Julius 
Nyerere when he stated that ‘our judiciary at every level must be independent of the executive 
arm of the state. Real freedom requires that any citizen feels confident that his or [her] case will 
be impartially judged, even if it is a case against the Prime Minister himself”.32 And since the 
independence of the judiciary is intertwined with the independence of its judges, it is critical that 
judges are guaranteed independence to ensure their work is not compromised by external 
influences.  
 
Another key attribute of an independent judiciary is the requirement that judges should be 
accountable. Under the Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan the President of the Supreme 
Court is accountable to the President of the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) for the 
administration of the court. Specifically Art. 126 states that:   
 
Art. 126 (8) The President of the Supreme Court of Southern Sudan, as the head of the Judiciary 
of Southern Sudan, shall be answerable to the President of the Government of 
Southern Sudan for the administration of the Judiciary. 
 
This provision can be construed as a mechanism to demand accountability from the judiciary. It 
should be noted that there is a marked difference between independence and accountability of 
the judiciary. While the former means freeing the judiciary from prior control of its decision 
making, accountability, on the other hand, focuses on having a mechanism in place by which the 
judiciary as an independent body is required to explain its operations after the fact. But is this 
requirement of accountability to the President who is the head of the executive not a hindrance 
                                                 
32 Julius Nyerere, Freedom and Unity: A Selection from Writings and Speeches 1952-1965, Dar es Salaam: Oxford University 
Press, 1966, 131.  
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to judicial independence? It is argued that while accountability is desirable, it should be exercised 
by an independent organ such as a judicial service commission. This is to avoid instances where 
the executive can interfere in the work of the judiciary or deny the court necessary resources 
when the former is not happy with cases being handled by the court. 
 
Perhaps the most controversial provision in the Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan relates 
to the accountability of judges at the state level. The constitution requires the President of the 
High Court to be accountable to the Governor in the performance and administration of the state 
judiciary. The provision states that: 
 
Art. 132 (2) The most senior judge of the High Court who shall be its President, shall be 
answerable to the Governor of the state for the performance and administration of the 
State Judiciary. 
 
The implication of this requirement is that it subordinates the judiciary to the whims of the 
executive, and this may in the long run affect its work of dispensing justice. For example, the 
president of the High Court will have to explain and be accountable for the performance of the 
state judiciary, not to the chief justice or the judicial service commission but rather to the 
governor who is an integral part of the executive. This aspect would be complicated if the 
judiciary was to rule against the government on a matter in which the latter might have an 
interest. This would necessarily call into question the relationship between the government and 
the judiciary. As argued earlier, whether the rule of law can be said to exist in a given society is 
largely reflected in the commitment displayed by the society concerned, not only in the creation 
of institutional conditions such as an independent judiciary but also in defending the values for 
which these institutions stand. Indeed this is one of the provisions which judges in Southern 
Sudan have continuously complained of, saying it has been misinterpreted by the executive at the 
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state level to interfere in their work.33It is argued that the correct approach to determine the 
effectiveness of the judiciary or its performance would be to leave it to the judiciary or an 
independent body established for that purpose. 
 
Individual independence of judges is further predicated not only on the ability and willingness of 
the executive to respect and implement decisions rendered by the courts but also on the 
individual competence and confidence of the judge. Indeed, one of the attributes of the rule of 
law identified earlier is that laws should possess characteristics of certainty, generality and 
stability. They should also be clearly expressed, open and publicised. The judge cannot be 
confident and competent if he/she is not well versed with the laws which she/he is responsible 
to adjudicate. Under the Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan (ICSS) both English and 
Arabic have equal status and neither language can claim higher status against the other.34 But 
closer scrutiny shows that the entire judicial system in Southern Sudan and now the independent 
South Sudan relies on and uses English language as the primary language of communication. For 
example, in Southern Sudan most judges and magistrates were educated in Khartoum and other 
countries, especially Arabic speaking countries where Arabic rather than English is the main 
language of legislation and communication. While efforts have been made to offer on and off 
training opportunities in current legal system of Southern Sudan, available evidence 
demonstrates that these efforts have not successfully addressed this challenge.35 
 
The prevailing assumption among international actors is that independence of judges can be 
enhanced through ‘capacity building’ of judges by giving them trainings in human rights or legal 
                                                 
33 Interview with the President of the High Court for the Eastern Equatorial state in Torit, December, 2008. 
34 Art. 6(2) (3) (4) ICSS. 
35 Efforts have essentially been undertaken by the British Council and other international institutions like the UNDP 
and RCN (Belgium) involved in rule of law reform programmes in the South.  
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related subjects depending on the specific needs of the relevant department. Indeed, in Southern 
Sudan, donors such as the British Council and NGOs continue to offer regular training to some 
members of the judiciary on various aspect of law such as international human rights law, 
constitutional law and criminal law. While on the face of it these efforts and training may prove 
useful to enhance educational skills of judges, they raise some serious problems that relate to the 
independence of judges. The major concern relates to the target of the training. More often it is 
directed at senior officials in the judiciary, necessarily excluding some of the judges and 
magistrates at the county and local levels. The danger with this selective focus is that it ignores 
the fact that most of the judicial functions are performed at the lower and rural areas where 
more than 80% of Southern Sudanese reside. But in addition training materials used are those 
brought in by international experts who adapt them to reflect their training role in Southern 
Sudan. Indeed this practice is similar to the previous efforts undertaken under the law and 
development movement where experts and scholars from some Western law schools were hired 
to provide training for senior judges and lawyers in some African countries in the hope that this 
would improve the rule of law.  
 
It is highly unrealistic to assume that provision of ‘capacity building courses’ offered on an ad 
hoc basis can automatically lead to individual competence of judges and in the process enhance 
the independent judiciary. One of the possible means to address this challenge is for the 
magistrates and county judges in lower courts to be given opportunities to attend continuous 
legal and English-language training courses which would allow them to keep abreast with the 
development of events in the legal field both nationally and internationally, which is crucial to 
their work. The problem with the current approach is that most of this training is not sequenced, 
rather it is offered when donors have made funds available to that effect, and even when offered 
it is directed at the higher judicial personnel like judges of the Supreme Court, Court of Appeal 
and High Court located in the capital, Juba.  
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a) Appointment of judges 
How then does the rule of law affect the appointment of judges? Perhaps more important, why 
should the mechanism or process through which judges are appointed be of any significance or 
merit discussion? Since power is exercised by individual judges and through the judiciary as an 
institution, how a judge is appointed and promoted greatly matters. If the appointment is not 
based on merit and transparency it can greatly tarnish the credibility of the judge, and the 
judiciary as an institution, which in effect can compromise a judge’s impartiality. Appointment 
based on merit requires that judges should be appointed on the basis of their qualifications and 
ability to discharge their functions, while transparency of the process requires the appointing 
authority to ensure that the entire process is open to the public so that any objection or concern 
regarding a candidate is addressed before the appointment is made. The European Court of 
Human Rights has reaffirmed that ‘in order to establish whether a tribunal can be considered as 
‘independent’ regard must be had inter alia to the manner of appointment of its members and 
their term of office, the existence of guarantees against outside pressures and the question 
whether the body presents an appearance of independence’.36 
 
In Southern Sudan the appointment of judges is provided for under Art. 135 of the Interim 
Constitution of Southern Sudan. The provision states that;  
135.      
(1) The President of the Government of Southern Sudan shall appoint the President, 
Deputy President and Justices of the Supreme Court, the Presidents and Justices of 
the Courts of Appeal, having regard to competence, integrity, credibility and 
impartiality as shall be determined by this Constitution and the law. 
                                                 
36 Decision of the European Court of Human Rights, Findlay v. United Kingdom, 1997, 24 E.H.R.R, Para 73. 
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(2) The appointment of the President, Deputy President and Justices of the Supreme 
Court shall be subject to approval by a two-thirds majority of all members of the 
Assembly. 
(3) The Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly shall enact a law to provide for 
appointments, terms and conditions of service of Justices and Judges of Southern 
Sudan. 
(4) All Justices and Judges shall, before assuming their duties, take and subscribe to the 
judicial oath of allegiance as shall be prescribed by law. 
 
Although the Constitution provides for the appointment of the President, Deputy President and 
Justices of the Supreme Court and the Justices of the Court of Appeal, it does not expressly 
provide for the appointment of the lower court judges; rather it leaves this task to other laws 
which may be enacted for the same purpose.37 In the absence of the law, how are the lower court 
judges appointed? Since the signing of the CPA, the practice has shown that these appointments 
are made by the President of the Supreme Court who doubles as the Chief Justice, an aspect 
which gives him enormous power in appointing lower court judges and magistrates and the high 
court judges who are not subject to presidential appointment. What criteria guide the President 
of the Supreme Court in making appointment to the bench? Admittedly, the constitution 
requires the President when making appointment of Justices to take into account competence, 
integrity, credibility and impartiality. Despite this constitutional safeguard there is no mechanism 
to ensure that these criteria are observed.  
 
Furthermore, there are problems with this requirement because it is capable of being abused by 
the executive to safeguard its own interests. Unlike in other countries where the appointment of 
                                                 
37 Article 133 of the Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan. 
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justices of higher courts is made with consultation and recommendations of a Judicial Service 
Commission or Council, in Southern Sudan there is no such body and the President takes the 
decision on whom to appoint as a Judge. The absence of an independent body to oversee the 
appointment process for justices does not fit well with the claim that rule of law reforms can 
automatically lead to an independent judiciary.   
 
In accordance with article 135 (2) of the ICSS the appointment of the President of the Supreme 
Court and his deputy and the Justices of the Supreme Court is subject to the approval by a two-
thirds majority of all members of the Assembly. This requirement is indeed (at least theoretically) 
one of the safeguarding constitutional mechanisms to ensure transparency and integrity in the 
selection and appointment of judges of the highest court. The challenge is to have the 
appointment process adhered to by the appointing authority. The flaw in this process is that the 
powers of the President to appoint justices are unchecked, so that he or she can use these 
powers to make appointments which may compromise the independence of the judiciary as an 
institution, for example by selecting judges who are unqualified or who would side with the 
government when determining critical issues in which the government may have an interest. It 
would be useful therefore if an independent body like a judicial service commission – comprising 
members of the judiciary and the bar association, the attorney general or his or her 
representative, and representatives of the public service commission among others – was 
involved in the process.38 This would ensure that all the candidates submitted to the legislative 
assembly for approval have been thoroughly vetted and their qualifications and integrity are not 
in doubt.     
 
                                                 
38 For example, in Uganda the Judicial Service Commission includes select members of the judiciary, a representative 
of the Attorney General, representatives of the Public Service Commissioner and the Law Society, and lay people 
appointed by the President. See Art. 146, 1995 Uganda Constitution. 
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While not legally binding, the Commonwealth guidelines on preserving judicial independence 
discussed earlier reaffirm that every jurisdiction should have an appropriate independent process 
in place for judicial appointments. Indeed the UN practice recognizes the imperative nature of 
these guidelines in strengthening the rule of law. Where no independent system already exists, 
appointments should be made by a judicial service commission (established by the constitution 
or statutory law) or by an appropriate officer of state acting on the recommendation of such a 
commission.39 The guidelines further stipulate that the appointment process, whether or not 
involving an appropriately constituted and representative judicial service commission, should be 
designed to guarantee the quality and independence of those selected for the appointment at all 
levels of the judiciary. As to the main criteria for the appointment, the guidelines insist that 
judicial appointments at all levels should be made on merit with appropriate provisions for the 
progressive removal of gender imbalances and of other historical factors of discrimination.40 
While these guidelines are not binding they provide a framework to enhance the independence 
of the judiciary.     
 
Despite these guidelines, there are no clear rules guaranteeing that a certain process of 
appointing judges will be more successful than the rest. Rather, the success of each process will 
largely depend on the history, culture and political context of the country and the immediate 
problem that is being addressed.41 Further examination of the above guidelines would show that 
there are some common denominators which, if used especially in Southern Sudan, can 
tremendously improve the appointment process of judges. These may include:  
 
                                                 
39 Latimer House Guidelines, abovenote 20,17.   
40 Ibid. 
41 See generally USAID, Office of Democracy and Governance, Guidance for Promoting Judicial Independence and 
Impartiality, Washington, DC: Technical Publication Series, 2002, 15-20. 
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(i) Transparency in the process: here several measures may be undertaken such as to 
advertise judicial vacancies whenever available, to publicize candidates’ names, their 
background and selection process, to invite public comments on the profiles of the 
candidates, and to entrust this task in the hands of an independent and a competent 
body like a judicial council or commission. To further enhance the independence of 
the judiciary, the appointment process of judges should strictly be based on 
meritocracy and transparency. These considerations would enable the judiciary to 
recruit best candidates available in the pool of applicants.42 
(ii) Closely related to the above is the composition and integrity of the judicial council or 
commission. The council or commission should be an independent body comprising 
different players from different organs. For example, the council or commission 
should comprise lawyers and non-lawyers alike – though clearly, the process used by 
the judicial council or commission is more critical than even the composition of the 
council itself.  
 
In South Sudan the above objectives can be achieved by advertising these vacancies within South 
Sudan and also on the websites of the country`s missions abroad. This is important because 
there are many South Sudanese who have been living outside the country because of the conflict. 
Some of them are well educated and capable to contribute to the building of their country. It is 
therefore critical to give an opportunity to such people to apply for various vacancies in the 
judiciary and other relevant offices by allowing them to present their candidacies for 
consideration.   
 
                                                 
42Ibid. 
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Mindful of the diversity of ethnicities and nationalities in South Sudan, it is argued that when 
making appointments of judges especially at the highest court like the Supreme Court and the 
Court of Appeal, the appointing authority must be keen to reflect the society in which it 
operates. This matter is eloquently captured by Shetreet who argues that an important duty lies 
upon the appointing authorities to ensure a balanced composition of the judiciary, ideologically, 
socially and culturally. This is based on the doctrine of ‘fair reflection’ which may be supported 
by additional arguments. The judiciary is a branch of the government, not merely a dispute 
resolution institution, and as such it cannot be composed in total disregard of the society it 
represents.43 In the context of South Sudan this aspect can be achieved by ensuring that while 
taking into account merit and individual qualifications, the appointing authority appoints 
qualified men and women from different nationalities. While it is not possible to accommodate 
all nationalities in the appointment process, equally it is not desirable to have all vacancies filled 
from a few major nationalities.44 
b) Tenure and dismissal of judges: 
What should be the mechanism for safeguarding judges’ tenure? For a judge to remain 
independent while in office, security of tenure is of paramount importance. Lifetime or long-
term tenures provide judges with the necessary employment security to avoid fear of non-
renewal of their appointments. Should judges be subject to short tenure, that may render them 
susceptible to political pressure or other influences endangering their independence.45 The 
importance of security of tenure for judges has been reaffirmed by the Human Rights 
Committee, which recommends the protection of judges against conflict of interests and 
                                                 
43 Shimon Shetreet, ‘Judicial Independence: New Conceptual Dimensions and Contemporary Challenges’, in Shimon 
Shetreet and Jules Deschenes (eds), Judicial Independence: Contemporary Debate, Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
1985, 594. 
44As of 2010, the Dinka ethnic group, which is one of the largest nationalities in South Sudan, represented more 
than 60% of all Justices of the Supreme Court.  
45 USAID Report, note 42, 19-23.  
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assurance of their tenure.46 Recommended measures to protect judges against physical harm may 
include such elements as provision for security guards on court premises or police protection for 
judges who may become or are victims of serious threats. 
 
On the importance of the security of tenure and procedures for dismissal of judges, the United 
Nations Basic Principles note that: 
 
11.  The term of office of judges, their independence, security, adequate remuneration, 
conditions of service, pensions and the age of retirement shall be adequately secured by 
law. 
12.  Judges, whether appointed or elected, shall have guaranteed tenure until a mandatory 
retirement age or the expiry of their term of office, where such exists. 
Reaffirming the importance of the security of tenure for judges, the Human Rights Council has 
expressed concern at the lack of security of tenure for judges in some countries by stating that 
short-term or non-guaranteed tenure for judges weakens the judiciary and affects their 
independence and ultimately their professional development as judges.47 Similarly, the Burgh 
House Principles on the Independence of the International Judiciary reaffirm that judges should 
have security of tenure in relation to their term of office and may only be removed from office 
upon specified grounds and in accordance with appropriate procedures and specified evidence.48 
Though these latter principles talk of the international judiciary, they serve as guidelines for the 
national judiciary as well.  
 
                                                 
46Human Rights Committee, General Comment 32, para 19. 
47Report of the Special Rapporteur on Independence of Judges and Lawyers Leandro Despouy, A/HRC/11/41, 
2009, para 53-64. 
48Burgh House Principles, 3.1. 
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The Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan guarantees the tenure of judges to ensure that their 
employment is not dependent on or affected by their decisions. Specifically, article 134 (3) of the 
constitution provides that ‘the tenure of office of justices and judges shall not be affected by 
their judicial decisions’. The Constitution further reiterates that judges can only be removed from 
office owing to gross misconduct which brings the office of the judge into disrepute, or for 
incompetence in discharging the functions of their office. In respect of disciplinary measures 
against the judges and justices, the Constitution vests power to the President of the Supreme 
Court.49 The removal of Justices of the Supreme Court can be made by the President of the 
Government of Southern Sudan on the recommendation of the President of the Supreme Court 
and with approval of a two thirds majority of the Legislative Assembly.50 
 
Despite legal safeguards embedded in the Constitution for the judges and judicial officers of 
lower courts, in practice ‘word text’ is quite different from the existing reality ‘on the ground’. 
For example, how can ‘adequate remuneration, conditions of services or pension’ be guaranteed 
in Southern Sudan where more than 80% of the population live below a poverty line and a 
similar percentage is illiterate?51Because of these existing challenges there is a compelling need to 
question whether the current approach of rule of law reforms can lead to an independent 
judiciary as assumed by international actors.    
 
                                                 
49Article 136 (1) ICSS. 
50Article 136 (2) ICSS. 
51 World Bank, World Development Report: Conflict, Reconstruction and Development, Washington, DC: The World Bank, 
2011.  
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c) Salaries and service conditions of judges 
While it is widely accepted that reasonable and decent salaries are a necessary element of judicial 
independence, increments in salaries alone cannot ensure judicial independence.52 To start with, 
why should judges be treated differently from other public servants? This question is critical 
especially when governments operate on a tight budget, in some cases struggling to meet the 
wage bill for public officials. Despite this reality, it should be acknowledged that dispensing 
justice fairly and effectively does not come cheap.  In most cases it is difficult to reduce low level 
corruption among judges unless they are able to support the essential needs of their families. 
Increasing and guaranteeing salaries of judges may contribute to improvement of the status of 
the judiciary, increase judges’ self respect, and attract a broader pool of qualified professional 
applicants who may be inclined and equipped to uphold the integrity of the judicial office. This 
aspect has been reaffirmed by the Special Rapporteur on the independence of the judiciary, who 
has consistently argued for the improved working conditions of judges as an integral part of 
judicial independence.53 
 
However, it is debatable whether increased salaries alone can decrease the temptation to accept 
bribes. A study commissioned by the World Bank concluded that there was no evidence that 
increasing salaries without taking other measures of reform could lead to significant reductions 
in corruption. Rather, reducing corruption appears to be much more closely linked to increasing 
transparency and meritocracy in hiring, promotion and discipline.54 The study therefore 
recommended that salary increases should be part of the reform package rather than an end 
within itself. These observations by the Bank confirm that the contribution of rule of law reform 
                                                 
52 For example see Special Rapporteur`s report, E/CN.4/2006/52/Add.3, Para. 47 on the impact of delayed salary 
payment on judicial independence. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Sandra Oxner, ‘The Quality of Judges’ in Ko-Yung Tung (ed.), The World Bank Legal Review: Law and Justice for 
Development, World Bank Legal Review, The World Bank, 2003, 343-344. 
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to judicial independence is not automatic, rather it requires a holistic approach to ensure that 
reforms are consistent and reflect existing problems. Pension benefits are an equally important 
component of benefit packages. Decent or comfortable pension prospects, coupled with security 
of tenure, increase the likelihood that judges will remain on the bench until the end of their 
careers. This in turn may incentivize judges to resist bribes and corrupt behaviour.  
 
Independence of the judiciary means independence not only from partisan political pressure but 
also from socially powerful litigants. The main way by which the socially powerful influence the 
judicial process is through bribes. Arguably there have been significant changes in the judiciary in 
Southern Sudan since the signing of the CPA, so that now judges in higher courts receive 
considerably higher pay compared with other civil servants in the government. However, in 
South Sudan, many of the provisions that guarantee judicial independence apply only to the 
Supreme Court, Court of Appeal and High Court judges, leaving lower court officials like the 
magistrates almost untouched by these guarantees and protection. Yet this is the part of the 
judiciary which handles the bulk of judicial work and it is also the level where the problem of 
corruption is most severe, partly because of widespread poverty and illiteracy which hinder 
common people from accessing justice at the higher courts. Indeed, in some countries including 
South Sudan, while judges of the High Court, the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court have 
been for a long time exempted from paying tax on their income, magistrates’ and county court 
judges’ income is subjected to tax.55 
 
                                                 
55 The wide disparity in remuneration between different judges has been blamed for the failure to attract and keep 
judges in rural areas. This challenge was recognized by the Special Rapporteur in the report submitted before the 
Human Rights Council See E/CN.4/2005/60/Add.2, Para. 37. See also Steven Jjuuko, The Independence of the Judiciary 
and the Rule of Law: Strengthening Constitutional Activism in East Africa, Kampala: Kituo Cha Katiba, 2005.  
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There are other factors which contribute to the involvement of judges in unethical practices that 
can compromise their integrity. For example, Peter argues that judges’ emoluments should match 
their status and the seriousness of the matters they handle in exercising their judicial functions, 
and he concludes by stating that it is unfair to expose judicial personnel to inducements and 
other questionable attractions due to genuine hardships.56 This danger is more pronounced in 
South Sudan, where there is no sound pension scheme across the entire government sector to 
guarantee not only a decent living but also a dignified retirement for civil servants including 
judges.           
 
iv. Rule of law reform and institutional independence of the judiciary 
This section will focus on the institutional independence of the judiciary in the Southern Sudan 
context. The discussion will examine the role and contribution of international actors in building 
an independent judiciary. From the international human rights perspective, institutional 
independence of the judiciary is assumed to be vital not only for the protection of individual and 
collective human rights but also to further the rule of law. This assumption is reflected in efforts 
undertaken by the Seventh United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the 
Treatment of Offenders, which in September 1985 adopted Basic Principles on Independence of 
the Judiciary. These Principles were subsequently endorsed by a UN General Assembly 
resolution.57 
 
To further understand this concept a provision in the South African constitution may be 
instructive. The provision states that ‘the courts are independent and subject only to the 
constitution and the law, which they must apply impartially and without fear, favour or prejudice’ 
                                                 
56Chris Maina Peter, above note 22, 66. 
57 UNGA Res., above note 7.   
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and further requires that ‘no person or organ may interfere with the functioning of the courts’.58 
Reading this provision it is clear that successful institutional independence of the judiciary 
requires that other branches of the government such as the executive and the legislature play 
their role in enabling the judiciary to discharge its functions without external interference. To 
achieve this objective the executive should take a lead in implementing decisions rendered by the 
court and also allocate adequate resources for the judiciary to carry out its functions as required. 
Similarly, the legislature would be required to refrain from passing legislations to preempt courts’ 
decisions, especially when such decisions are considered to be against the government’s or the 
ruling party’s interests.59 
 
This concept of institutional independence is well enshrined in the Southern Sudanese 
Constitution. Article 128 of the Interim Constitution reaffirms that: 
 
(i) The Judiciary of Southern Sudan shall be independent of the executive and the 
legislature, its budget shall be charged on the consolidated fund and it shall have the 
necessary financial independence in the management thereof. 
(ii) The Judiciary of Southern Sudan shall be subject to this Constitution and the law which 
the Judges must apply impartially and without political interference, fear or favour. 
(iii) The executive and legislative organs at all levels of the government in Southern Sudan 
shall respect and protect the independence of the Judiciary.     
 
                                                 
58Section 165 of the 1996 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. 
59 For example, the legislature in Tanzania passed a law in 1994 to pre-empt a court’s decision allowing independent 
candidates to run for public office. See the decision of Lugakingira J (as he then was) in Rev. Christopher Mtikila v. 
Attorney General, High Court of Tanzania at Dodoma, civil case no. 5 of 1993 (reported in Commonwealth Human Rights 
Law Digest, Vol. 1, 1996, 11). 
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The Interim Constitution calls on other branches of the government to respect and protect the 
independence of the judiciary. However, a closer examination of the ‘reality’ in Southern Sudan 
shows that the bigger challenge is not whether judicial independence is well enshrined in the 
Constitution, but whether other organs of the government such as the executive and the 
legislature are willing to implement what is written in the Constitution to ensure not only that the 
judiciary is independent but that it is seen to be independent. The constitutional or foundational 
laws are the starting point in the process of securing institutional independence of the judiciary. 
Ultimately the independence depends on the totality of a favourable environment created and 
supported by all state organs, including the judiciary itself, and public opinion.60 
 
Institutional independence of the judiciary should correspond with the ability of the judiciary to 
perform its functions in favourable conditions. Otherwise this independence means little when 
the courts cannot be allocated adequate resources to address some of the challenges facing it. In 
most cases the judiciary in Southern Sudan has had to rely on external partners like the UNDP 
and other international donors to fund some of its activities. Yet, it is clear that this practice has 
its own dangers. The practice not only makes the judiciary dependent on the resources of 
donors, which are neither predictable nor sustainable, it also hinders the ability of the judiciary to 
set long-term plans and goals for its effective functioning. Admittedly, the ability of the 
government to allocate funds for the proper functioning of the judiciary and the entire 
government is limited, but it should be noted that the government has a responsibility to match 
the constitutional provisions with the commitment to allocate sufficient resources. It is therefore 
crucial for international actors to ensure that their assistance is tailored to the actual needs of the 
local beneficiaries to enhance the latter`s role in the reform process.  
 
                                                 
60M.P. Singh, above note 4, 246. 
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What can be done to enhance the institutional independence of the judiciary in Southern Sudan? 
Both local and international actors have crucial but complementary roles to play. The 
independence of the judiciary or its effectiveness can be achieved neither by the infrastructure 
alone nor by constitutional provisions drafted with assistance from donors. Rather, the 
independence should be determined by the extent to which these constitutional provisions are 
enjoyed by the citizens, the extent to which the executive and legislature respect and enforce the 
decisions rendered by the judiciary, and the extent to which people can access the judiciary to 
resolve their dispute among themselves or with the government. However, the current approach 
to reforms is underpinned by flawed assumptions which place undue focus on infrastructure 
development and drafting legislations. The approach fails to appreciate that unless these 
elements have practical application in the day to day lives of those in whose names are built or 
written, they remain redundant with little impact on those people’s lives. It can therefore be 
argued that for the rule of law to have a significant impact on judicial independence, reforms 
should clearly articulate how these constitutional and other legislative measures adopted can be 
translated into concrete outcome. This can be achieved through increased involvement of the 
local polity in the reform process. International actors must recognize that building the rule of 
law is the primary responsibility of the local polity; hence their support should always reflect the 
needs and priorities of the local people rather than what these external actors consider crucial for 
successful reforms.  
 
B. Creating and strengthening law and order institutions 
Building and strengthening the rule of law requires not only an independent judiciary but also 
law and order institutions enjoying a strong degree of public support and confidence. Indeed this 
is one of the core attributes of the rule of law identified in chapter one. Stable law and order 
constitutes a vital element in enhancing the protection and advancement of both individual and 
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collective human rights of members of a given polity.61 Often cut off from the populations they 
are meant to serve and protect, in a post-conflict context these institutions tend to operate more 
like military contingents than public security institutions.62It is on the assumption that rule of law 
reforms can address these challenges that international actors continue to justify their activities. 
Examination of the situation in Southern Sudan demonstrates that in the past law and order 
institutions have functioned as instruments of control, repression, and intimidation rather than 
protecting people.63 It is this history which provides a compelling need to question whether the 
involvement of international rule of law reformers can contribute to addressing these problems.  
 
The imperative of building effective law and order institutions is a precondition for a successful 
political and economic development in any post-conflict society.64As already discussed in chapter 
four, without strengthening of law and order institutions all other reforms are unlikely to 
succeed. For example, without a trained police force to guarantee domestic peace and security, a 
country can hardly attract foreign or domestic investors to invest their capital. Similarly, the 
absence of strong prosecution services to prosecute wrongdoers may erode the credibility of the 
state to fight crime and protect citizens and their property. But even undertaking rule of law 
reforms alone cannot guarantee effective law and order institutions, rather such efforts must 
proceed in tandem with other reforms in key sectors like the judiciary, because of their 
interdependence and their mutually reinforcing nature. This argument is reinforced by the fact 
that without a holistic approach, problems such as extended pretrial detention, lack or flawed 
                                                 
61 See UN Secretary General Report, Strengthening and Coordinating United Nations Rule of Law Activities, August 2011. 
Available at: www.unrol.org.  
62 Jane Stromseth et al., Can Might make Right?: Building the Rule of Law after Military Interventions, above note 3, 134-170 
63 See generally chapter two.   
64 See the United Nations Report, ‘Civilian Capacity in the Aftermath of Conflict: Independent Report of the Senior 
Advisory Group’, A/65/747–S/2011/85, 2011. 
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due process, and unfairness in the treatment of suspects will greatly undermine the impact of 
overall rule of law reforms.   
 
Despite the imperative context of these reforms, the way they are carried out continues to 
challenge the basis of their implementation. For example, despite the continued rhetoric of 
reformers about reforms that are ‘owned’ by local constituents, the reforms continue to be 
dominated by international actors such as the UN, bilateral donors and non-governmental 
organizations. Essentially there is a top-down approach whose implication is that it alienates 
local people as the legitimate participants in the determination and implementation of reforms. 
The absence of local people’s participation makes it difficult for international actors to impart 
skills, knowledge and tools so that local institutions are stronger and capable to contribute to the 
reform process especially when donors and international institutions have left. Below, we 
examine reforms of specific law and order institutions to establish whether and to what extent 
the effectiveness of such institutions has been enhanced by the ongoing rule of law reform 
efforts in Southern Sudan.     
 
i. Police reform in Southern Sudan 
The UN resolution authorizing the creation of UNMIS mandates the mission to undertake 
police reform in Southern Sudan. Specifically the resolution requires the mission to ‘assist parties 
to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, in coordination with bilateral and multilateral assistance 
programmes, in restructuring the police service in Sudan, consistent with democratic policing’.65 
A question to pose is, why should the Security Council get involved in law and order institutional 
reforms in places like Southern Sudan? As discussed in chapter five, the involvement of the 
Council is underpinned by several assumptions, but mainly by the belief that strong law and 
                                                 
65 UNSC Res. 1590/2005.  
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order institutions significantly contribute to the maintenance of peace and security at the national 
and international levels. Indeed, this belief of the Council is well captured by the UN definition 
of the rule of law discussed in the introductory chapter.       
 
It is these assumptions that continue to inform the role of major players involved in police 
reform within the United Nations system including the DPKO, the DPA, the UNDP and the 
OHCHR. The question is whether the content of this kind of resolution responds to the existing 
practical challenges. For example, major challenges facing the police force in Southern Sudan 
include corruption, illiteracy, poor working conditions and continued violations of human rights. 
Reading this resolution raises some significant questions. The resolution requires reformers to 
undertake reforms consistent with ‘democratic policing’.66 But what does democratic policing 
signify, especially in the Southern Sudan context, and what are the precise objectives underlying 
this concept? International actors identify key attributes of democratic policing as including 
police accountability to the law, protection of human rights, transparency of police operations 
and giving priority to serving the needs of the public.67 The main goal envisaged under the 
concept is a police force that understands itself as functioning in the public interest, with the aim 
of fair enforcement of the law and protection of basic rights, within a system of government that 
is accountable under the law. 
 
While these attributes of democratic policing are laudable, the challenge is how to achieve them 
and how they fit within local conditions. How do international actors transform former 
combatants who have spent most of their adult lives waging guerrilla war into an accountable 
                                                 
66 See generally Christopher E. Stone and Heather H. Ward, ‘Democratic Policing: A Frame Work for Action’, 
Policing and Society: an International Journal of Research and Policy, vol. 10, 1, 2000, 11-45.   
67 For example see Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Guidebook on Democratic Policing, 
2nd edn, Vienna, 2008. See also Gemma Celador, ‘Police Reform: Peace Building Through ‘Democratic Policing’?’, 
International Peacekeeping, vol. 12, 3, 2005, 364-376. 
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and human rights respecting police force? What mechanism can be employed to achieve this 
goal? While the international community has promoted democratic policing through police 
reforms with significant success in Liberia and Sierra Leone, it is clear that these countries differ 
markedly from Southern Sudan. Although Liberia and Sierra Leone endured a long spell of 
conflict, at least they had a prior semblance of law and order institutions. This can be contrasted 
with the situation in Southern Sudan, where in most parts of the country there was no police 
force and only local militias were responsible to guarantee security. It is these marked and 
peculiar differences confronting different post-conflict countries that are often not taken into 
account by international actors.    
 
Building a functioning police force that enjoys public legitimacy may require a brand new police 
force created either from scratch or by vetting and retraining some existing forces, or through 
some combination of the two. To achieve democratic policing requires a fundamental shift in the 
current approach by international actors rather than using common denominators in different 
countries where the UN may be involved. In other words, reforms should reflect the existing 
needs and expectations of the local polity rather than the ‘world imagined by reformers’. The 
central goal of UNMIS in conducting police reform has been stated as to ‘significantly facilitate 
the transformation of Sudanese police into a professional, efficient, community orientated police 
service capable of ensuring safety and security of the common citizen of Sudan’.68 The Mission is 
further tasked to ‘help reform and restructure the Sudanese police service, and develop 
evaluation programs and train Sudanese police”.69Arguably, an effective and professional police 
force is key to guarantee fundamental rights and protect citizens and their properties. The 
question is, how precisely does building the rule of law enhance the effectiveness of the police 
service? Perhaps a larger concern is, how does the Mission evaluate the success of its objectives 
                                                 
68Mission statement of UNMIS. 
69Ibid. 
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or the impact of its outcome? Considering these objectives in the Southern Sudan context, they 
are highly aspirational and taken at face value because there are no tangible benchmarks upon 
which the Mission can evaluate whether the reforms have led to democratic policing. It is argued 
that the Mission must have concrete benchmarks reflecting existing reality in the society 
concerned to determine whether the objectives underpinning its mission have been achieved.  
 
The Mission has invested relatively significant resources in police reform compared with the 
judicial reforms or any other rule of law cluster. This aspect can partly be attributed to the 
ongoing security challenges facing the country, threatening the peace process upon which all 
other reforms depend. However, as already stated above, police reform in Southern Sudan 
should be analyzed against the historical context of policing in Southern Sudan. Before the 
signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in January 2005 the police force was seen as an 
instrument of oppression imposed by the central government in Khartoum. Indeed, after the 
signing of the CPA this perception hardly changed, especially in view of widespread accusations 
of corruption and human rights abuse by the force and violence that continues to characterize 
Southern Sudan.70 To successfully attain democratic policing it is therefore essential for 
international actors to treat each post-conflict country uniquely, taking into account peculiar 
challenges facing each country. In the case of Southern Sudan international actors, while 
undertaking police reforms, should take into account historical challenges that have defined 
policing in the country rather than assuming that ‘one particular approach or mode’ of reforms is 
suitable to all countries. 
 
                                                 
70 Human Rights Watch Report on Southern Sudan, There is no Protection: Insecurity and Human Rights in Southern Sudan’, 
New York: Human Rights Watch, 2009.  
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ii. Correctional services reforms 
It is important that we examine how the rule of law can enhance correctional service in a post-
conflict situation. In the introductory chapter we saw how equality is central to the rule of law. It 
is this attribute that provides a compelling need to examine whether the rule of law reform can 
automatically enhance correctional services. Correctional services in post-conflict countries and 
developing countries in general are considered less important mainly because they are meant to 
improve living conditions of ‘criminals’ who have broken the law. Thus it is assumed, wrongly, 
that such resources should be used to improve the living conditions of law abiding citizens 
instead of being spent on criminals. It is to challenge this narrative that this section intends to 
demonstrate and reaffirm that a functioning and humane prison system is an integral element to 
the rule of law.71 However, the way such a thing is developed challenges the assumption that rule 
of law reform in post-conflict countries can automatically enhance the effectiveness of 
correctional services. 
 
What precise criteria does the Council use to determine whether the rule of law can enhance 
correctional services in a given post-conflict context? More often it is simply taken as self-
evident that rule of law reform will lead to the improvement of correctional services. An 
examination of the Libyan situation would illustrate how international actors take these claims as 
self-evident. Resolution S/2011/580 establishing the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) 
mandates the Mission to support the Libyan national efforts to ‘restore public security and order 
and promote rule of law’ and ‘extend state authority through strengthening accountable 
institutions’. The correctional service unit in the Mission is required to participate in the 
‘development and implementation of the Mission’s strategies related to strengthening and 
development of all aspects of the corrections system, including: implementation of applicable 
                                                 
71 Michael J. Trebilcock and Ronald J. Daniels, Rule of law Reform and Development: Charting the Fragile Path of Progress, 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2008, 170-175.  
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international standards; review and development of relevant legislation; management of prisoners 
and staff; management of critical strategic and operational issues; and supporting the 
development of effective linkages with the police and the court system’.  
 
From the wording of the mandate of this unit, it can be argued that there are many assumptions 
that make one wonder whether they can be achieved at all. These goals are not only highly 
aspirational, they are also premised on a flawed assumption. For example, one cannot see how 
international actors can strengthen ‘all aspects of correction systems in Libya or manage 
prisoners and staff both uniformed and non-uniformed’. It is assumed that previously Libya 
lacked a legislative framework for correctional services, so that it was necessary to develop one, 
and that correctional services were poor and therefore in need of rehabilitation from outside. 
The mandate assumes that the existing framework was incompatible with international standards, 
hence the need to apply all applicable international standards. It is also assumed that there was 
no linkage between prison services and the court system, hence the need to develop an effective 
linkage between these institutions. 
 
Equally, the mechanism to achieve these objectives renders it questionable whether this 
approach is realistic. The objectives would be achieved by ‘coaching and mentoring local 
correctional officers’ and ‘developing and implementing corrections training programs for all 
levels of staff’. However, it is not clear who is going to do this and with what means. A question 
worth posing is whether the NATO intervention that lasted less than six months destroyed 
correctional services in Libya so completely as to warrant international actors undertaking a 
‘complete review and development of a new legal framework, train all levels of staff and 
strengthen all aspects of correction service’. These questions are important because until the 
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intervention by NATO in March 2011, Libya was a stable and relatively developed country 
without any form of internal conflict.72 
 
The example of Libya is one among many scenarios where international actors draw up a list of 
highly abstract goals of reforms that can hardly be achieved in the real world. For example, Libya 
and Southern Sudan, now independent South Sudan, are two markedly different countries. While 
Libya was considered a dictatorship during Gaddafi’s rule, it had institutions that were able to 
guarantee peace and security for its citizens, access to justice and protection of human rights. 
Imperfect as these institutions might have been, nevertheless they existed. This can be contrasted 
with the situation in Southern Sudan which, owing to the long running conflict, lacked rule of 
law institutions. Yet, examining the role and contribution of international actors in promoting 
the rule of law in these places shows that they are guided by similar objectives without 
acknowledging the differences and how these could affect their work. Clearly, under these 
circumstances the rule of law can hardly contribute to the effectiveness of correctional services, 
precisely because there is a complete disconnection between practical realities and assumptions 
made by reformers.  
 
The UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners provide guidelines upon 
which prison service reform can be undertaken.73 However, one might be inclined to question 
whether the application of these guidelines and principles in Southern Sudan context is viable. 
                                                 
72 By 2010, the per capita GDP of Libya was estimated to be US$9,150; 2010 statistics estimated life expectancy in 
Libya to be 77 and 72 for men and women respectively. For comprehensive statistics on different economic 
indicator see,http://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx?crName=Libyan%20Arab%20Jamahiriya. Accessed March 
2013. 
73 United Nations, Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, 30 August 1955. Adopted by the First United 
Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, held at Geneva in 30 August 1955, 
and approved by the Economic and Social Council in its resolutions 663 C (XXIV) of 31 July 1957 and 2076 (LXII) 
of 13 May 1977. 
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This question is significant because applying these standards in a place like Southern Sudan itself 
presents a challenge. In Southern Sudan the correctional services are basically non-existent and 
where they do exist they are devastated and squalid, poorly equipped and poorly run. The 
implication of this dire situation is that it has discouraged major donors and international 
community who, when faced with competing priorities, tend to focus on more ‘quick impact 
projects’ in the domain of law and order, especially projects for the police and the judiciary, as 
these are seen as likely to have quick and positive impact in the reform process. As stated above, 
domestic attitudes, especially in poor societies like South Sudan, make it even harder to consider 
prison reform as a matter of priority when ordinary people struggle to secure social and 
economic rights amidst economic hardships and poverty.74 
 
The overall objective of prison service aid in a post-conflict context should be to contribute to 
the maintenance of sustainable peace and security by building national prison staff capacity to 
develop and manage a viable, safe, secure and humane prison system. At its most basic level, 
strengthening and re-establishing a prison system is about rehabilitating buildings which are ‘fit 
for purpose’, recruiting and training appropriate staff to manage those prisons, and developing 
legislation, policies, procedures and systems which enable the system to function in a coherent, 
integrated and accountable manner.75 Collectively these efforts not only advance the rule of law 
but help in promoting fundamental rights and freedoms and human rights of all citizens. The 
fact that a person is in prison does not deprive him or her of the basic rights enshrined in the 
constitution or other international human rights instruments. It is in the quest to promote these 
                                                 
74 See generally Frans Viljoen, ‘The Special Rapporteur on Prisons and Conditions of Detention in Africa: 
Achievements and Possibilities’, Human Rights Quarterly, vol. 27, 1, 2005, 125-171.  
75 See generally, ‘Supporting National Prison Systems: Lessons Learned and Best Practices’. Available at 
www.pbpu.unlb.org. 
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rights that rule of law reforms, when pursued within a correct approach, can have a significant 
impact in enhancing correctional service delivery.    
 
Correctional services reform is important both as a reaffirmation of international human rights 
standards and as a development of the rule of law, but the way these reforms are conceived and 
implemented will continue to challenge the approach used by international actors and the 
outcome of the process itself. Reformers should not simply assume that rule of law reform will 
automatically address challenges facing correctional services or any other law and order 
institutions. Rather each situation should be treated differently. The desire to transform post-
conflict countries like Libya or Southern Sudan to resemble an imaginary world of rule of law 
compliant states conceived by international actors inhibits successful reforms. While 
international actors continue to insist on ‘national ownership’ of the reform process, perhaps to 
allay fears and accusations of domination, their contribution will have little impact, if any, as long 
as they continue to set and support such highly abstract and imaginary objectives that would be 
difficult to achieve even in the most developed countries. Rather they should condition and 
promote their reforms on the basis of the actual needs of each country to achieve desired 
objectives on behalf of the local beneficiaries.  
 
iii. Assistance to the Ministry of Legal Affairs and Constitutional 
Development 
An examination of institutions critical for the advancement of the rule of law would be 
incomplete without an inquiry into whether rule of law reform can enhance the role and function 
of the Ministry of Legal Affairs in the overall objective of legal service delivery in Southern 
Sudan. This ministry is the key government department entrusted with various functions 
including prosecution, legislative drafting, legal education, provision of legal aid and access to 
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justice, and above all it serves as the chief legal adviser to the government as a whole.76 Clearly, 
there is a correlation between the rule of law reforms and functions of these departments. 
 
In rule of law reform the prosecution system is central because of the importance of its 
functions. The significance of the prosecutorial function lies in the prosecutor’s responsibility to 
represent the public interest in criminal proceedings. Contrary to widely held views, the role of 
the prosecutor is not to secure conviction by any means, but rather to ensure that the law is 
respected and enforced.77 This aspect is succinctly noted by an American judge who stated that 
‘the prosecuting officer represents the public interests, which can never be promoted by the 
conviction of the innocent. His [or her] objective like that of the court should simply be justice; 
and has no right to sacrifice this to any pride of professional success. And however strong may 
be his [or her] belief of the prisoner’s guilt, he [or she] must remember that, though unfair means 
may happen to result in doing justice to the prisoner in the particular case, yet, justice so attained, 
is unjust and dangerous to the whole community’.78 
 
The interest of international actors in strengthening prosecutorial services is predicated on the 
assumption that such reforms can enhance protection and promotion of human rights. This 
belief is reflected in the United Nations and other regional initiatives reaffirming the importance 
of effective prosecution in the realization of human rights. The UN guidelines provide extensive 
criteria upon which prosecutors should be selected, promoted, remunerated and disciplined. 
Some of these criteria require that (i) prosecutors should have appropriate qualifications and 
training, be selected without discrimination, and be made aware of the ethical duties of their 
                                                 
76 Article 138(2), ICSS. 
77 See generally the United Nations Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors, adopted by the Eighth United Nations 
Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Havana, 27 August to 7 September 1990.  
78 Hurd v People, 25 Mich. 404, 415-16 (1872). Quoted from Bruce A. Green, ‘Why Should Prosecutors ‘Seek Justice’? 
Fordham Urban Law Journal, vol. 26, 3, 1998, 613. 
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office; (ii) their promotion must be based on objective factors, such as professional qualifications 
and experience, and assessed in accordance with impartial procedures; (iii) their remuneration, 
tenure, and pensions and age of retirement should be legally provided for in published rules; and 
(iv) disciplinary procedures for prosecutors must be based on law that guarantees an objective 
evaluation.79 The guidelines also seek to ensure the independence of prosecutors by placing 
responsibility on the state to protect prosecutors from any form of intimidation, harassment and 
improper interference.        
 
Lack of public confidence in the public prosecution service is unfortunately common in 
Southern Sudan where prosecutors must overcome a history of unequal application of the law. 
Given an entrenched history of widespread and continuous human rights abuse, prosecution of 
criminals who in some cases may include those in decision making positions is a critical step in 
demonstrating equal application of the law. How to accomplish this continues to present a 
serious challenge to both national and international actors. The assumption that provision of 
‘capacity building courses’ will enhance the effectiveness of prosecution services ignores the fact 
that challenges facing prosecution services are varied and interdependent. For example, 
corruption, insufficient manpower and inadequate knowledge constitute some of the most 
serious problems facing the department. Similarly, while prosecution services are critical in 
realization of important rights such as access to justice, the involvement of international actors 
has not addressed this aspect. To address these problems requires a holistic and innovative 
approach involving both formal and informal means of dispute resolutions. It is the latter aspect 
that the next discussion will address.  
 
                                                 
79 United Nations Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors, note 77.  
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C. Traditional justice institutions and rule of law reform in Southern Sudan 
In the introductory chapter, one of the attributes of the rule of law considered was predictability, 
clarity and stability of the law. For example, Joseph Raz observed that a central component of 
the rule of law is knowledge of the law by those likely to be affected by it. The preceding 
discussion has further examined the critical role of rule of law reforms in enhancing the 
effectiveness of legal institutions and the myriad challenges that continue to inhibit the 
realization of this objective. But if these institutions are still weak and unable to serve the 
interests of all Southern Sudanese, how then can rule of law reforms enhance their effectiveness 
to deliver legal services, especially in rural areas? Taking into account that a majority of Southern 
Sudanese are illiterate and reside in rural areas, how then do they access these institutions? This 
question is significant because during the war Southern Sudan hardly had any ‘modern’ legal 
infrastructure such as the judiciary, the police, correctional services or prosecution services. It is 
this reality that prompts the discussion of mechanisms they used to resolve disputes.       
 
In the absence of formal justice institutions, customary law has played an important role in 
forming the core of the legal system in Southern Sudan. The role of customary law was formally 
recognized in Sudan for the first time by the colonial administration through the enactment of 
the Civil Justice Ordinance 1929 and the Chiefs’ Courts Ordinance 1931. The latter explicitly 
recognized the legal authority of the chiefs to exercise their traditional authority in their areas of 
competence. This formal recognition galvanized the powers of traditional chiefs to adjudicate 
disputes outside the realm of formal justice institutions. For example the law provided that ‘the 
chiefs’ court shall administer the native law and customs prevailing in the area over which court 
exercises its jurisdiction provided that such native law and custom is not contrary to justice, 
morality or order.’80 
                                                 
80Section 7, Chiefs Court Ordinance, 1931. 
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This enactment not only strengthened the powers of the traditional chiefs to settle disputes, it 
was also a recognition of Sudan’s diverse and cosmopolitan society which had its own ways of 
living way before the coming of colonialism. However, customary law was required to comply 
with ‘morality and order’’, although one notes that it did not assert whose concept of morality 
and order was to be taken into account. While colonial powers recognized the imperative of 
customary law, they wanted to retain overall control over that law and its application. Hence 
customary law was allowed to apply as long as it did not contravene common law or what the 
colonial powers deemed to be ‘morals and good order’. It was this subordination of customary 
law to colonial law that defined and indeed continues to define its application in modern-day 
Southern Sudan.  
 
The role of customary law in the administration of justice was not limited to the colonial Sudan, 
it was also recognized in post-independence Sudan when in 1977 the government enacted the 
People’s Local Court’s Act of 1977. While this new law repealed the colonial law of 1931, it 
maintained the authority of the chiefs as before, subject to ‘compliance with the constitution’. 
But why was the newly independent government keen to maintain the role of local chiefs in the 
administration of justice? This recognition can be attributed to the government’s realization that 
formal institutions of justice administration were expensive to build to match the needs of the 
population, and also the fact that people could easily identify themselves with these local 
institutions rather than foreign inspired institutions and legislations.   
 
Examining the current status of customary law in Southern Sudan, one would not fail to note 
that the current Constitution expresses a clear recognition of the role of customary law in 
advancing rule of law and human rights. Article 5 of the Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan 
provides that ‘customs and traditions of the people of Southern Sudan shall be one of the 
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sources of legislation in Southern Sudan’. Similarly the Comprehensive Peace Agreement makes 
an express recognition of customary law and traditional institutions in the advancement of the 
rule of law. This recognition of customary law in the legal order of Southern Sudan can be 
attributed to the fact that, as Southern Sudan had experienced protracted conflict for many years, 
it would be extremely difficult for the government to ensure availability and accessibility of 
formal justice institutions for all citizens. This recognition of customary law in the constitutional 
legal order of Southern Sudan provides a compelling need for international actors to clearly 
articulate how rule of law reforms can strengthen informal institutions which have traditionally 
stood as a symbol of access to justice and dispute resolution in the absence of formal 
institutions.  
 
After the CPA the Local Government Act of Southern Sudan made some profound changes in 
the administration of justice to the level never seen before.81 For example, the legislation 
established the Customary Law Council (CLC) as the highest customary law authority in the 
Country.82 Among the duties of the Council was to maintain, monitor and ensure proper 
administration of the customary law and protect, promote and preserve traditions, norms, 
cultures and customs of the communities.83 Similarly, the law establishes Customary Law Courts 
(CLC) with functions to adjudicate on customary disputes and make judgments in accordance 
with the customs, traditions, norms and ethics of the communities and ensure that freedoms and 
rights enshrined in the constitution are upheld and respected in the customary law courts.84 
 
                                                 
81 The Act was enacted in January 2009. 
82Section 93, Local Government Act. 
83Ibid., Article 95.  
84Ibid., Article 98 (1). 
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In what may be considered as a desire to fashion the customary courts and customary council 
alongside the formal judicial institutions, the legislation provides for the independence of 
customary law courts and also grants  their members immunity from criminal proceedings for 
any act committed while in office unless the immunity is waived by the relevant authority. 
Despite these notable efforts, it is clear that they do not enjoy same level of independence as 
formal judicial institutions. For example, the head chiefs who preside over these courts are 
elected by the chiefs and sub-chiefs with the approval of the County Commissioner or the Mayor 
as the case maybe.85 Disciplinary action against the chairpersons and members of the Customary 
Law Courts may be taken by the Customary Law Council.  
 
A closer examination of this legislation shows that it presents several challenges which could 
significantly inhibit its ability to administer justice and promote the rule of law. For example, 
despite the requirement of constitutional compliance, it is not clear how compliance can be 
enforced given that local chiefs are not experts in formal constitutional law or international 
human rights standards. Similarly, the legislation fails to provide for a minimum formal 
education requirement for members of the customary courts, especially the presiding chiefs. This 
implies that any chief can be appointed to preside over these courts, which is likely to negatively 
affect the ability of local chiefs to administer justice in the absence of clear guidelines, and may 
also lead to miscarriages of justice if the chiefs are not trained in the application of statutory law, 
mainly because their function is to be based on hybridization of customary and statutory laws. 
 
Having examined how the law recognizes the role of local institutions in the administration of 
justice, it is pertinent to ask, how precisely do these local institutions work in practice? As in 
much of the post-colonial African societies, in Southern Sudan customary law is not written 
                                                 
85Ibid., Article 105.  
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anywhere and those interpreting it have hardly had any formal training. While it is true that the 
interpretation of customary laws varies and at times is subject to bias or prejudice against some 
groups of people such as women, children or the disabled, nevertheless they have remained a 
cornerstone of addressing conflicts in Southern Sudan in particular – so essential to everyday 
culture and practice that some commentators have argued that to view customary practices as 
‘law’ is essentially a Western-centric approach which may not be the most effective approach to 
understanding societies and their legal systems.86 Indeed, for Southern Sudan customary law is 
being projected not only as a central element in the Southern identity for which the people 
fought, but as an important source of legislation, constitutionalism and advancement of the rule 
of law necessary to build a society premised on the ideals reflected in the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement.87 
 
It can therefore be argued that despite the widely held views suggesting that justice is ‘universal’, 
reality has consistently challenged this claim by demonstrating that justice and its performance 
differ from one society to another. This aspect requires that any successful rule of law initiative 
must twin increasingly globalized rule of law institutions and values with local meanings and 
practices of justice.88 At the same time, local justice practices must be articulated within 
international human rights norms and standards because countries are bound by their 
international obligations. It is this requirement to link local justice practices with international 
standards that continues to challenge the efforts to make rule of law reforms. For example, how 
can rule of law reformers integrate ‘international best practices’ in an environment where a 
majority of the targeted beneficiaries struggle to understand or identify with such reforms? It is 
                                                 
86 Aleu Akechak Jok et al., A Study of Customary Law in Contemporary Southern Sudan, 2004. See also Sally Engle, ‘From 
Law and Colonialism to Law and Globalization’, Law and Social Inquiry, vol. 28, 2, 2003, 569-573. 
87 Francis Deng, Customary Law in the Modern World: The Cross-Fire of Sudan’s War of Identities, Oxford: Routledge, 2010.  
88 Jennifer Widner, ‘Courts and Democracy in Post Conflict Transitions: A Social Scientist Perspective on the 
African Case’, American Journal of International Law, vol. 95, 2001, 64-66. 
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this reality that provides a compelling need to examine how rule of law reforms can enhance the 
effectiveness of local justice institutions without contravening international human rights 
standards that underpin these reforms.    
 
Earlier the discussion in the introductory chapter argued that reforms of judicial institutions 
must be examined in terms of their accessibility by the local population and how they respond to 
their needs and aspirations. More often international actors argue that ‘access to justice’ is closely 
linked to poverty reduction, contending that being poor and marginalized means being deprived 
of choices, opportunities, access to basic resources, and a voice in decision making. Indeed the 
UNDP argues that lack of access to justice limits the effectiveness of poverty reduction and 
democratic governance programmes by limiting participation, transparency and accountability.89 
But what these actors and especially the UNDP do not explain is the linkage of poverty and 
access to justice. What kind of justice are these actors promoting? The challenge is to create 
synergy between local institutions and international standards, and available evidence shows that 
local justice institutions have not been given necessary recognition and support as a vehicle to 
promote the rule of law. Without clear articulation of how international norms can be 
incorporated in local institutions to embody the values the local citizenry can identify with, rule 
of law reforms will continue to be an ‘elite driven’ enterprise with little impact on those for 
whose benefit these reforms are justified.    
 
The traditional justice mechanism in any post-conflict society constitutes an essential component 
of the rule of law and access to justice in particular. Often, during a long-running conflict local 
people devise and adhere to their own means of justice dispensation and general maintenance of 
law and order within their communities to enable them to coexist peacefully. Admittedly, these 
                                                 
89 Quoted in Michael J. Trebilcock and Ronald J. Daniels, note 71, 236. 
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informal mechanism may not necessarily conform to the ‘universal standards’ as recognized by 
international actors. This may be because traditional rules are in some cases unwritten and justice 
is administered by local chiefs who may lack legal training in important issues concerning human 
rights and constitutional law. However, despite these features, they are the same mechanisms 
which to a large extent enable members of a local polity to coexist side by side amicably and 
punish the wrongdoers in their midst in the absence of government authority to intervene. 
Indeed, traditional local justice institutions have been key in resolving land and property 
(especially cattle) disputes among people in Southern Sudan in the absence of formal judicial 
institutions. 
 
If one of the key attributes of the rule of law is knowledge of those likely to benefit from the law, 
how then can reformers expect to successfully build the rule of law in societies like Southern 
Sudan where a majority of people can hardly understand various legislation drafted and adopted 
in the English language which they cannot comprehend? Arguably, reforms can improve the 
effectiveness of traditional institutions if international actors acknowledge the important role of 
traditional institutions in the overall discourse of reforms. The profound challenge which must 
be addressed is that a society like Southern Sudan, though having undergone and experienced the 
tragic history of war for many decades, has managed to survive the war. With this reality, the 
objective of rule of law reforms should focus on how precisely such reforms can contribute to 
the improvement of traditional justice institutions which have served people for many years. 
 
The challenge with customary law is that its ability to dispense justice in fairness hinges on the 
willingness and ability of chiefs to apply it in a fair and impartial manner. But who determines 
that the law is not ‘repugnant to justice and morality?’ This question is relevant because ‘justice, 
morality or order’ as espoused by the colonial powers was a relative term subject to varied 
interpretation. For example, what constitutes ‘morality’ in the eyes of a British trained judge may 
304 
not seem the same to a local chief somewhere in Bor or Maridi in the interior region of Southern 
Sudan. It is worth noting too that most areas covered by customary law such as marriage, 
adultery, divorce, child custody and property rights have a great impact on enjoyment of 
international human rights standards. It is perhaps on this basis that international reformers have 
been critical of customary law and traditional justice institutions for their potential to inhibit the 
realization of the rule of law and human rights.  
 
Having identified the numerous challenges which may inhibit the effective implementation of 
constitutional provisions and the Local Government Act, one must ask, what can be done to 
address them? Admittedly, it is not possible to give all the local chiefs a formal legal education as 
a way of enhancing their understanding of formal constitutional law or human rights norms, 
considering the practical challenges facing Southern Sudan’s legal and economic sectors. 
However, there are comparisons of ‘best practices’ in other African countries that underwent 
similar challenges which can usefully be made. This comparison is made in the belief that 
customary law is a living law and as such it has to change with time to respond to the needs of 
the society concerned. Indeed many African countries have had to contend with the challenge of 
reconciling customary laws with modern laws and institutions. For example, in Tanzania primary 
courts, which are the equivalent of customary courts envisaged under the Local Government Act 
in Southern Sudan, use both tradition and statutory laws. While the assessors who sit in these 
courts are not trained in the formal legal system, they form an integral part of the decision 
making body under the presiding magistrate, who is required to have a certificate in formal legal 
training.90 Under this system assessors have a dual role. They operate as a safeguard for the rights 
                                                 
90 Luhekelo Kyando and Chris Maina Peter, ‘Lay People in the Administration of Criminal Justice: The Law and 
Practice in Tanzania’, African Journal of International and Comparative Law, vol. 5, 3, 1993, 661-682. See also Luhekelo 
Kyando and Chris Maina Peter, ‘The People's Representation in the Courts of Law in Tanzania: The Need to Retain 
the Assessors’, Commonwealth Law Bulletin, vol. 20, 1, 1994, 317-328. 
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of those accused of crime and also provide a guarantee to native population that their own 
customs and habits are not misunderstood.91 This ensures that decisions are reached by 
consensus and local ‘realities’ are taken into account when reaching a decision. In case of any 
disagreement between magistrates and assessors, on a point of law the former can prevail as long 
as he or she gives reasons. Similarly, in Zambia local court judges are appointed by the judicial 
service commission with both territorial and substantive jurisdiction. The former relates to the 
town or area of the chief`s authority and the latter to the monetary value or the sentence it may 
impose.92These courts may enforce customary law as long as they are not repugnant to or 
inconsistent with the constitution or other statutory law. This approach, if adopted, has a 
potential to contribute to legal service delivery in South Sudan also.  
 
Customary courts when operational will be more convenient than the formal courts, mainly 
because of their simple rules and the fact that they are cheap and accessible. In a place where the 
majority use informal justice mechanisms access to justice may become more practical than the 
current system, which heavily relies on formal procedures that are not only limited in scope and 
marred by technicalities but also expensive and ‘elite driven’.93 There is also a need to create a 
synergy between informal and formal justice institutions to coexist successfully and collectively 
serve the interests of the people. To realize this objective the traditional chiefs could serve as 
assessors in customary courts with the magistrates trained in formal justice administration. The 
advantage of this synergy would be two fold. It could allow traditional chiefs to get involved in 
the direct administration of justice using both formal and informal laws, and also enable the 
judiciary keep an oversight role on traditional justice institutions by letting people use their 
                                                 
91 Lord Atkin in Mahlikilili Dhalamini v R [1942], AC 583. 
92 Munyonzwe Hamalengwa, ‘The Legal System of Zambia: Law, Politics and Development in Historical 
Perspective’ in P. Ebow Bondzi-Simpson (ed.), The Law and Economic Development in the Third World, New York: 
Praeger Publishers, 1992, 26-28. 
93 Jennifer Widner, above note 88.  
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preferred means of dispute resolutions. This kind of arrangement could also mitigate 
miscarriages of justice resulting from improper interpretation of the law such as the Bill of 
Rights, which is an integral part of the Southern Sudan Constitution.    
 
In light of the prevailing conditions in South Sudan, it is clear that a state-centric justice system 
will take more than a generation to establish and even then will, most likely, be unsustainable.94 
Because of this reality international actors must devote their resources equally to strengthening 
local justice institutions as a mechanism to enhance the rule of law and advance human rights. 
With a myriad challenges facing the justice sector in South Sudan, it is highly counterproductive 
to assume that rule of law reforms will strengthen formal legal institutions to serve the interests 
of all South Sudanese. Ultimately the population, challenged by inadequate resources, extreme 
poverty, illiteracy and corrupt and inefficient central government, will look to what they know, 
use, and find consistent with their own values underpinned by traditional justice mechanisms for 
dispute resolution.95 
 
The need for the rule of law reforms to refocus on informal institutions is further confirmed by 
the fact that under-staffed and under-resourced formal justice institutions in South Sudan are 
hardly in a position to compete with highly resilient, locally legitimate, and resource independent 
informal community courts and modes of dispute resolution.96 However, the need to support 
informal institutions should not obscure the critical role of formal institutions in preservation 
and enhancement of the rule of law. Ultimately, the state-wide promotion of rule of law and the 
proliferation of inter-community exchange and communication which accompanies the 
                                                 
94 Bruce Baker and Eric Scheye, ‘Access to Justice in a Post Conflict State: Donor Supported Multi-dimensional 
Peacekeeping in Southern Sudan’, International Peacekeeping, vol. 16, 2, 2009, 171-185.  
95 Jennifer Widner, above note 88.  
96 Jennifer Widner, ibid., 64-66. 
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emergence of stronger national authorities require strengthening of the formal justice system as 
more and more cases involving parties from different cultural background emerge. With this 
recognition, it is useful for the two systems to collaborate to ensure that South Sudan’s legal 
sector protects and advances the interests of both its rural majority and ‘minority elites’ such as 
foreign investors and urban dwellers.    
 
D. Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was to challenge the prevailing assumption that building the rule of law 
can automatically lead to an independent judiciary or effective law and order institutions in South 
Sudan. Deciphering differing examples, the chapter has demonstrated that international actors 
take these assumptions as self-evident without linking the assumptions with the existing ‘reality’ 
on the ground. It has been argued that while international actors may indeed play a key role in 
enhancing the effectiveness of these institutions, especially in a post-conflict context, successful 
reform requires that these assumptions should reflect the practical needs of the beneficiaries. 
Taking into account the attributes of the rule of law discussed in the introductory chapter – such 
asa general predictable legal system, access to justice, equality before the law and general 
congruence of law with social values consistent with international human rights standards – this 
chapter has argued that external reformers should equally focus on informal justice institutions 
as a mechanism to enhance the legal service delivery.  
 
The importance of informal institutions in the South Sudanese context cannot be 
underestimated, mainly because more than 80% of the population resides in rural areas with little 
or no access to formal legal institutions. It is this reality which requires international actors to 
adopt a holistic approach to reforms which takes into account the challenges facing southern 
Sudanese polity. This approach will ensure that while rule of law reforms can indeed enhance the 
independence and effectiveness of formal institutions, they should be adapted to the challenges 
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facing South Sudan to enhance the effectiveness of informal institutions which continue to be 
relied upon by majority of the population for dispute settlement.   
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Chapter Seven 
VII. Conclusion 
A. Summary 
The objective of this thesis was to inquire into different meanings attributed to the rule of law, in 
order to establish what the concept signifies in the context of statebuilding, taking Southern 
Sudan as a case in point. By doing this, the study sought to contribute to the conceptual 
understanding and application of rule of law norms in the larger goal of statebuilding under a 
legal framework in which people have faith, to guarantee their rights and advance their collective 
wellbeing as a society. The research has critically unpacked the normative content of the rule of 
law by developing what the study terms as ‘minimum attributes of the rule of law’. It has been 
argued that for international actors to succeed in the reform process, they should pattern their 
efforts based on these attributes. The advantage of doing this will ensure that the success and 
impact of these reforms can be measured against clearly identified goals.  
 
The main assumption by those who promote rule of law (the UN and regional organizations 
among others) is that societies emerging from conflict face a host of challenges including 
inadequate or lack of institutional mechanisms to support rule of law development. And since 
these societies are incapable of undertaking these reforms on their own, they require external 
help. It is these claims that provided a basis for inquiry into whether these actors can transfer or 
export these values and institutions as conceived and understood in their respective societies. 
From this examination of the involvement of the UN and the African Union, it has been argued 
that, while indeed the rule of law can be useful in statebuilding to attain a state based on 
constitutional legal order, international actors have only marginally succeeded in positioning their 
assistance to reflect the needs of their target groups. In other words, they have failed to 
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recognize that while the rule of law has some attributes which can be considered universal, the 
means to realize these attributes differ from one society to another.  
 
B. Implications of minimum attributes for the rule of law 
Recognizing the ongoing variations in the way the rule of law concept is conceived by different 
scholars and practitioners, research has developed minimum attributes of the rule of law. It is 
hoped that developing these attributes will enable reformers to conceive and apply the concept 
on the basis of well-known benchmarks. The universal validity of these attributes is reflected in 
their consistency with the UN Charter, the international bill of rights, the Constitutive Act of the 
African Union and various international and regional human rights instruments. Hence the 
intrinsic value of these attributes lies in their ability to serve as a guideline for rule of law 
reformers and in the process address the current anarchy in the way the rule of law concept is 
conceived and applied. 
 
Some of the attributes identified include certainty, generality and stability of law and institutional 
conditions for an effective legal order necessary for protection of the rule of law, such as an 
independent judiciary and accountable government. I argued that focusing on these attributes 
will lessen the chances or possibilities of the rule of law being invoked to justify different 
activities or reforms such as international action against terrorism, which may have little or no 
correlation with the needs and aspirations of those in whose names these reforms are 
undertaken.  
 
The identification of the minimum attributes of the rule of law has further been necessitated by 
the reality that the rule of law is not a neutral concept. Rather it can be used by different actors 
to achieve independent objectives contrary to their claims of assisting post-conflict countries to 
build strong institutions and improve their social and economic conditions. For example, 
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whether it is the World Bank pushing for intellectual property law reforms or better tax regimes 
in poor countries, some Western powers using drones to fight Al Qaida in Afghanistan or piracy 
in Somalia, or an Irish or French NGO promoting literacy in Yambio in a remote part of 
Southern Sudan, all justify their respective activities in the name of the rule of law. It was to 
address this challenge of divergent conceptions of the rule of law that the study developed the 
minimum attributes in chapter one.  
 
The relevance of the minimum attributes further emanates from the reality that building the rule 
of law involves both an institutional approach and a values approach. While international actors 
can significantly contribute towards building strong institutions to support the rule of law, they 
cannot create a culture in which values underpinning these institutions are upheld and respected. 
The latter task can rather be undertaken by local actors who are likely to benefit from and live 
with the outcome of such reforms. Hence the need to enhance their capability through technical 
and financial support to fulfill this role. It is also important to note that while rule of law 
institutions may exist in different countries, this does not automatically lead to respect for the 
rule of law. Rather, the way these institutions uphold the values underpinned by the rule of law 
determines the respect for it. Citing different examples, the research has shown that even 
countries such as Zimbabwe or North Korea have well-built judicial institutions just like those in 
countries claiming to be rule of law compliant like Britain or the United States. The difference 
resides in how these institutions serve the interests of the people and uphold basic tenets of the 
rule of law.    
 
C. Challenges identified in the research 
The discussion has established several varied challenges that continue to have a negative impact 
on successful efforts to build the rule of law in Southern Sudan. The examination of these 
challenges has helped us understand major impediments to the realization of the rule of law both 
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at the national and international levels. The key challenge identified relates to the different 
understanding attributed to the rule of law by different actors. It has been shown that most 
actors continue to define the rule of law in a way that advances their primary interests. The 
implication of this is significant. It means that rule of law reforms tend to reflect not only a 
particular understanding advanced by a specific actor, but also that actor’s own interests.  
 
Citing the role of international financial institutions in rule of law reforms as an example, one of 
the findings was that these institutions support reforms related to their primary objectives. For 
example, both the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund direct their rule of law 
efforts towards measures that significantly contribute to enhancing conditions for a market 
economy and foreign investment. Similarly, powerful countries have been funding rule of law 
reforms which advance issues that are important to their national or regional interests, such as 
combating terrorism. While it is evident that these measures may fall under the rubric of the rule 
of law, the question posed was whether such activities reflect and address primary concerns and 
priorities of the target groups in whose names these activities are justified.  
 
The research has further shown that lack of local participation in building the rule of law remains 
one of the major hindrances to successful reforms in Southern Sudan. While a few organizations 
like the UNDP have made significant efforts to seek and incorporate opinions and views of local 
actors (at least senior governmental officials) in the overall conception and implementation of 
the rule of law programmes,1 this practice is not uniform among major actors involved in these 
reforms. The inherent danger of this approach is that reforms continue to reflect external rather 
than internal priorities. 
 
                                                 
1 The researcher attended one of the strategic meetings convened by the UNDP which involved senior officials of 
the Ministry of Legal Affairs to determine priority areas of reforms in Juba, in December 2008. 
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Inadequate participation by local actors in rule of law reforms is not only limited to the 
implementation of policies, it is also reflected in legislative process. While it is clear that laws are 
debated and passed by a country’s parliament, some laws are drafted by international experts 
assisted by a few local personnel appointed by the relevant departments. A closer look of the 
practice in Southern Sudan shows that these experts bring their own draft models of laws from 
other countries facing similar challenges and adapt them to reflect their current assignments.2 
However, the danger of this practice is clear. Even if countries face similar challenges and share a 
common legal heritage such reforms may not necessarily lead to similar results. This aspect is 
crucial because a common or shared legal history, modified by a multitude of different 
influences, may not necessarily produce similar outcomes in different locations.3Admittedly, as 
pointed out in chapter four, in some cases foreign models can be the best legal basis for other 
countries, especially in areas like commercial law or the taxation system – in fact it can 
discourage the concerned polity from ‘reinventing the wheel’. But the problem lies in the pursuit 
of law reform processes that generally do not permit the end beneficiaries to adapt the draft to 
local conditions, in the spirit of maintaining ‘international standards’.4 
 
Another key challenge identified is the inadequate capacity to translate legal text into concrete 
value. In the wider framework of access to justice, the law mandates the state to provide legal aid 
to those who cannot afford legal services. However, closer examination of the capacity of 
different departments shows that their efforts to achieve this objective are constrained by 
inadequate resources. For example, at the ministry’s headquarters where the department dealing 
                                                 
2 Interview with the senior officials in the Department of Legislative Drafting in the Ministry of Legal Affairs, 
December 2009. 
3 See generally Sandra Joireman, ‘Inherited Legal Systems and Effective Rule of Law: Africa and the Colonial 
Legacy’, Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 39, No. 4, 2001, 571-596.  
4 Wade Channell, ‘Lessons Not Learned about Legal Reform’ in Thomas Carothers (ed.), Promoting the Rule of Law 
Abroad: In Search of Knowledge, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace:, 2006, 140. 
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with legal aid is located there are fewer than five legal counsel for the task.5 At the state level 
government supported legal aid does not exist. In fact very few people are aware that they are 
entitled to free legal services provided by the government. What then is the implication of this 
aspect to the right to access justice enshrined in the Constitution? It is that some of those 
accused and convicted of crimes and offences are sent to jail without being offered legal 
assistance because few of them can afford private legal assistance which is neither adequate nor 
effective. The disconnect between the law and its implementation requires changes to the current 
approach to reform where external actors tend to concentrate on institutional reform without 
examining how such reforms impact the target groups. As argued throughout this discussion, it 
is critical that rule of law reform should be undertaken on a holistic basis by balancing 
institutional reforms and the way ultimate beneficiaries access them.  
 
The research has further pointed out that rule of law reforms do not provide sufficient focus on 
issues that may have significant impact on the majority and the poor in particular. However, 
some of the issues given less priority including access to land and house and property ownership 
more often constitute the main cause of conflict. Greater focus on such issues would serve two 
purposes. It would enhance protection of human rights, especially the right to property 
ownership, which has the potential to reduce conflicts emanating from land related disputes. It 
would also contribute to improved social economic rights for the people, through guaranteeing 
the right to undertaking productive economic activities such as farming and trade. Indeed this 
would not only empower citizens to own land but could significantly reduce the perennial 
tensions that stem from land ownership and have in most cases been a source of inter-tribal 
clashes in Southern Sudan.  
 
                                                 
5Visit to the Ministry, June 2009. 
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The causes of land and property ownership disputes in post-conflict societies are varied and 
interdependent. They range from increased demographic pressure, resource scarcity, agricultural 
transformation, and exploitation of valuable natural resources to tenure insecurity and 
inequalities in land and property distribution, in particular along ethnic and other cleavages, and 
intergenerational tensions over land ownership and use.6How can international actors address 
these challenges? It is argued that such support may include supporting the government to enact 
relevant legislation to address land and property issues. But crucially, it may involve building and 
strengthening both formal and informal legal institutions to effectively address existing and 
potential disputes and tensions related to property ownership.  This is needed because situations 
characterized by large scale displacement, abandoned land and property, illegal occupation, 
overlapping claims, reduced housing stock, lack of documentary evidence and gender 
discrimination in access to land and property assets are frequent and often create potential for 
renewed violence.7 
 
The existing disconnection between formal and informal legal institutions in Southern Sudan is 
another significant challenge discussed. The assumption of international actors is that informal 
legal institutions have the potential to contradict international human rights standards and 
perpetuate discrimination, especially against women and other vulnerable groups like children. 
However, the key question to pose is, how precisely did these societies resolve their disputes 
during the war in absence of functioning and effective formal legal institutions? This research has 
reiterated that it is through answering such questions that assumptions made by international 
actors can have correlation with practical needs of their target groups.  
 
                                                 
6 See generally, Agnes Hurwitz and Reyko Huang (eds), Civil War and the Rule of Law: Security, Development, Human 
Rights, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2008, 195. 
7 Hurwitz & Huang, ibid., 195. 
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For example, to address land and property ownership conflicts, it is evident that traditional 
dispute institutions can play a significant role, especially when the land is communally owned as 
it is in Southern Sudan. International actors should not direct their resources towards building 
and enhancing capacity of formal institutions only, but equally towards building and enhancing 
the role of traditional institutions in dispute resolution. While it has been acknowledged that 
enacting land legislation is not a panacea for successful rule of law reforms, such initiatives 
backed by strong institutions may provide an avenue where reforms contribute to address 
challenges identified.  
 
D. What is likely to condition the success or failure of the rule of law reforms? 
Having identified and discussed multifaceted challenges that continue to inhibit successful 
building of the rule of law at both the national and international levels, one must ask, what can 
be done to address these challenges? While it is evident that there are no uniform measures to 
address them because of their varying nature and context, there are specific measures that can be 
undertaken which could significantly enhance the impact of the rule of law reform at the national 
and international levels. Below, specific measures that could potentially contribute to this are 
examined.   
 
The discussion of the law and development movement has shown that the current rule of law 
reform efforts are essentially a continuation of the former, albeit in a different context and era. It 
is therefore crucial for reformers to identify and learn lessons from the law and development 
movement. The research has further pointed out in chapter six that one of the major factors 
inhibiting rule of law reform is the ‘top-down’ approach whereby reforms are conceived by 
international actors and imposed on the local polity. While it has been acknowledged that 
reformers often reaffirm through policy declarations and recommendations that local 
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participation should be central to these reforms, various examples have shown that this rhetoric 
has found little traction in the ‘real world’ where these actors work.8 
 
To address the challenge of local participation, it is suggested that reformers take deliberate 
measures to enhance vibrant civil society in Southern Sudan. The effectiveness of the latter can 
significantly contribute to enhancing of the rule of law through acting as an intermediary 
between the local people and decision makers in the government and amonginternational actors. 
This objective can be achieved through significant allocation of resources and provision of 
additional skills through training of members of civil society, especially women and those with 
disabilities, to ensure that they effectively advocate for issues of concern to these marginalized 
groups. It is further argued that while it is important to stick to international standards and best 
practices, this objective should not be achieved at the expense of legitimate aspirations of 
members of a local polity to pattern such reforms to their specific needs and challenges.   
 
The Local Government Act cited and discussed in chapter six is a starting point in the realization 
of this objective. However, success will significantly depend on how both the government and 
reformers incorporate these local institutions in the mainstream framework of reforms through 
adequate allocation of resources and continued capacity building of local officials who are key in 
the administration of justice and dispute settlement in the framework of these institutions.  
 
International cooperation will also be crucial for realization of the rule of law in South Sudan. 
The discussion in chapter five has shown that building the rule of law at the national level 
requires states to work together to address common challenges. Article 56 of the UN Charter 
reaffirms the imperative of this cooperation to enhance realization of the ideals of the Charter, 
                                                 
8 See generally discussion in chapter six 
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especially those related to human rights and peace and security. Similarly, the Vienna Declaration 
and Programme of Action acknowledges this aspect by encouraging states, working through the 
United Nations and bilaterally, to extend assistance to countries which so require to enhance the 
effectiveness of rule of law institutions. However, as shown in this discussion, this objective has 
been difficult to achieve largely because in most cases, states provide assistance when doing so 
directly or indirectly advances their interests. It is therefore essential that there should be a 
rethink of the international cooperation approach, ensuring that views and needs of the 
beneficiaries are taken into account in the development process.    
 
There is equally a strong need to improve service delivery in South Sudan as part of the rule of 
law reforms. This is because most of the rebel movements in Southern Sudan justified their 
actions on the grounds of the failure of the government to translate the ‘dividend of peace’ into 
concrete results.9 Effective rule of law reforms should encompass predictable and timely delivery 
of services to the citizens, because without effective institutions to deliver services, the 
confidence of citizens in the institutions of the state will be undermined, as it already has been in 
Southern Sudan. The capacity of institutions of justice administration such as the police, 
correctional services and the civil justice administration should be enhanced to deliver concrete 
services to the people as enshrined in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the 
Constitution. Outside the context of state institutions, rule of law reforms can significantly 
enhance the effectiveness of professional associations of lawyers, prosecutors and judges, 
academic and policy research institutions, paralegal organizations and advocacy organizations. It 
is therefore important for international actors to provide technical and material support to these 
institutions to contribute towards effective legal service delivery.  
 
                                                 
9 See generally Elizabeth Tesfaye Haile,South Sudan’s Post-Independence Challenges: Greed or Grievance? Available at 
http://www.monitor.upeace.org/innerpg.cfm?id_article=855. Accessed March 2013. 
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It has also been stated that in South Sudan rule of law reforms can contribute towards enhancing 
protection and improvement of the rights and conditions of the most vulnerable groups, 
especially women, the disabled, and children. A weak and sometimes non-existent legal 
framework perpetuates gender inequality in state institutions and discrimination in critical areas 
such as health, employment, political participation and property rights. All these factors limit 
women`s access to justice institutions and discourage them from reporting crimes committed 
against them. Yet it is evident that women play a key role in the social and economic 
development of their communities, and so state and international partners should take deliberate 
measures to empower them by eliminating major hurdles that inhibit the realization of their 
potential and actively facilitating their participation in the reform process.  
 
To uphold the international rule of law will further require strong international and regional 
dispute resolution mechanisms. These institutions are crucial because they allow states to settle 
their disputes peacefully. Indeed, under the UN Charter, the Security Council and the General 
Assembly have the ability to make use of these institutions like the International Court of Justice 
to seek Advisory Opinions. Commitment to this would ensure that actions undertaken by states 
or international organizations are in accordance with the United Nations Charter and hence 
grounded in international law. However, the discussion has noted that some of these institutions 
lack adequate enforcement capabilities for their decisions. For example, the ICJ does not have 
compulsory jurisdiction as states have discretion whether to refer a matter to the Court or not. It 
is suggested that states should resolve to recognize the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ on 
matters connected with the UN Charter. This argument is noted by Higgins who observes that 
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‘the absence of a compulsory recourse to the ICJ falls short of a recognizable ‘rule of law’ 
model’.10 
 
At the regional level institutions of dispute resolution either do not exist or, where they do, have 
been weak and ineffective. While it is clear that almost all regions such as Europe, Africa and 
Americas have in place regional mechanisms for dispute resolution and human rights protection, 
their ability to perform their functions differs. Because of this reality there is a compelling need 
for the international community to provide adequate support to some of these organizations that 
are weak and resource constrained, to enable them to contribute to advancement of the rule of 
law at the regional level. For example, the ineffectiveness of the African Commission for Human 
Rights and the African Court of Human and Peoples Rights continues to inhibit their ability to 
address serious violations of human rights on the continent. International support for the 
Commission and the Court would potentially enhance their institutional effectiveness. Having 
strong human rights institutions at the regional level can significantly contribute to realization of 
rule of law in South Sudan through addressing violations of human rights submitted to the Court 
and the Commission.  
 
E. Conclusion and way forward 
In conclusion, the research reiterates the finding in the introductory chapter where rule of law 
was identified as a concept whose realization is manifested both in the institutions built to 
underpin its existence and in the values or attributes of the law that form an integral part of these 
institutions. It has further been argued that while there continues to be varying invocation of the 
rule of law to justify actions and interests of powerful actors, the concept needs to be reclaimed. 
The legitimacy and credibility of building the rule of law will increasingly hinge on the extent to 
                                                 
10 Rosalynn Higgins, ‘The Rule of Law: Some Sceptical Thoughts’ Grotius Lecture at the British Institute of 
International and Comparative Law, October 2007.  
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which beneficiaries identify themselves with the reforms being undertaken under the banner of 
the rule of law.  
 
While the rule of law is desirable in any particular society, its realization is not dependent on a 
specific framework; rather each society may pursue this concept in way that best reflects its past 
history and shared international commitments. It is the latter aspect that elevates the rule of law 
to being an important component in international cooperation to address common challenges 
facing the international community. It is therefore pertinent to reaffirm the argument that while 
international actors are critical to provide assistance in rule of law reform in countries emerging 
from conflict like Southern Sudan, the success of these efforts will largely depend on how the 
hopes, expectations, needs and concerns of the local polity are taken into consideration to reflect 
both their past history and their commitment to international shared values underpinned by 
international law.  
 
This inquiry, while examining the role of the UN and the AU in building rule of law in Southern 
Sudan, did so within a specific time frame from 2005 to 2011. This period was chosen because 
of its significance in the constitutional development in Southern Sudan. It was the period which 
followed the signing of the CPA and saw the large scale involvement of international actors to 
build the rule of law. These efforts were examined during the period when Southern Sudan had 
complete autonomy from the North. While it was not the objective of the research to go beyond 
this period it is worthwhile to highlight the fact that in January 2011 Southern Sudanese 
exercised their right to self-determination by overwhelmingly voting for secession to form an 
independent state, which was officially proclaimed as the Republic of South Sudan in July 2011. 
Indeed, whenever issues with relevance to the post-independence period were discussed, 
attempts were made to situate them into South Sudan reflecting to the new name of the country.  
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While it is too early to evaluate whether rule of law reform efforts in Southern Sudan have been 
a success, an independent South Sudan faces many social, economic and political challenges. 
Insecurity, poverty, illiteracy, and poor or non-existent infrastructure remain major challenges 
confronting the country. The state is increasingly becoming autocratic, suppressing any voice of 
dissent and limiting the enjoyment of fundamental rights and freedoms of its people. The CPA 
on which its relationship with the Republic of Sudan is based remains shaky with both countries 
amassing military personnel along their common border. Furthermore, there are several issues in 
the CPA that remain unaddressed to date, such as the Abyei dispute, determination of the 
boundary between the two countries, citizenship, and division of national debt. All these issues 
have made it difficult for the two states to have a normal diplomatic relationship. Because of 
these challenges that face South Sudan, it is crucial that international actors involved in building 
the rule of law in the country reassess their approach to achieve their objectives. Successful 
efforts will call for sustained involvement of the local polity in undertaking reforms that 
adequately reflect these challenges.  
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